Dr Latinka Perović

Croatian MPs assassinated in the People’s Assembly: June 20, 1928

 

 

 

 

Case study 2

 

The first decade in the life of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians ended in bloodshed: on June 20, 1928 Radicals’ MP of the parliamentary majority Puriša Račić gunned down two MPs of the Croatian Peasant Party /HSS/ (Dr. Đuro Basariček and Pavle Radić), wounded two (Dr. Ivan Pernar and Josip Granđa), while the fifth, the party leader (Stjepan Radić) succumbed to his wounds a few days later. Four out of the five were in the leadership of HSS (the Croatian Republican Peasant Party till 1925) the indisputable political representative of the Croat people on the account of parliamentary seats won in all earlier elections. The consequences of the shooting were both immediate and far-reaching. The former became evident in almost no time: pseudo-parliamentarianism collapsed to be replaced by overt dictatorship of King Alexander (January 6, 1929). Reactions to the crime, especially by foreign press, hinted at the latter. By the way the crime was committed in – the way that must have humiliated the entire Croat nation – foreign commentators only logically predicted new tensions in the Kingdom.1

Historiographic writings in various centers of the Kindgom and, later on, of the Republic of Yugoslavia have not ignored the factographic side of the crime the scene of which was the People’s Assembly. And yet, Croatian authors were those who occupied themselves with it the most.2 Many of them were publishing integrally the transcripts taken at the People’s Assembly’s sessions discussing the crime as prime historical source.3 Some were explaining they were doing it “to venerate the memory of the victims.”4 True, no interpretation could replace the authenticity of the above-mentioned transcripts. But by quoting only, these historians were freeing themselves of the obligation to discern the motive from the long history of crime, from its essence.

The WWII when so much to what the Kindgom’s instable peace had paved the way to, subsequent rebuilding of Yugoslavia and the new order placed in the back seat not only the interest in the bloodshed in the People’s Assembly but in the Kindgom itself. However, conditions for the renewal of that interest were being created in 1960th and 1970th. Historical distance was there, and contemporaries of the events silenced by circumstances up to then were still alive. Many had written memoires while in emigration and began publishing them (V. Maček, I. Meštrović, S. Pribićević, M. Stojadinović, etc.). However, crucial was the renewal of “old” controversies, especially about the character of the common state, a deep-rooted controversy considering constant constitutional amendements. Feeling freer to research historians began turning their attention to the causality of the events from recent and not so recent past. And so the turn came to the bloodshed in the People’s Assembly: the incident that had lethally spurred “separatist currents, especially at the time of Yugoslavia’s occupation in 1941–1945.“ And so the context came under scrutiny. “Račić’s shooting, resulting from the unsettled controversies permeating the entire public sphere of old Yugoslavia at the time, was a culmination of political tensions and conflicts between the official centralism and oppositionist anti-centralism.”5

A study of the incident itself, detailed inansumuch as scrupulous, belongs to the period of grown interest in the bloodshed taking place in the People’s Assembly.6 It is the more so worthy as its author has found witnesses and gave them floor. The latter were very old, “with one foot in the grave,” and the historian was by far more interested in their reflections about complexities of Yugoslavia’s history and their causality than in details witnesses remembered. These reflections were not a fruit of some historical theory but of human desire for truth and justice knowledge can help to reach.7

The ideal way to come to historical explanation of the crime committed in the People’s Assembly on June 20, 1928 is comparable to exploring with a probe the insides of the entire state and society, the structure of their mentality and political culture; and the illegal sphere with its secret organizations such as King Alexander’s “White Hand” /Bela Ruka/ in the Army.8

Despite all the difficulties of exploration comparable to a probe, unmistakable dots remain in full view and, once connected into a single line, lead towards a relevant conclusion about the causes and consequences of the crime. It is a historian’s duty to draw that line. This is why quoting authentic historical sources such as transcripts taken in the People’s Assembly are not good enough.

St. Vitus Day Constitution declared; political tensions grow;
attempt at reaching compromise; the strategy changed

Declaration of the St. Vitus Day Constitution failed to relax the situation in the country. On the contrary, the gap between centralists and anti-centralists grew deeper and deeper. Stjepan Radić announced he recognized not the Constitution and not without a good reason. Four of Croatia’s parties formed the Croatian bloc that had the support of the majority of Croat population.

Soon after the Constitution was declared in Belgrade (August 10, 1921) King Peter I died. The Zagreb municipality refused to send a delegation to his funeral; and the government, therefore, dismissed its management. Stjepan Radić was elected the prefect in the elections that ensued – a testimony of HRSS’s repute not only in the countryside but in the city as well. And yet, the trench warfare was not over: the government sent its commissioner to Zagreb.

To draw Europe’s attention to the “Croatian question” the Croat bloc addressed a memorandum to the International Conference in Genoa.9 The entire Kingdom was in turmoil. In late 1922 the Radical Party formed the government. As early as in March that followed it called the elections for August 18, 1923. During the election campaign the Radical Party was settling accounts with the Democratic Party accusing the latter of its readiness to reach an agreement with Croats.

HRSS triumphed in the elections but continued boycotting the People’s Assembly. How to overcome the impasse? HRSS and the Democratic Party were trying to find a way out. Initiated by HRSS the talks with the Radicals were first held in Belgrade (in early April 1924) and then in Zagreb. They resulted in the Zagreb or Marko’s protocol10 that paved the way to the agreement. But the Radicals treated the document like they had the Corfu Declaration: that is no agreement at all, they claimed, but just a memo. In a public address (June 7, 1923) Pašić started distancing himself from it.

Embittered by Pašić’s disloyalty, Radić told the HRSS convention commemorating the anniversary of the French Revolution (July 14, 1924) that Croatia was a prisoner of “the Serbian Bastille.” Another of his statements was seen as an insult to the King and the Queen. The procedure for depriving him of MP immunity and putting to trial was launched. To avoid such a scenario and with a helping hand from his associates Radić went abroad undercover. From Vienna he made towards Paris and London advocating with European governments for the “Croatian question.” His mission failed: his interlocutors were only interested in stability of the Balkans and the East Mediterranean. In other words, they were concerned with the survival of the Kingdom of SHS at any price, including Serbia’s domination over smaller nations making it.

During his tour of Europe Radić was invited by Soviet Foreign Minister G.V. Chicherin to visit Moscow. Once there, he enrolled his party in the membership of the Peasant International, a part of the Third International (Komintern). At home, the news about it was seen as high treason.

A year later Radić returned to the country. He was arrested on January 5, 1925. He was charged with a crime punisheable with ten-year imprisonment and a ban on his party. And then, strategies were changed: both by anti-centralists and centralists.

Elections were called for February 8, 1925. HRSS won 67 seats, while Stjepan Radić triumphed in three electoral districts though from prison. And against the background of high tensions he decided to take yet another risky step that was subsequently labeled capitulation, a political maneuver or a new strategy. In the People’s Assembly (March 27, 1925) his nephew Pavle Radić, the HRSS politician people trusted the most, read out a statement by his party’s leadership – the statement that rounds off the period from 1918 to 1925.

Writings about the history of the Kingdom of SHS usually quote the passage of the statement that, at the time, turned the wheel of history:

“We acknowledge the overall political situation as it is today by the St. Vitus Day Constitution and with the Karađorđević dynasty at the throne.”11

However, the statement has many meanings. Pragmatic as it was, though not out of fear or in the attempt to have his leader released from prison, HRSS – or HSS – practically set the foundation for its activity in the times to come:

“We want to be politically equal, like Croats, Serbs and Slovenians are, being three equal brothers. If we make up the same people, we hear them saying, it makes no difference whether a Serb or a Croat is in some office, and then, when all the offices are occupied by Serbs, again we hear them saying, it’s all the same.

“If in this country, it’s not all the same to us. We do not want to be here quantité négligeable (the quantity that can be neglected). We want our share here, we want to be among the creators of this state…We want to be equal in decision-making since our people, thank Heaven, are politically too mature to be treated as second rate citizens or to have a status as such…”12

Recognizing the factual state of affairs – the St. Vitus Day Constitution – the statement quotes at the same time, “To amend these facts and the state of affairs our will and conscience cannot possibly approve of, the Constitution, the said popular agreement between Serbian, Croat and Slovenian peoples should be revised.”13

Was the Court really sure that it has finally subjugated Croats? It continued putting them to the test by appointing them ministers, Stjepan Radić included. As for Radić, he turned to the struggle against corruption the center of which was the Court. “The people in the King’s circle belong more behind the bars than in the Court.”14 With a policy as such Radić was finding an echo among the peasantry in Serbia and Macedonia. And that was threatening indeed; his activism triggered off the idea about his liquidation, the more so after he formed, with his once opponent Svetozar Pribićević, the Peasant Democratic Coalition.

Last elections before January 6 Dictatorship were held on September 11, 1927. The already quoted Dragoljub Jovanović compared the country to a mental asylum. And it was in 1928, at the time of Velja Vukićević’s premiership, that the idea about Radić’s liquidation – born in Serbia earlier15 - became “legitimate.” Vukićević, the secondary school teacher with no political authority and reputation, was King Alexander’s man. In his newspaper “Jedinstvo” /Unity/ he was openly calling for the murder of Stjepan Radić.

Assassination of Stjepan Radić and his associates prepared

Preparations for for the murder of Stjepan Radić and his associates in the People’s Assembly on June 20, 1928 (a precise gun was procured, Stjepan Radić himself prevented from attending a conference of the Interparliamentary Union so as to ensure his presence in Belgrade on June 20; and sessions of the parliament were chaired contrary to the relevant procedure Dr. Ninko Perić, the chair and law professor, must have been well aware of) have been examined in detail in Croatia’s historiography.16 This leads to the conclusion other historians share with their Croat colleagues that the assassination had been contracted and organized, executed impassively and in cold blood, while executioners felt safe. The executioners were known, the small circle of their accomplices, too. As for those who ordered it, all the leads pointed toward the Court – or to King Alexander. But like in all political murders demonstrative evidence was missing for the simple reason that such traces are never left behind.

The atmosphere creating psychological and political climate for the murder was examined in particular detail – the manner in which the public in Serbia had been prepared for all earlier political murders.17 The word already had it. People in many places were telling one another, “Radić is killed!” Then the very term murder became frequent. With his anti-Yugoslav editorial policy Milan Gavrilović, the editor-in-chief of the Politika daily, was brewing bad blood between Serbs and Croats. And “Jedinstvo,” the above-mentioned mouthpiece of Prime Minister Velja Vukićević, who was financing it from disposition funds under his control, was openly threatening the leaders of the Peasant Democratic Coalition Stjepan Radić and Svetozar Pribićević with murder.

The paper’s insolence was also to be ascribed to the trap the cabinet found itself in. The parliament had the Neptune Conventions with Italy on agenda. The Conventions were not in the country’s interests in Dalmatia, Croatian Coastland and islands. Croats were especially embittered by them. In Belgrade (May 31, 1928) people were protesting under the slogans, “Down with fascism!” “Down with Mussolini!” “Long live Dalmatia!” and “Long live the Yugoslav Rijeka!” Gendarmes intervened brutally hurting a number of citizens. The opposition called for a parliamentary debate on the incident and the cabinet’s resignation.

Two weeks before the bloodshed in the People’s Assembly (June 14, 1928) Vukićević’s paper run a story under a banner saying, “One can speak with swines only in their own language!” Its author announced, “Traitors’ and wicked persons’ heads will be chopped off if need be to have peace and order in the country and the parliament with authority.” And he also quoted a passage from a letter he wrote Col. Pavle Juzbašić (1922), “It is your paramount duty then to kill Svetozar Pribićević in Belgrade and Stjepan Radić in Zagreb.” The other side answered the fire. So, Radić’s paper “Narodni Val” /People’s Wave/ wrote (June 16, 1928), “Only Balkan bandits can write like this…”

Many Radicals’ MPs were also aware of the impeding catastrophe. Having been warned by them, Radić, only 22 hours before assassination, dictated by phone a story titled “Velja Vukićević’s Diabolic Plan” to be published in his Zagreb-based paper.

“A Radicals’ leader, MP and ex-minister told me by phone that Velja Vukićević was so furious that he would refrain from nothing. This also means that would stop at nothing to stay in power. And that’s why what his paper Jedinstvo published – that Radić and Pribićević should be killed – is not just a mere threat. Not a single situation so far has been so barbarious and so contrary to all the notions of political and parliamentary struggle as this one (emphasis by L.P.). And that’s why some Radicals’ leaders decided to publicly oppose all this in the parliament…”

Shots fired in the People’s Assembly

Having been promoted by the press and the rumor discrediting Radić, the idea about the murder had the front door to the parliament wide open to it. On the eve of the bloodshed (June 19, 1928) a group of 23 MPs led by Puniša Račić put forward the motion for having Stjepan Radić medically examined given that his actions “cause strong and justified doubts about his being a normal person.” They wanted, they explained, to avoid possible developments.18 And on the day of assassination MPs were telling each other, “Radić will be killed today.” Commenting on the ensuing parliamentary debates, many historians simply concluded that the Assembly resembled “a Balkan pub.” These debates were registered in detail the Assembly’s transcripts and in the then press. Even years later historians were impressed by their vehemence that overshadowed political essence. Harsh words were uttered in the name of a policy and, it could be said, in the name of an already criminalized whose promoters had been defending the interests of a camarilla while invoking the nation and its best interests. In any case, the atmosphere on the eve of the assassination was such that Radić’s associates and friends were trying to dissuading him from attending the session next day. He went, nevertheless, and silently listened to the debate. And it was his life that was at stake.

Addressing Croatian MPs, Radical from Kosovo Toma Popović said, “If your leader Stjepan Radić, an embarrassment to the Croatian nation, goes on with his insults, I can guarantee…that Serbia will not be to blame, that Serbs will not be to blame, but you, who have not been trained. It’s a shame to have you, as you are, in the People’s Assembly.” (The opposition goes on shouting, protesting and banging against benches.).19

Puniša Račić just waited for a reason why to act, and it came with a remark made by Dr. Ivan Premer he might have not – eyewitnesses are not quite sure about it – heard properly and even less understood. Before starting to shoot, he said from the rostrum:

“Ever since I’ve begun socializing, ever since I’ve become a man (laughter), I’ve never, not for a single moment, overlooked the interests of the Serbian people, the interests of my homeland.

“I declare before you all that Serbian interests – whenever guns and cannons are not firing – were not more engangered than today (clamor). And, gentlemen, when as a Serb and MP I see that my nation and my homeland are in jeopardy, I say loud and clear that I will use some other arms to protect the interests of Serbhood.

“Our country should have consolidated itself several years ago, our people should have profited from what they attained in the war with bravery (emphasis – L.P.) and fidelity to its allies, while, what’s worst of all, a part of our people was using slander to undermine consolidation and betray the interests of our people and this country of ours.”20

At this point, Dr. Ivan Perner interrupted him with a rather meaningless remark, “You have robbed beys.” Račić demanded his punishment from the chair of the People’s Assembly, or else “I will punish him myself,” he said. He threatened all MPs, “Whoever tries to intervene between me and Perner will be killed.” And he fired at Perner. The Chair of the People’s Assembly just said, “The session is being adjourned.” Stenographers noted down, “The session was adjourned at 11:20 a.m.”21 Here the transcript ends.

Puniša Račić went on firing his gun. Dr. Đuro Basariček was shot dead. Pavle Radić died in hospital. Josip Granđa who tried to protect him was wounded: he died on August 1928 in Zagreb. Historians have debated whether Puniša Račić was aiming carefully or shooting at random. Be it as it may, Stjepan Radić was his target.

On the basis of transcripts and reports by its journalists attending the session, the Politika daily dedicated almost an entire issue (June 21, 1928) to this “historical session.” And then went on for days to write about the crime. There were hints at the murder’s “insanity.” The paper ran a story about King Alexander visiting the wounded Radić in the hospital. Their conversation, according to the paper, was as follows: the King – “I came to see you.” Radić – “Thank you, thank you very much!” and then he kissed his hand. However, judging by the statement for the court he gave 14 days before he died, Radić told the truth as he saw it: “All in all, I am convinced that Puniša Račić was just an executioner of what had been planned and agreed on by a part of Radicals’ caucus, and probably with the knowledge and maybe the approval of parliamentary chair Dr. Ninko Perić and Prime Minister Velja Vukićević.“22 Radić’s statement led to Minister of the Court Dragomir Janković and its highest noblemen. Croatia was imbued with this feeling. Three hundred thousand people attended his funeral, and this mass attendance “had the significance of a strong, anti-Serb, anti-governmental and anti-regime manifestation.”23

After assassination: the hero left down and the murdered privileged

Having committed the murder, Puniša Račić passed through ministerial chambers onto the street exclaiming, “Long live Serbia, long live Greater Serbia!” His friend Dragomir Bojović, the accomplice, had been waiting for him in a car. Where he had stayed before giving himself up remains disputable: was it in some apartment or in a military facility. In the afternoon he went to see Minister of the Interior Anton Korošec. Refusing to receive him as he was not an executive officer, Korošec had him sent to the City Hall.

Puniša Račić was self-confident: he did not realize that he was nothing but an instrument of the crime. Belgrade-seated „Reč“/Word/paper described (June 23, 1928h) how first meeting with reporters, with him already in jail, looked like.

“A coached stopped… Puniša came out and nobody would say he looked like a murderer. Puniša stepped out, clean shaven, in brand new, lilac suit, with a new straw hat on his head and wearing brown shoes. Not a trace of anxiousness. When he saw photographers about to take his picture, he addressed them smiling, ‘Wait till I stand still and then take a shot.’ And he stepped at the first flight of stairs and looked into the camera peacefully and with a smile. Everyone was surprised by the murder’s looks, everybody having expected to see him brought in handcuffed.”

Račić felt assured that his mission had been grand. Why shouldn’t he when he had been supported by the circle closest to the Court, his party, the parliamentary chair and the Prime Minister? He was looking forward to recognition and glory. And then he turned out to be just a murderer under protection. His trial was a farce. Contrary to the law, the Minister of Justice appointed the investigative judge. This predetermined the course of the proceedings. This was why most of Belgrade’s lawyers refused to represent the defense. Stjepan Radić’s family and party boycotted the process. The attempt to engage some French lawyers failed. And it was the US charge d’affaires in Belgrade who poked a “probe” into the process – or in the mentality and political culture. He wrote in his report to the Secretary of State (June 15, 1929):

“To an observer from the West the way in which this trial is being handled is disgusting. Using a less harsh term would be hard indeed, since all the motions, from the beginning to the end, have been marked by deficiency of dignity for which the President of the court is responsible beyond any doubt, and which was often ridiculed and made a laughing-stock by both the accused and the audience of some twenty-odd lawyers and about the same number of reporters. So, when a Serb MP was describing jokingly how his colleagues (but not him) had rushed to hide themselves under benches the moment the shooting started, the audience was cheering openly at such inappropriate remarks.”

The American diplomat goes on, “It is sad to note that in a case like this one the murder himself, Račić, was pushy and manifested no remorse throught the trial, since he, shooting off his mouth, took up the role of a patriot attacked by rebellious elements who were allegedly after his personal honor. It is even sadder to note that several Serbian MPs and one ex-minister tried to justify the murder’s act by saying Račić had acted in self-defense…There can be no doubt that this inappropriate fun and frolic must have resounded like sacrilege to several millions of Croats who had looked upon Stjepan Radić, and ubiased observers have been left under general impression that effect of these unfortunate actions could not but be contrary to better understanding between Western and Eastern parts of this Kingdom…And still, this Embassy is not of the opinion that anyone else except for Račić himself is truly responsible for this gruesome murder, but there is also no doubt that the manner in which the trial was handled … strengthened the standing of anti-Serbian leaders in Croat masses…I am aftraid this trial will come down in history as one of most deplorable cause célèbre in the history.”

The above-mentioned report also quotes, “It is generally thought in Belgrade that Račić will not serve his entire sentence (20 years – L.P.) but could, in fact, be included in various amnesties the Crown has been proclaiming from time to time.”24 Such forecasts turned out to be basically correct – and actual developments even more favorable to Puniša Račić.

Out of the 20-year imprisonment, Račić spent twelve years in a villa near the Zabela prison in Požarevac. He had even moved his family to Požarevac. His wife was receiving 3,000 dinars from the Foreign Ministry’s disposition fund each month. He owned a coach of his own.

He was formally released during occupation and the quisling regime. He moved back to Belgrade. There are several versions of way his life ended. According to one, he went to a mill at the foot of the Mt. Avala. A partisan unit tracked him down and shot him dead.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 A French reporter, the eyewitness to the crime, wrote for „Le Quotidien“ (July 25, 1928):
“The well calculated murder was committed in cold blood and, indeed, with such skill and technique that in the eyes of criminals this unprecedented crime will be a masterpiece... impassive, resolute, taking careful shoots and holding his arm after each Račić fired off five times in sequence. He is pulling the trigger in such cold blood and precisely as if he was trying to break the record of Gastinne Renette. And it is this terrible composure of the assassin that imbues the scene with biggest horror.”
And German „Deutsche Tageszeitung“ run the following story (August 18, 1928):
„The death of Croatian leader Stjepan Radić that should have been taken for granted after his wounding deprived the Croatian opposition of a leader. It is to be assumed that the differences between the territories of pre-war Serbia and former Austro-Hungarian provinces will grow.“ Quoted in Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića, Zagreb, 1967, pp. 382, 285.

2 Ferdo Čulinović, Jugoslavija između dva rata, 1–2, Zagreb, 1961; Ibid., Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji, Zagreb, 1968; Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, 1–2, Zagreb, 1989; Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, Zagreb, 1999.

3 The session of the People’s Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians on June 20, 1928 in Belgrade; transcript, Belgrade, pp. 531–539; Ferdo Čulinović, „Krvoproliće u Skupštini“ in Jugoslavija između dva rata, I… pp. 524–531.

4 Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest… p. 83.

5 Ferdo Čulinović, Preface in Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića, Zagreb, 1967, p. V.

6 Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića…

7 Above all, this refers to Ilija Trbić (1881–1962), the well-known Tchetnik duke in Macedona and Radicals‘ MP. He supplied conspirators with the gun Puniša Račić used to shoot. However, that was just a coincidence: Trbić had not been one of them. As an MP he witnessed the shooting at Croat political leaders. Kulundžić describes him as a decent and rational person. The two were corresponding. In one of his letters to him (Oct. 20, 1962) Trbić wrote:
„It is high time to have the deplorable incident in the People’s Assembly on June 20, 1928 thoroughly investigated...It is on us to disclose this woeful happening from all sides. I am going to do it without any hesitation.“ And in the next letter he explains why he deems it necessary:
“The consequences (of the crime, L.P.) are so hard, and it must be investigated in whose interest it was to organize the murder since it actually resulted in NDH, Musolini’s creation, and in unprecedented massive slaughter of Serbs in the entire territory of NDH. It was during that massive slaughter of Serb that their murderers, Ustashi, were telling children about to be killed and people about to have their eyes pulled out, ‘This is to revenge Stjepan Radić.“. Vasilije Trbić (Oct. 10, 1961) in Moja sećanja na Stjepana Radića, na njegov politički rad i na ubistva hrvatskih poslanika u Narodnoj skupštini u Beogradu. See, Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića… pp. 273, 274, 276.

8 There is no country like Serbia in the Balkans that, along with political parties and the government, has so many clandestine groupings obstructing international control over governmental policies and acting in unusual, extreme and most terrorist ways,” wrote Virginio Gajda, Mussolini’s envoy, in 1930s. Jože Pirjevec, Jugoslavija… p. 50.

 

 

 

9 See, Jugoslavija 1918–1984. Zbirka dokumenata… pp. 197–198.

 

 

 

10 Ibid, pp. 199–200.

 

 

 

11 Ibid, pp. 204–207.

 

 

 

12 Ibid, pp. 204.

13 Ibid, p. 206.

14 Jože Pirjevec, Jugoslavija… p. 47.

15 At the meeting in Jagodina (October 30, 1928) convened by Nastas Petrović, Prof. Momčilo Ivanić, close to Stojan Protić, said, „Radić and Croats have been reproached for not wanting to come to Belgrade. However, as they were accusing Radić in such a way, they were doing all in their power to prevent him from coming. Way back (1922 – L.P.) Radić received death threats. I know about it and want now to say the truth so that everyone hears it at long last...But now that Radić lost his life in the People’s Assembly, just imagine how we, doing our best to have him in Belgrade, must feel.” Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića…p. 474.

 

 

 

16 Zvonimir Kulundžić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića…; Ferdo Čulinović, Preface, ibid.

17 I have written about this atmosphere in my writings about assassinations of Prince Mihailo Obrenović, King Alexander Aleksandar Obrenović and Premier Zoran Đinđić.

 

 

 

18 Ibid, p. 323.

 

 

 

19 Transcript of the regular session of the People’s Assembly of the Kingdom of SHS, June 20, 1928, Belgrade, p. 538.

 

 

 

20 Ibid, p. 539.

21 Ibid.

 

 

 

22 Zvonimir Kuludžnić, Atentat na Stjepana Radića… pp.383–394.

23 Jože Pirjevec, Jugoslavija… p. 47.

 

 

 

24 See, Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1978, p. 105–106.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l a t e s t   . . .

. . .   l a t e s t

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With the assistance of the Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the FR of Germany

 

 

 

 

 

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