Mrika Limani

The Albanians of Kosovo in Yugoslavia – the Struggle for Autonomy

 

 

 

 

Case study 2

 

In his memoirs, Fadil Hoxha recollects how terrible he felt when Milivoje Bajkić had yelled at him for writing the recruits’ names in Albanian while they were mobilizing men to fight for Yugoslavia’s final battles.1 Being slammed for using his mother tongue, he claimed, had made him aware of the unitarist tendencies that were becoming evident among the Serbs in Yugoslavia. This fear of unitarist approaches, a pejorative term meaning Serbian centrist tendencies, was prevalent among the internationalists, who opposed the formation of one nation from all the nations in Yugoslavia.2

Kosovo was incorporated into Yugoslavia rather than Albania because of the influence that the Serbian communists had, because of the indifference of Tito on this matter, and ultimately because of the inability of the Albanian Partisans to do anything about it. At a meeting in Belgrade in 1944, Fadil Hoxha recalls, Edvard Kardelj had transmitted Tito’s decision to the former, that it was perhaps best to leave Kosovo as part of Serbian territory to appease the Serbs, whose insurgence at such a time would cause a great deal of trouble.3 At one point, even the Montenegrin Marko Vujaćić had argued to Tito that the Dukagjini Plain (Metohija in Serbian) belonged to Montenegro, but Djilas had countered this argument by drawing attention to the fact that if the Dukagjini Plain were to be incorporated into Montenegro, thereafter the Montenegrins would become a minority in their own republic.4

The worst incidents after the Partisans secured control over Kosovo, were the events that occurred in Tivari, where 1,670 Albanian recruits were killed on their way to the Syrmian front.5 This contributed somewhat to fostering anti-communist sentiments in the rural regions of Kosovo, especially in Drenicë, from where the majority of recruits were drawn.By September 1945, the Serbian Parliament passed a law on the formation of two autonomous regions within the republic, namely Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija.6

The Party’s Agitprop (the Agitation Propaganda issued by adepartment at the Central Committee witht he same name)7 seemed barely successful in Kosovo, nor significantly so elsewhere.8 However, the emergence of schools in 1945 teaching in Albanian were welcomed - where books and teachers came from Albania proper–and this met with a positive response and represented a step forward in embracing the newly-formed government in Kosovo, an approach which had not been practized under the previous Yugoslav government.9 The calls to action were mostly led by local communist cadres, who had the charisma to go from village to village and convince the local peasants about the necessity and benefits of a united Yugoslavia. It is evident that there were no attempts at ideological indoctrination of the local populace, at least not until 1947.10 This rang especially true for Kosovo –indoctrination with Marxist-Leninist concepts was a rather strange thing for the local peasants who had not yet fully surpassed feudalism. However, economic and social differences existed between the semi-urban and rural groupsand this perhaps contributed to the fact that urban classes were more rapid in adopting Marxist-Leninist theses. In connection with this assertion, Ströhl eobserves that the prevalence of social disparities in socialist Yugoslavia among the rural and urban classes was noticeable even during the later decades of socialist Yugoslavia.11

After the establishment of the Federation, the State Security Department (OZNA) already began retaliating against “enemies of the people”. While initially formed to discover war crimes, it very swiftly transformed into the Party’s weapon to eliminate political enemies. While those groups that had been considered enemies during the war such as the Ustašas, Chetniks, active Germans, and šiptari,12 were eliminated to some extent, the latter remained a perennially stigmatized group within socialist Yugoslavia.

Having established political control, the communists sought to put into motion an economic revolution by 1947, aimed at changing Yugoslav society from an agrarian into an industrial society.13 However, due to extremely backward and stagnant development, the process lagged far behind in Kosovo – it finally occurred in 1957.14 The initial emergence of socialism and the formation of cooperatives were welcomed in Kosovo.15 They were considered the first step upthe ladder of economic development. The cooperatives eventually grew into small, modern factories.16 There were not that many families who owned large pieces of arable land, but those who did own land, certainly had to give it away to the state. And this was not necessarily a bad thing – indeed, it assured the instalment of socialism to some extent and a fairly equal distribution of goods. It made certain that the average peasant could be sustained without having to work the land of some landowner with minimal reparation. However, on a general scale, it became evident within the second half of the ‘40s that agricultural production was insufficient to sustain the general populace in Kosovo, an issue which most likely resulted from the inability to stimulate efficient production.17 This changed slightly for the better when modern agricultural technologies were introduced and with the introduction of land production based on self-management during the period from 1950 until 1952.18 The peasant resistance that erupted in Yugoslavia in 1954 pushed the government to oust the peasant workers’ unions as a form of collective ownership.19

The ideological monopoly which the Party, renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslaviain 1952, enjoyedelsewhere in public life20 translated poorly to the average Kosovar Albanian and the alienation that a great number of Albanians felt in relation to the Yugoslav state remained intact.

The emergence of Yugoslav socialism21 also brought to light the potential dichotomy of centralism versus federalism. Although these political inclinations were clearly evident on governmental levels, they took on a completely different nuance in Kosovo. The centralist approach of the Serbian republic, which aimed to expand its power and influence vis-à-vis other republics in the federation, was viewed as a continuity of Serbian oppression to Kosovar Albanians. This became increasingly evident in 1948, where Kosovo was seen as the proxy ideological battlefield between the Albanian Stalinists and the Yugoslav Communists. Ironically, Enver Hoxha accused Tito in 1948 of attempting to incorporate Albania in the Yugoslav Federation in a blatant attempt at imperialist colonization, at the height of the Stalin-Tito conflict.22

Admittedly, Albania sent spies to Kosovo, which conversely transformed the latter into the “most dangerous place in the country”.23 In the meantime, some Kosovo Albanians also left for Albania.24 In effect, this excused the state-organized usage of violence against Kosovar Albanians accused of treachery, in the form of forced imprisonment and beatings.25 Fear of a counter-revolution grew exponentially, thus legitimizing the actions of UDBA to raid Albanian homes for weapons – and those who didn’t have any weapons would be forced to buy them so that they could hand over something when requested.26 In the meantime, a secret trial was held in Prizren in July 1956, against nine people charged with engaging in espionage against Yugoslavia for Communist Albania.27 Their execution was followed by rising nationalistic irredentism, albeit latent.

In his memoirs, Fadil Hoxha says that this benefited OZNA28 and Serbia financially – because according to him “the weapons were being bought from Serbia to hand over to OZNA|”.29 Aleksandar Ranković played a major role in using state mechanisms to suppress the Albanians, which resulted in furthering local inter-ethnic grievances.30 He was of the opinion that the state security apparatus was a tool for destroying “internal and external reaction”.31 Therefore, it comes to no surprise that harsh action was taken against Albanians – they were considered foreign bodies within Yugoslavia who neither fitted naturally into a South Slavic state, nor made any significant attempts to adapt to it. It is highly likely that ethnic stigmatization contributed to the status they earned as a reactionary force against communism and the state.

Credible historical sources regarding this period and this issue, in particular, are scanty. However the action of arms requisition triggered another reaction -persecution and subsequently fear among the Albanians, a factor that might have influenced some of them to emigrate to Turkey.

The reconciliation with the Soviet Union in 1955 increased Yugoslavia’s importance in the international arena. However, relations with Albania remained bad. This resulted in further estranging Kosovar Albanians, and the ‘50s stand as a historical testimony to this inability to adapt. The issue of the national and ethnic identity of the Albanians in Kosovo re-emerged, equating them once again with the Turks. This resulted in about 50,000 Albanians emigrating to Turkey between the years 1953-1954.32 This wave of migrations was initiated after the Split agreement between Tito and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mehmet Fuat Köprülü.33 Granted, a number of Albanians spoke Turkish in their homes, a tradition thatsome Albanian families had absorbed from the Ottoman past and maintained it as an oriental remnant. What might have further contributed to this situation was the prohibition of Albanian schools throughout the existence of the First Yugoslavia.34

In his memoirs, Fadil Hoxha recalls his meeting with Aleksandar Ranković in an attempt to explain that identifying themselves as Turks was a cultural remnant rather than an actual ethnic appellation for the Albanians. He discussed it further to resolve this issue with Ranković, who thereafter agreed that Albanians should not leave Yugoslavia, but only Turks could do so.35 This evidently referred to the “free migrants” who were leaving for Turkey on a voluntary basis in accordance to Turkey’s Law on Settlement and who identified themselves as belonging to the Turkish ethnicity or identity, which in itself under the law was not a clearly defined concept. Turkish-speaking communities like the Bosniaks, Pomaks, Circassians, Albanians and Tatars had benefited from this law.36 However, the exclusion from key public positions and marginalization that Albanians faced in Yugoslavia certainly pushed them further into emigrating to Turkey. The reasons for emigrating were numerous and varied in nature – discrimination, persecution and lack of economic prosperity which resulted in social and cultural exclusion from Yugoslav society seemed to have been the major incentive behind these migrations.37 It is estimated that more than 80,000 emigrated to Turkey between 1953 and 1966.38

Adem Demaçi, a young Albanian man, had raised his voice against these resettlements, which he believed were attempts by the Serbian authorities to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians. He was imprisoned in 1958 and was released three years later. In a series of suppressive measures, as a sign of vigilance against what was assumed to be cradles of Albanian nationalism, the Albanology Institute was closed in 1955, having been established only two years prior.39 These oppressive actions also contributed to the growing irredentism amongst Albanians, who interpreted the closing of the Albanology Institute as a clear sign of national oppression against the development of Albanian consciousness.

After Adem Demaçi’s release, he founded the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of Albanians, a clandestine organization which, as the name suggests, promoted unification with Albania proper.40 In 1964, he was again put on trial as the leader of a pan-Albanian movement (the National Movement for the Annexation of Kosovo to Albania) and was sentenced to jail for 15 years.41 Adem Demaçi went on to become the symbol of Albanian national resistance.

The discontent of the Albanians was growing, and as a sign of resistance, some youngsters began to unfurl the Albanian national flag as a gesture of opposition towards the regime throughout 1956. This action was again followed by arrests and interrogation of the accused by UDBA.42

Although principally against irredentism, Albanian politicians continued their attempts to promote the wellbeing of Albanians within the federation. With the revisions of the Federal Constitution in 1963, Kosovo was given the status of an autonomous province, as opposed to an autonomous region.43 This was a positive development for Kosovo, much to the dismay of some Serbian authorities, who interpreted it as a sign that Serbia was losing dominance over Kosovo. Matters deteriorated further at the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, where Ranković was ousted, although this occurrence paved the way for advancement of the Kosovo case on a federal level. The meeting also set into motion the course of further federalizing the republics.44 Internal polarization was already evident in the ‘60s, but the meeting sent a clear signal to Serbian high-ranking officials.45

While the student demonstrations that erupted in Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere in Yugoslavia represented a rebellion against the ruling oligarchies46,the demonstrations that erupted in October and November of 1968 in towns throughout Kosovo were motivated by a slightly different agenda. The majority of the protesters who were Albanian students demanded a republic and an Albanian university.47 Although there were reprisals against the demonstrators, with one demonstrator even ending up dead and some 22 others who protested in Tetova being imprisoned, the effect of the demonstrations helped elevate the Kosovo case within the political echelons of Yugoslavia.48 Three years later, the University of Prishtina was established in 1971.49 For Hydajet Hyseni, who would later become a member of Grupi Revolucionar (Revolutionary Group) and a political prisoner, the demonstrations of 1968 influenced his national fervor.50

In the meantime, progressive steps were being taken to elevate the status of Albanians within the Yugoslav Federation. Albanian was acknowledged as an official language in 1971.51 The Congress for Unification of the Albanian Language was held in 1972 in Tirana, where Kosovar Albanian delegates were sent to participate at the meeting. The latter supported the application of a standardized Albanian language that would be used in Kosovo, which was mostly based on the Tosk dialect of Albanian.52 Acceptance of this standard signaled a national unification of Albanians, at least within linguistic margins. The final event that had an everlasting effect on the deterioration of Serbian-Albanian relations was the revisions to the Constitution in 1974, which confirmed the status of Kosovo as an autonomous province.53 This granted a vast amount of rights to Kosovo in terms of self-government, much to Serbia’s defiance.

Demanding a Republic of Kosovo

True to his fundamental communist beliefs, Miroslav Krleža was of the opinion that the right to self-determination, including secession as a manifest of rhetoric, is easily transformedinto nationalism and irredentism.54 As such, the national irredentism of Albanians in Kosovowithin the Yugoslav communist framework was ideologically a betrayal of the communist foundations of denouncing nationalism as a destructive force in the communist social system, and therefore was treated as a counter-revolutionary force that must be met with proper retaliation. However, in the greatdebate on the sustainability of Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic country, it is historically relevant to acknowledge the growing nationalism and irredentism that was being fostered and nurtured in the other republics as well, even if they were more latent in development. These were crucial impediments to Yugoslav integration.

The movements in themselves invited a further increase in national polarization and ultimately stimulated the antagonized parties who, by and large, rejected the overt centralism of the federation gravitating towards Serbia. While the destruction of Yugoslavia is a multi-faceted historical debate, to which one would not do justice in attempting to analyze it as anything else but a treatise when discussing Kosovo’s place in Yugoslavia, one must confine oneself to addressing the political role of the communist cadres and their counter-ideological colleagues in the historical developments that occurred in Kosovo during the last decade of Yugoslavia’s existence.

Central to this debate are the irredentist nationalist organizations, or clandestine groups, who arguably laid the foundations of a unified resistance against Serbian oppression in Kosovo. However, just like any other historical event, the political movements and the Albanian resistance were not linearly unified, where many ideological hurdles had to be overcome and numerous political alignments shifted to achieve independence from Serbia. In this historical discussion, it would be inaccurate and superficial to assume that Kosovo’s history in Yugoslavia was limited solely to a perpetual inter-ethnic feud, the Serbian vs. Albanian duel, and even further irreverent to adopt the humdrum “ancient hatreds” as the ubiquitous reason behind Albanian-Serb tumultuous relations.

Therefore I adopt Todorova’s negation that the bloody history of the Balkans begins within the geographical realm of Kosovo in 138955, an assertion which wrongfully asserts that socio-cultural groups are unchanging and eternal, hence the medieval hatreds deriving from fluid ethnic identities in the Balkan context stand immutable. To take a position on this issue seems to be imperative when discussing the role of Kosovo in the Yugoslav wars, whose geographical importance in the medieval context was invoked to stir up the masses.

In similar atavistic vein, it has been argued that the demonstrations of 1981 initiated a domino effect that exposed the brittleness of the federation. Meier is quick to repudiate this assertion by calling the attention to the “Croatian Spring” and the following spark of state repression in Croatia.56 This assertion is not intended to divert the reader from the importance and the effect that the 1981 demonstrations hadon the history of Yugoslavia’s demise, but rather to point out that tensions in Yugoslavia evidently predated the inter-ethnic feuds in Kosovo, and that the latter were not prevalent exclusively in Kosovo.

Nonetheless, it is also important to address the argument that national sentiments were not suppressed in Yugoslavia, but that they were merely utilized by national groups to regress entire social groups into previous feuds.57 While partially true, and perhaps more valid within the context of inter-ethnic hatred between the Slavic nationalities of Yugoslavia, to negate the existence of ethnic hostilities between the Serbs and Albanians prior to 1974 would simply be historically inaccurate. Frankly, the argument does not do justice to the discourse of Albanians in Yugoslavia – a surplus of historical evidence suggests that while national sentiments were utilized to incite specific political behaviors at certain periods, the inter-ethnic feud between the Serbs and Albanians was in many ways pervasive throughout Kosovo’s history in Yugoslavia.

This assertion is strongly supported by the evident persecution that Albanians faced when expressing irredentist, i.e. nationalistic, stances in the immediate examples after the creation of socialist Yugoslavia. Whether the intent was to persecute them solely on an ethnic basis or because nationalistic stances were incongruent with the reigning communist ideology is difficult to assert with certainty. One must note that the public statements and official approach of Serbian party officials in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s justified their actions precisely by calling on the latter, and then went on to install a police state in Kosovo. Perhaps in this case, the figure of Dobrica Ćosić provides an excellent example of how inter-ethnic antagonisms were shaped throughout the second half of the 20th century, even among the truest of communists.58

The student demonstrations of 1981 marked a turning-point in Kosovo’s history. The demand to elevate Kosovo’s status to a republic indicated that the Albanian masses had grown so great in numbers that they felt sufficiently comfortable in their right to demand such a position within Yugoslavia, an appeal which had been thought impossible only decades earlier. The factors leading to such a tumultuous situation are numerous and most likely complemented each other. The economic downfall of Kosovo, or rather its stagnation, had a great impact on the prosperity of Kosovo’s young people. The accumulation of tensions between ethnic groups furthered the overall grievances, and left both groups immensely polarized. The Serbs, on the one hand, anticipated the ramifications that a Kosovo comprised of an absolute majority of ethnic Albanians would bring – and the Albanians felt secure enough in their numerical strength that the time had come to raise their voice against what the majority of them considered to be centuries-long Serbian oppression.

While there were Albanians who were vehemently anti-Yugoslav in their conviction and furthermore demanded unification with Albania proper, a great number of Kosovar Albanians had submerged within the social and cultural threads of Yugoslavia, and remained at least fairly firm in their beliefs that Yugoslavia could prevail as a state provided that Kosovar Albanians would be recognized as a nation59 and given the rights they believed they deserved. The latter usually occupied public offices and were members of the League of Communists. While it might be easier in this discourse to employ absolute terms and proclaim a certain group anti-Albanian (or collaborators with the Yugoslavs) and deem the other groups devout nationalists who fought for the Albanian cause, as seems to be the current trend in Albanian historiography, the truth is that both groups fall somewhere in between. The existence of irredentist clandestine Albanian organizations who proclaimed themselves Marxist-Leninists60 provides a great example as to how these political identities were not clearly defined, and rather than portraying a division between ideological alignments among the Albanians, they best represent the historical development and ideological approaches which paved the way for a political consciousness of self-determination. Ultimately, it can be argued that both the left and the right were willing to fight for a common cause.61 The fusion of the Marxist-Leninist and nationalist groups occurred in 1993, when both groups were willing to set aside their ideological differences to fight for a common cause and participate in the Kosovo Liberation Army.62

The irredentist Albanian organizations63 operating during previous decades, had certainly left a mark on a growing national consciousness in the Albanians, and in many ways influenced forthcoming political developments by instilling and promoting nationalistic and anti-Yugoslav sentiments among the youth. At the same time, they serve as a great historical guide on how the Albanians’ struggle for independence began from modest demands to use Albanian as an official language, to use the national flag, from establishing the University of Prishtina, and lastly to demand independence. The illegal organizations represented a mainly latent ideological resistance against the Yugoslav establishment because their activity in itself was limited to an ideological one, especially so in the previous decades. While numerous scholars agree that this struggle was continuous – in a sense, it was – such conclusions might indicate that this struggle had been continuous, unified and unchanging since the establishment of the Yugoslav Federation, which it certainly wasn’t. While irredentist Albanian organizations were profoundly active during the ‘60s, a number of them ceased their activities during the ‘70s, only to regroup and ignite another wave of activities in the ‘80s. While most of these occurrences correspond directly to cultural, economic and social developments in Yugoslavia, it is the demonstrations of ’81 and the activity of the illegal organizations of the same decade that truly mark the social and cultural developments most specific to Kosovo. Although the party officials in Kosovo attempted to keep these movements under control, the cohesion gap between the Serbian authorities and the local Kosovar Party representatives resulting under circumstances of Kosovo’s autonomy64, aggravated the retaliation of the Serb authorities against the irredentist movements. Irredentists, who were labeled nationalists in Kosovo, were persecuted throughout Yugoslavia.65 By 1975 and onward, UDBA was arresting people indiscriminately, which in itself ignited reactionary rebellion.66

The riots of 1981 were particularly brutal. They initially erupted in Prishtina on the March 26 1981. That same evening, the then president of the League of Communists of Kosovo, spent hours with the students ensuring them that conditions wouldimprove at the university.67 However, in the upcoming months they spread to other cities such as Podujevë, Gjilan, Vushtrri, Lipjan etc.68

By April 6, a state of emergencywas declared in Kosovo.69 The police retaliated brutally, with as manyas 300people beingkilled during these demonstrations and some 1,000 others wounded.70 Almost 1,700 people were imprisoned and 154 awaited trial.71

In 1981, another nationalist Albanian organization was established, which was named Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo), founded by Hydajet Hyseni, Mehmet Hajrizi and Nezir Myrtaj.After its fusion with other clandestine organizations, the LPRK would play an indispensable role in forming the Kosovo Liberation Army. A similar organization, the irredentist organization “Lëvizja për Republikën Socialiste Shqiptare në Jugosllavi” (The Movement for a Socialist Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia) was formed in 1982,initially in Switzerland by Xhafer Shatri, and later in Kosovo by Gafurr Elshani and Shaban Shala.72 The Movement, which sought the elevation of Kosovo’s status to a republic within Yugoslavia, was accused of plotting unification with Albania proper.73 The activity of these groups intersected, yet they often merged into one group within a geographical region.74

Between the years 1981 and 1986, around 4,000 Albanians were imprisoned75, allegedlyfor being involved with irredentist nationalist organizations. By 1988, the number of those imprisoned had reached 584,373.76

This decade also marks the period when initial attempts to organizearmed resistance were being put into effect. Jusuf Gërvalla, Bardhosh Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka attempted to organize armed Albanian resistance based in Germany, but they were quickly uncovered by the Serbian police service in cooperation with the secret service in cooperation with the German police.77 They were killed in Germany in 1982.78 The Albanian diaspora becameincreasingly active for the national cause, forming clubs and societies that would later serve as a basis to financially support the Kosovo Liberation Army. By July 1983, around 55 illegal groups had been uncovered.79

Political alternations in the Communist League of Kosovo
and the revocation of autonomy

In a speech held at the Ninth Congress of the Union of Associations of the Veterans of the National Liberation War, Pavle Jovićević addressed the unrest in Kosovo. He referred to it as counter-revolutionary activity that was disrupting the brotherhood and unity of the people in Kosovo. He drew attention to the indoctrination of young Albanians with irredentist and nationalistic ideas. His closingremarks called on the ability of the socialists’ power to stabilize the situation in Kosovo.80

Undeniably, on an institutional level, efforts were made to keep the situation somewhat under control. The new wave of Albanian communists was hopeful abouttheir ability to maintain peace and stability without furthering inter-ethnic hatred.However, tensions were on the rise. The Albanians were no longer viewed as a group that belonged in Yugoslavia – the alienation the former had felt since Yugoslavia’s inception was acknowledged by Serbian public opinion. An article written by Zvonko Simić in July 1985 calledattention to the low numbers of Albanian participants in the National Liberation War.81 The intention was to argue that Albanians did not fight for Yugoslavia, and as such did not deserve to be part of it.

At the 14th Conference of Communists in Kosovo heldin April 1986, Azem Vllasi, who was previously the leader of the League of Communist Youth in Yugoslavia, succeeded Kolë Shiroka as provincial party chief. A month later, Sinan Hasani became President of the Collective Presidency.82 This political power that was given to the Albanians allowedthem some power in exercising their own authority in the province. Kosta Bulatović, a Serbian Kosovar, was arrested in April 1986 because the police found a copy of a petition that demanded constitutional changes to Kosovo’s status in order to stop the alleged terror of Albanians against Serbs, a text thathad previously been published in the press. It turned out that the police could not say on whose authority Bulatović was arrested –eventually it was understood that he was arrested on the orders of someone from Belgrade.83

It soonbecame evident to the Albanian communist leaders that tensions were being played on intentionally.84 However, as Clark noted, it was too late at this point for the Albanian communists to turn to the people – they already were far too antagonized.85 The released Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art of September 1986, which drew attention to alleged genocide against the Serbs, made the ultimate contribution to the worsening of inter-ethnic relations up to that point.86

The President of the Presidency of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić remained largelyhesitant in involving Serbian nationalism regardingnationalistic sentiments for Kosovo as a political tool to garner support and this was used against him and the other liberals by Slobodan Milošević in 1987, subsequently accusing them of having taken the soft option on Kosovo.87 Dragiša Pavlović, who had warned about what might happen in the event of Serbian agitation in Kosovo, was forced to resign.88 Shaping his political authority among the masses, in April 1987 Miloševič visited Fushë Kosovë (Kosovo Polje) where Serbian demonstrators were rallying against alleged oppression by the Albanians.89 In his speech, Miloševič referred to the situation in Kosovo as another exodus since medieval times of the European nation from Kosovo, alluding that Albanians were of oriental heritage.90 During the same period, a vicious media attack was being launched on Fadil Hoxha – at the time retired -who had been a leading Albanian politician during the demonstrations of 1968 and 1981. In effect, he was accused of having supported the development of nationalist and irredentist currents.91 The attack on first-wave communist politicians of the Second Yugoslavia came at a time when the Tito era was being portrayed as a period of oppression for the Serbs.

By December 1987, Milosević was still co-operating with Vllasi on a state level in what Vllasi assumed was an attempt to appease the tensions in Kosovo. However, it quickly became obvious that Milosević had no realistic expectation of solving the Kosovo problem through collaboration with the local Kosovo leadership.92

After annulling Vojvodina’s autonomy in 1988, Miloševič set his sights on Kosovo. In November 1988, the day the provincial party board was preparing to dismiss Kaqusha Jashari, who had replaced Vllasi in May and stood also for defending the status of Kosovo,93 3,000 miners from Trepça marched to Prishtina in a peaceful protest. They inspired others to join the march, which swelled to almost 300,000 people in total. Their requests were to retain Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province.94

After dismissing Jashari, Rrahman Morina, Hysamedin Azemi and Ali Shukriu replaced the former in party positions. The newly-appointed officials remained loyal to Milosevič and helped by appeasement in the process of revoking Kosovo’s autonomy.

In February 1989, revolting against the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, 1,300 miners went on strike in the mines of Stan Tërg. Three days later, Morina promised the miners that he would resign, which ended the strike. However, Morina did not deliver his resignation and the miners admitted that they had been duped.95 In the meantime, 215 Albanian intellectuals signed a petition,which they addressed to the Serbian Parliament, where they expressed their opposition tothese constitutional changes. A number of them were dismissed from their jobs or arrested thereafter.96 Those who were sent to the prison in Leskovac endured brutal torture by the Serbian police.97 By March 1989, Azem Vllasi, too,had beenarrested.98

The proposed revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy was approved in the Parliament of Kosovo, where 126 delegates were Albanian out of a total of 190. The session exerted extreme pressure on the Albanian delegates, with the voting being completed in a completelyerroneous manner. In what was superficially supposed to be a democratic session, in utterly illegitimate and staged settings, Serbia overruled Kosovo’s autonomy. The latter regressed to being under the complete authority of Serbia, which paved the way for further oppression and ultimately Serbia’s attempt to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians.

Mass protests were organized in various towns of Kosovo during early 1989, which met with harsh retaliation by the Serbian police. In Podujevë, the Albanian protesters used stones against the Serbian police, as well any hard object they could find, some also used firearms, and indeed one police commander was shot dead. Thereafter, the police began using dumdum bullets.99

Peaceful resistance and the emergence of an armed insurgency

In December 1989 the Democratic League of Kosova (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) was established, with Ibrahim Rugova as president. Rugova was a writer who had finished part of his education at the University of the Sorbonne – he was chosen as a president precisely because he was thought to embody the typical Western intellectual. The party would serve as the herald for leading political matters in Kosovo during the ‘90s. Their approach centered onpeaceful resistance – an objective which they hoped would ultimately garner international support for the Albanian issue. They also hoped that the domino effect of the fall of communist regimes would hit Yugoslavia before anything tragic happened.100 While there were other political parties that were operating during the period, the LDK amassed the most support from the people.101

Maliqi contends that during this critical moment between January and February 1990, the LDK had a major impact on the sudden change of pace from violent unrest to peaceful resistance.102 The peaceful resistance managed to deflect the riots, which would have most certainly been used as a casus belliby the Serbian military. Although the pacifist resistance was not embraced by the illegal organizations that were already in the early stages of preparing armed resistance – it did buy them sufficient time to prepare for the guerrilla warfare that was to fully erupt in 1998.

However, by 1989 the first armed group was formed by the LPRK in Llap.103 The group changed their name to LPK (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës) in 1991, the same year when the group wassetting up its headquarters in Zürich. At the same time, its members Xhavit Haliti, Xhavit Haziri, Ahmet Haxhiu met with the president of Albania at the time, Ramiz Alia.104 Ties with Albania proved to have been extremely important in the process of training recruits for the KLA and smuggling weapons.

By closing down the Kosovo parliament, on July 2,the Serbian authorities attempted to annihilate any legitimate Albanian authority within Yugoslavia’s framework. However, the 114 Albanian delegates held a session in the courtyard of the Assembly building, where they declared Kosovo’s independence.105 The Serbian parliament dissolved the Kosovo parliament, and on July 26, the former approved the Law on Labor Relations under Special Circumstances, which among other things, enabled the dismissal of workers at short notice.106 By 1991, more than half the Albanians were dismissed from their jobs.Thereafter, a police state was instituted in Kosovo.107

In September 1991, the Albanian delegates of the Kosovo parliament called for a referendum to declare Kosovo’s independence. 99.87% of the voters (constituting 87% of the electorate) voted for independence.108

By January 1992, Yugoslavia had already begun to disintegrate when the European Community recognized the secession by Croatia and Slovenia.109

The ‘90s also correspond with the establishment of an Albanian parallel system in Kosovo. This included state institutions as well as schools that operated within the framework of the self-declared independence. The emergence of Albanian schools within the parallel system had become imperative since 1989 when the Serbian authorities introduced ethnic-based segregation in schools – Serbian pupils were not to be taught in the same classes or according to the same schedules as Albanian pupils.110 The establishment of Albanian schools outside the Serbian curriculum also meant that teachers and professors operatedas units within the institutions of an independent Kosovo. This also bore a symbolic importance to Albanians because it embodied defiance against Serbian oppression. The academic staff and the students of the University of Prishtina were also banned from using the University’s property and were therefore forced to hold classes in private homes.

At the same time in 1993,serious preparations for armed resistance were set in motion in Kosovo. Aware of these developments, the Serbian police and military initiated attacks against people they suspected were involved in organizing the territorial defense of Kosovo.111 Between 1992 and 1995, around 135 attacks were organized against Yugoslav forces.112 The peaceful resistance did not give up its activity despite harsh retaliation from the Serbian police – a peaceful student demonstration was held in 1997 organized by the Students’ Union of the University of Prishtina (1997-1998)113 where police arrested the leaders of the Students’ Union and even the rector of the University of Prishtina at the time, Ejup Statovci.

 

 

 

In the meantime, armed resistance was gaining momentum. The Dayton Accords did not foresee Kosovo in the peace agreement – which left the Albanians disheartened. In such circumstances, the emergence of the KLA was not considered merely an alternative plan for promoting the Kosovo issue among international opinion, but rather the only force that could make any substantial change. Between the years 1994-1996, the clandestine LPK organization was training soldiers for the Kosovo Liberation Army and on the November 28, 1997, marking Albanian National FlagDay, the KLA made a public appearance at the funeral of Hasan Geci in Llaushë of Drenicë.114 The emergence of the KLA marked the beginning of a fully-fledged war betweenSerbian forces and the KLA in Kosovo.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, (Prishtinë, 2010), p. 259.

2 Dejan Jović (ed.), ‘The Kardelj Concept’, in ‘The Kardelj Concept’:, Yugoslavia (Purdue University Press, 2009) p. 54.

3 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, pp. 266–270.

4 Rilindja, 12.01.1988, p. 16.

5 Aleksandar Ranković addressed this issue at a Party session in May 1945, where he remarked that the incident was a mistake by the Partisans. Osnivacki Kongres KP Srbije (8-12 Maj 1945), (Institut za istoriju Radnickog Pokreta Srbije, 1972), p. 158. Source courtesy of Anna di Lellio. See also a survivor’s testimony http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SHABAN-PAJAZITI-ENG-REAL
FINAL_August-4.pdf. See also Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, (2000), p. 31. See also Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian : A History of Kosovo, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1998), p. 143.

6 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, (Europaverlag: Wien; Zurich, 1992), p. 57. Vojvodina was settled as an autonomous province and Kosovo as an autonomous area.

7 Fred Warner Neal, ‘The Communist Party in Yugoslavia’, The American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), p. 90.

8 Carol S. Lilly, ‘Problems of Persuasion: Communist Agitation and Propaganda in Post-War Yugoslavia, 1944-1948’, Slavic Review, 53 (1994), pp. 396–397.

9 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 310.

10 Carol S. Lilly, ‘Problems of Persuasion: Communist Agitation and Propaganda in Post-war Yugoslavia, 1944-1948’, p. 398.

11 Isabel Ströhle, ‘Of Social Inequalities in a Socialist society - The Creation of a Rural Underclass in Yugoslav Kosovo’, in Rory Archer, Paul Stubbs, and Igor Duda, eds.. Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism (2016).

12 Zdenko Radelić, ‘The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-party System’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds., Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition (Palgrave Macmillan UK: London, 2016) p. 24. In the revised constitution of 1968, the Albanian nation was recognized and the term ‘šiptar’ was replaced by ‘Albanian’. See Gorana Ognjenović, Nataša Mataušić, and Jasna Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds., Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory (Palgrave Macmillan US: New York, 2016) p. 24. The contemporary usage of the term “šiptar” is meant as a pejorative.

13 Holm Sundhaussen, Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolgestaaten 1943-2011: Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Gewöhnlichen, (2012), p. 142.

14 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 37.

15 Agrarian reform was introduced in 1945, where it was lauded that the “land belongs to whoever is working it”. See Ognjenović, Mataušić, and Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’, p. 29.

16 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 301.

17 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 305.

18 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to theFall of Milosevic., (2002), p. 5.

19 Ognjenović, Mataušić, and Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’, p. 13. See also John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York, 1996), p. 233.

20 Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, ‘Was Tito’s Yugoslavia totalitarian?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47 (June 2014), p. 238.

21 Which deemed it ‘self-managing socialism’ and ‘nonaligned’. See Zachary Irwin, ‘The Untold Stories of Yugoslavia and Nonalignment’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds., Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition (Palgrave Macmillan UK: London, 2016) p. 140.

22 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 58.

23 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 59.

24 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 321.

25 Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’, in ‘Një mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’, Përballje historiografike (Instituti Albanologjik - Prishtinë: Prishtinë, 2015) p. 113.

26 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 59. See also Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 37.

27 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, (1999),
p. 26.

28 By March 1946 OZNA was already reorganized, and the section responsible for civilian counter-intelligence was transformed into the Directorate for State Security (Uprava državne bezbjednosti, UDBA). See Zdenko Radelić, ‘The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-party System’, p. 18.

29 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 298.

30 Frederick F. Anscombe, ‘The Ottoman Empire in Recent International Politics-II: The Case of Kosovo’, The International History Review, 28 (2006), p. 760.

31 Zdenko Radelić, ‘The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-Party System’, p. 18.

 

 

 

32 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 297.

33 Nikolina Rajkovic, ‘The Post-Second World War Emigration of Yugoslav Muslims to Turkey (1953-1968)’, (Central European University), p. 63.

34 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian : A History of Kosovo, p. 103.

35 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 297.

36 Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Post-Second World War Emigration from Balkan Countries to Turkey’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 12 (April 1995), p. 61.

37 Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’, p. 114. Rozita Dimova, From past necessity to contemporary friction: Migration, class and ethnicity in Macedonia, (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology: Halle/Saale, 2007). See also Hajredin Hoxha, Arsyet, faktorët dhe pasojat e lëvizjeve demografike dhe migruese të popullsisë së Kosovës dhe të pjesëtarëve të popullsisë shqiptare në Jugosllavi, Përparimi, nr. 7, Prishtinë, 1976.

38 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 26. 100,,000 according to Emine Bakalli. See Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’, p. 114.

 

 

 

39 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 37.

 

 

 

40 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 38.

41 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 26.

42 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 38.

43 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 59.

44 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 63. See also Četvrti plenum Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, (Komunist, 1966), pp. 70–74.

45 Latinka Perović, ‘Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito—A Political and Intellectual Relationship’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds, Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory (Palgrave Macmillan US: New York, 2016) p. 115.

46 Hrvoje Klasić, ‘Tito’s 1968 Reinforcing Position’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds., Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition (Palgrave Macmillan UK: London, 2016) p. 168.

47 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 67.

48 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 39.

49 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die politische Geschichte des Kosovo’, in Dunja Melčić, ed., Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden, 1999) p. 128.

50 http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/Hydajet-Hyseni_ENG_Final.pdf, p. 8.

51 Ognjenović, Mataušić, and Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’, p. 22.

52 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 325. See also Robert C. Austin, ‘Greater Albania: The Albanian State and the Question of Kosovo, 1912-2001’, in John R. Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds., Ideologies and national identities the case of twentieth-century Southeastern Europe (Central European University Press, 2004) p. 239.

53 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 63.

54 Albert Bing, ‘Tito(ism) and National Self-Determination’, in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds., Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory (Palgrave Macmillan US: New York, 2016) p. 82.

 

 

 

55 Mariia Nikolaeva Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, (2009), p. 186.

56 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, pp. 16s–17. On a similar vein, Isa Blumi contends a similar approach in refuting the “powder keg effect” of Albanians in the Balkans, which had become the epitome of publicist work in regards to the Balkans. See Isa Blumi, ‘The Commodification of Otherness and the Ethnic Unit in the Balkans: How to Think about Albanians’, East European Politics and Societies, 12 (September 1998), p. 535. In refuting the “ancient-hatred” hypothesis see also Noel Malcolm, ‘What Ancient Hatreds?’, Foreign Affairs, 78 (1999), pp. 130–134., Arjan Hilaj, ‘The Albanian National Question and the Myth of Greater Albania’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 26 (July 2013), p. 397.

57 Dejan Jović, ‘The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches’, European Journal of Social Theory, 4 (2001), p. 104.

 

 

 

58 Latinka Perović, ‘Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito—A Political and Intellectual Relationship’. In regards to this issue see also Thomas Bremer, Serbiens Weg in den Krieg: Kollektive Erinnerung, nationale Formierung und ideologische Aufrüstung, (Berlin-Verl. Spitz: Berlin, 1998).

 

 

 

59 Then again, the concept of nation and nationality were never clearly defined in the constitutional system. In 1981 alone there were 1.7 million Albanians in Yugoslavia, 570,000 Montenegrins and 1.3 million Macedonians, however the first group was considered a nationality and the two last groups a nation. See Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, pp. 8–9.

60 For example Organizata Marksiste-Leniniste e Kosovës (the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova), established in 1969, which promoted the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo. See Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, (Instituti i Historisë - Prishtinë: Prishtinë, 2003), pp. 101–108. Similar to ‘Partia Komuniste Marksiste-Leniniste e shqiptarëve në Jugosllavi’ (The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia), who sought unification in one territorial unit of Albanian-inhabited lands in Yugoslavia. See Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, pp. 169–87.

61 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, (Onufri: Tiranë, 2013), p. 75.

62 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 92.

63 Nominally referred to as ‘illegal Albanian organizations’ in Albanian.

 

 

 

64 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milosevic.,
p. 12.

65 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 17.

66 http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/Hydajet-Hyseni_ENG_Final.pdf, p. 12.

67 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 78.

68 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, pp. 62–63.

69 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 22.

70 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 66. See also Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 42.

71 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale
në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave
ish-jugosllave, p. 64.

72 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 301.

73 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 151. The movement transformed several times, initially being named Zëri i Kosovës (The Voice of Kosovo), thereafter Fronti i Kuq (The Red Front), and lastly Fronti i Kuq Popullor (The People’s Red Front).

74 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 152.

75 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 32.

76 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 43.

 

 

 

77 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 75.

78 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 301. See also Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 43.

79 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 315.

 

 

 

80 Rajko Goranović, Deveti Kongres saveza udruženja boraca Narodno Oslobodolilačkog rata Jugoslavije, (Četvrti jul: Beograd, 1982), pp. 139–141.

81 NIN, 7.07.1985. The article also criticizes the Albanian publication series of the publishing house Rilindja, entitled Në flakën e revolucionit (At the hearth of revolution), with the first volume published in 1966. It claims the publication falsified the number of Albanian victims fallen during the National Liberation war.

82 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 35.

83 Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic: The Unfinished Trial, (2016), p. 50.

84 Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic: The Unfinished Trial, p. 50.

85 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 47.

86 Enver Hoxhaj, ‘Das Memorandum der Serbischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste und die Funktion politischer Mythologie im kosovarischen Konflikt’, Südosteuropa, 51 (2002), p. 6. See also Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic., p. 20. The Memorandum was contemporary with a petition signed by some two hundred Serbian intellectuals which called for attention to the supposed genocide committed against the Serbs in Kosovo specifically by Albanians, and which urged for ‘deep social and political changes’ to halt the genocide in Kosovo. See Branka Magaš, The destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, (New York : Verso: London, 1993), pp. 49–52.

87 Branka Magaš, The De struction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up 1980-92, pp. 109–110.

88 Viktor Meier, Yugoslvia: A History of its Demise, p. 38. The rift within the Party was more or less not centered solely on the manner of tackling the Kosovo issue. Magaš argues that the crisis was a result of conflicting ideas on how to deal with the economic crisis that had overtaken the country combined with the struggle of overcoming nationalist counter-revolution prevalent in the republics. See Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, p. 203.

89 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, p. 38.

90 Zekeria Cana, Apeli 215 i intelektualëve shqiptarë, (Rilindja: Prishtinë, 2001), p. 11.

91 Rilindja, 21.10.1987, p. 5., Rilindja, 9.12.1987, p. 5., Rilindja, 10.12.1987, p. 5. For the role of the media in inciting antagonistic stances amongst the masses in Yugoslavia see Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic., pp. 40–41.

92 Borba, 9.12.1987, p. 3. Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, p. 109.

93 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 29.

94 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 48.

95 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, pp. 112–114. See also Branka Magaš, The destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up 1980-92, p. 180.

96 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die politische Geschichte des Kosovo’, p. 129. See also Zekeria Cana, Apeli 215 i intelektualëve shqiptarë, p. 286. See also Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 118. See also Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Why the Peaceful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed’, in ‘Why the Peaceful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed’, After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States p. 45.

97 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, p. 118.

98 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic., p. 31.

99 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des Balkan, pp. 116–118. For the demonstrations of 1988, 1989 see also Blerim Shala, Kosovo - krv i suze, (Zalozba alternativnega tiska: Ljubljana, 1990).

 

 

 

100 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die politische Geschichte des Kosovo’,
p. 130.

101 UJDI (Udruženje za jugoslovensku demokratsku inicijativu), founded by Shkëlzen Maliqi and Veton Surroi in 1988 did not garner mass support in contrast to LDK. By the end of 1990, there was a pluralist system of political parties established in Kosovo.

102 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Why the Peaceful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed’, p. 45. Hajzer Hajzeraj who was accused by Serbian authorities for serving as Minister of Defense for Kosovo, later admitted that the LDK had issued an order to construct a territorial defense. See Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 65.

103 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 302.

104 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 303. Pettifer contends that Ramiz Alija was interested in styling the Kosovo Liberation Army along the lines of the Irish Republican Army. See James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 78.

105 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 31.

106 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 73.

107 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, pp. 74–81.

108 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, p. 82.

109 Bette Denich, ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide’, American Ethnologist, 21 (1994), p. 368.

110 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, pp. 95–98.

 

 

 

111 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 62. James. Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army : underground war to Balkan insurgency, 1948-2001, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2012), p. 90.

112 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 95. *Picture courtesy of Milot Caka and Rina Krasniqi

113 Howard Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo, p. 152. See
also Bujar Dugolli, 1 tetori i kthesës - Lëvizja studentore
1997-1999, (Universiteti i Prishtinës: Prishtinë, 2013).

 

 

 

114 James Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në një kryengritje të Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 127.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l a t e s t   . . .

. . .   l a t e s t

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With the assistance of the Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the FR of Germany

 

 

 

 

 

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