Case
study 5
Over twenty years
on, authors and scholars still
differ in their interpretations of
the mass violence committed against
Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) in the
1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Some argue, as I have
since the war’s end, that genocide
was a process which took place
throughout the conflict, starting in
1992 and culminating in Srebrenica
in 1995. This is a view shared by
scholars such as Marko Attila Hoare,
Adam Jones, Eric D. Weitz, Norman
Cigar, and Smail Čekić, among
others.2
Yet, according to
some, including Michael Mann and
Jacques Semelin, what Bosniaks
experienced was not genocide, but
was at most “ethnic cleansing.”3
Scholars who make this claim often
frame it within the context of
intent, perhaps even acknowledging
that Serb perpetrators engaged in
genocidal actions, but not that
those actions were matched by a
genocidal mindset. Michael Mann has
implied, for instance, that the
crimes of Radislav Krstić – who was
found guilty of genocide in
Srebrenica by judges at the
International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – were
somehow too incoherent to amount to
genocide. Mann referred to Krstić’s
actions as a “local genocidal
outburst, set amidst a broader
murderous cleansing of Muslims which
was too erratic and regionally
varied to be called genocide.”4
One hears more and
more about fake news,
anti-intellectualism, and a
post-fact world; and this
discussion, which now occupies
people globally, reflects how
Bosnians in Sarajevo have felt ever
since they engaged in wartime
arguments with international
visitors and journalists who, under
the pretense of “objectivity,”
offered the same treatment to those
blatantly spreading lies,
propaganda, and inciting ethnic
division as they did to those who
advocated for a united and
multinational Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
After all, Serbia
had openly invaded Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the spring of 1992
and had targeted the non-Serb
population – particularly Bosniaks,
but also Croats in some places as
well as Serbs who disagreed with
these actions. At the outset, armed
forces were coordinated by
leadership in Belgrade via the
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA),
Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense
units, militias based in Serbia, and
Bosnian Serb civilian authorities
headed by the Serb Democratic Party
(SDS). Warlords like Vojislav Šešelj
and Željko Ražnjatović (known as
Arkan) led militias that
participated in genocidal operations
which were harmonized with actions
of the JNA. By May 1992, some 14,000
JNA troops from Serbia and
Montenegro had been transferred into
a new force – the Army of Republika
Srpska – established under the
self-proclaimed Serb para-state in
Bosnia, which Belgrade continued to
finance and supply.5
The Serbian
aggression was recorded by
journalists, both domestic and
international, on a regular basis.
They showed the shelling of
civilians, the destruction of
mosques and other cultural
monuments, the aftermath of mass
killings, and testimonies of rape by
Bosnian Muslim women. Some of the
photojournalists who captured these
crimes on film received
international awards, and some of
the journalists who reported on them
won Pulitzer prizes; and yet these
images and stories did not compel
international political action.
Indeed, not even footage from
concentration camps near Prijedor,
run by Bosnian Serb authorities,
prompted the world to respond.
In Bosnia, we
wondered how the world could close
its eyes to this. These were real
concentration camps, with barbed
wire and starving civilians! Hadn’t
Europe and the Western world said
“Never again” after the Holocaust?
Bosnians had no weapons, and
couldn’t defend ourselves. “Why
won’t you intervene to stop the
genocide?” we pleaded.
“At least stop the
arms embargo!”
The deafness with
which these arguments were met in
mighty capitals around the globe and
in the UN Security Council was
evidence of how deeply embedded
certain narratives had become during
the conflict, and rather quickly.
The dominant narrative of
international policy makers was that
the mass violence occurring in
Bosnia was not genocide, but “ethnic
cleansing” linked to “ancient
hatreds.” By introducing the term
“ethnic cleansing” and insisting the
conflict in Bosnia was a civil war –
in which Serbia and its Bosnian Serb
collaborators were most responsible
for crimes yet “all other sides”
were also to blame –the UN and world
governments avoided having to comply
with the obligation of all parties
to the Genocide Convention to
intervene in cases of genocide. So,
even as genocide was broadcast in
cruelly vivid images on
international newscasts, the
international community felt freed
from any apparent culpability and
ignored the duty to prevent it.
In three and a
half years, the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina claimed approximately
100,000 lives.6 In 1993, the
establishment of the ICTY brought
temporary hope that justice meted
out by international criminal law
could make up for the mistakes of
international politics; but,
Bosnians were once again
disappointed. The cells of the
Tribunal remained empty for the
duration of the conflict, and
without indictees to try, judges
engaged in convoluted debates on
legal procedures that resulted in
unrealistically high standards for
proving genocidal intent. Meanwhile,
those committing genocide in Bosnia
carried on undisturbed, facing
victims who, thanks to the UN arms
embargo, were denied the right to
defend themselves.7 During the summer
of 1995, the scale and intensity of
the killing escalated to such a
degree that international actors
were compelled to intervene. In
July, the UN Safe Area of Srebrenica
was conquered by Serb forces, who
killed 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and
boys over just a couple of days, and
the failure of UN troops to protect
civilians there finally pushed the
international community toward
military action.
Yet, when peace
talks then resumed with renewed
determination on the part of Western
negotiators, the resulting plan –
the Dayton Peace Agreement – defied
all principles of justice. Territory
that had been acquired by genocide
was awarded to the Serbs who had
perpetrated it, some of whom had
already been indicted by the ICTY.
Indeed, at the negotiating table,
these crimes won Serbs half the
pre-war territory of Bosnia as well
as the freedom to transform the
self-invented Serb Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina into the
officially recognized entity known
as Republika Srpska. As Nena Tromp
has noted, Slobodan Milošević had
long sought to “transform de facto
military conquests into de jure
territorial gains, with the ultimate
goal that territories seized by
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia be
recognized in a peace settlement
mediated by the international
community.”8
It wasn’t until
the end of 1995, after NATO
intervention, that the term
“genocide” finally crossed the
threshold of international
political, journalistic, and
academic discourse on Bosnia, and
only in the context of events in
Srebrenica. Since then, both courts
in The Hague have also applied the
label of genocide to only the
massacre that occurred in Srebrenica
and, in one case, to killings that
took place just weeks later in Žepa,
describing all the crimes that took
place prior to this as ethnic
cleansing.9 There remains
surprisingly little scholarly
consensus on the definitions of both
genocide and ethnic cleansing, but
there are clear political and legal
motivations for use of one term or
the other given the obligation of
signatory states to the Genocide
Convention to respond to cases of
genocide. Practically, the terms are
associated with different degrees of
international accountability. And
so, controversy about the definition
of genocide has negatively impacted
both its prevention and war crimes
prosecutions in its aftermath.
Decisions from
international criminal law have
characterized genocidal intent as
something buried so deeply in the
mind of a perpetrator that it is
nearly impossible to prove; but
transcripts of parliamentary
proceedings, recorded telephone
intercepts, and other authenticated
evidentiary documents from the ICTY
show that genocide against Bosnian
Muslims was planned and implemented
by leaders like Slobodan Milošević,
Radovan Karadžić, and Ratko Mladić,
with the full knowledge and
participation of a wide circle of
Serb political, security sector, and
military actors. In these
documentary materials, the intent of
Serb elites to partially destroy
Bosnian Muslims as a group (the
definition of genocide put forth by
the Genocide Convention) is plainly
clear. General Mladić himself said
in May 1992 that without “a sieve to
sift” the non-Serbs out of Bosnia,
the only way to achieve Serb goals
“would be genocide.”10
Lacking a
standardized conceptualization of
genocide, the lens of “judicial
truth” should be just one through
which genocide researchers and
historians view any case of
genocide. In fact, without the
burden of a verdict, the rich
documentary sources that comprise a
trial record may be examined in a
new light, perhaps illuminating
undiscovered value. This was the
experience of former ICTY
investigator Nena Tromp, who worked
for years on the Slobodan Milošević
case. When Milošević died in his
cell at the ICTY in 2006, Tromp and
her colleagues were faced with the
question of what value a trial
record has when the trial itself has
no verdict; and Tromp sought the
answer by undertaking an exhaustive
study of the legal processes that
controlled the flow of evidence in
the case, the legal narratives that
emerged from the record, and the
transformative effects of the trial
in Serbian society. She concluded
that, “those of us with a
professional interest in
international criminal trials must
work on the basis that lawyers and
judges in international courts are
doing their best with the material
available to them; but we would be
wise to remind ourselves that,
sometimes, significant political
manipulations influence what
evidence is made available.”11 And
further, that “states simply cannot
be relied on to tell the truth or to
resist corrupting and interfering in
international legal processes.”12
What’s more,
judicial truth as determined in
verdicts often represents a
departure from sociological theories
that frame genocide as a process,
requiring time to plan, serious
organization to perpetrate, and
extensive participation on the part
of its executers. Ton Zwaan argues,
for instance, that genocide is never
an isolated event or a single act,
but “is more adequately
conceptualized as a process in space
and time: an interconnected series
of many different acts by a
considerable number of
interdependent people, acting
individually and in organized,
collective forms.”13 And evidence from
trial records reveals that those who
engage in this process are sometimes
surprisingly indiscreet; thus, a
focus on discerning the concealed
intent of individuals – which is
what much legal theory insists upon
– is often an exercise detached from
reality.
Indeed,
documentation presented below, some
of which reflects the rhetoric of
Bosnian Serb leadership from the
earliest days of the conflict, will
make it clear just how freely
leaders like Radovan Karadžić
discussed their intent to destroy
Bosnian Muslims. Nonetheless, in
March 2016, Karadžić was acquitted
on one count of genocide related to
crimes committed in municipalities
across Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1992. He was found guilty on another
count of genocide, for his role in
the Srebrenica massacre, and was
therefore determined to have had
genocidal intent in 1995; but the
Chamber was not satisfied that he
had acted with genocidal intent
earlier in the conflict.14
The Karadžić
Judgement, which prosecutors have
appealed, represented among the last
opportunities for judges at the ICTY
to broaden the legally-established
scope of genocide in Bosnia – beyond
Srebrenica and Žepa in geographic
terms, and reaching back to 1992 in
chronological terms. Yet, their
failure to do so must be
contextualized. After all, as Tromp
notes, “judgements…are formed in the
normative legal framework and in
rigid court procedures,” which
merely establish what she refers to
as “forensic truth.” She explains
that “the test for the introduction
of evidence in court is bound by a
strict forensic process…[and] the
product of this process – forensic
truth – is different from historical
truth in several ways. For one, a
historian is not bound by the same
forensic process in order to include
a source in a historical account and
may seek corroboration in a greater
variety of sources than are
admissible in a courtroom.”15 Genocide
researchers should therefore focus
less on judicial verdicts as
guideposts toward “truth” and
instead view trial records, in their
entirety, as sources of evidence
that must be evaluated and
corroborated using the full range of
tools available to historians.16
Though a
theoretical framework for the
analysis of genocide has not yet
been fully harmonized, one key
similarity seen across the work of
genocide scholars is an emphasis on
the role of states and on the idea
that genocide does not occur
accidentally or spontaneously.
Irving Horowitz wrote, for example,
that genocide must be “conducted
with the approval of, if not direct
intervention by, the state
apparatus.”17 Some more recent works
have also highlighted the role of
non-state actors in perpetrating
mass crimes; and scholars such as
Christian Gerlach suggest that
researchers should bring a greater
focus to the agendas of these
non-state actors, who have an
increasingly significant influence
on global levels of participatory
violence.18 This approach is wise,
too, because it accounts for the
tendency among state authorities to
obscure their own involvement in
genocide and frame it as
uncontrolled violence carried out by
“rogue” non-state actors.
Spurring a
population to participate in the
extermination of “others,” or even
to look the other way and accept the
genocidal actions of the state
without resistance, requires the
psychological preparation of
citizens. Thus, one of the main
tasks of a state in implementing a
genocidal plan is to dehumanize the
victim group. To this end,
nationalist ideology – which serves
as a powerful motivator for social
crisis – can support the realization
of such a plan. Horowitz pointed to
nationalism as one of the primary
means by which states gain approval
for genocide, noting that it
highlights who belongs and who does
not, and also dehumanizes those who
do not.19
Raphael Lemkin’s
interpretation that genocide is not
only about killing, but about social
and cultural destruction as well, is
also important to appreciate. As
Martin Shaw has emphasized, genocide
involves “batteries of coercive
powers – legal, administrative,
political, ideological and economic,
as well as armed, violent and
military. Defining genocide by
killings misses the social aims that
lie behind it.”20 Indeed, viewing mass
crimes committed in Bosnia during
the 1992-1995 war exclusively in
terms of lives lost misses the
point. Marko Hoare has highlighted
the logical inconsistencies that
extend from the assumption that
genocide is defined purely by scope
noting that “although Srebrenica has
come to dominate the outside world’s
memory of the Bosnian genocide, it
was actually the smaller of the
three principal instances of mass
killing during the war: the first
being the initial Serb genocidal
assault across Bosnia-Herzegovina in
1992 – more Bosniaks from Podrinje
alone were killed in that year than
in 1995 – and the second being the
Sarajevo siege.”21
The erroneous
distinction made by many scholars
between crimes in Srebrenica, in
which large numbers of people were
killed quickly, and those carried
out earlier in the Drina River basin
or over time in Sarajevo and
Prijedor raises questions as to how
the dimensions of these crimes are
weighed. Can the label of genocide
really be applied only to mass
murder carried out on a swift
timeline? And when people are killed
over time, tens and hundreds every
day for over three years – as they
were in Sarajevo – is this not
genocide, too? Focusing solely or
mostly on the scope and density of
killing can divert researchers from
analyzing the deeper social aims of
genocidal plans; in this case, the
objectives of Serbian state
authorities and Bosnian Serb
leadership. And yet, to understand
the genocide in Bosnia, it is
crucial to understand the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the
expansionist ideology of key Serb
actors.
In late 1989,
profound changes within the European
political environment significantly
impacted the destiny of Yugoslavia.
In both Croatia and Slovenia,
Communist leadership chose to hold
multiparty elections, and in the
spring of 1990, Communist slates in
both republics lost. In Slovenia,
the liberal-nationalist coalition,
which advocated sovereignty and
economic independence for the
republic, swept into power behind
former Communist leader Milan Kučan.
In Croatia, the opposition led by
Franjo Tuđman won a convincing
victory. Despite serious political
attempts on the part of Slovenia and
Croatia, as well as Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia, to
transform Yugoslavia into a
confederation, Serbia resisted. And
so, after referendums on
independence, leaders in both
Slovenia and Croatia declared the
secession of their republics from
the SFRY in June 1991.
Slovenia’s exit
from the Federation was met with
only minimal military opposition;
but in Croatia, the JNA openly took
up Milošević’s cause to create a
Greater Serbia.22 By late 1991, it was
clear that the Yugoslav People’s
Army was acting in the specific
interests of Serbs and Montenegrins.
As the year came to an end, the
Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina voted to follow
Slovenia and Croatia, and apply for
independence.
By then, Karadžić
had already openly and ominously
alluded to the violence that would
come. Several months earlier, in a
dramatic Parliament session that
stretched through the night of
October 14th and into the morning of
October 15th, Muslim and Croat
parliamentarians – supported by the
Left bloc, made up of former
communists who remained loyal to
Bosnia – had passed a resolution
demanding sovereignty for Bosnia.
Serb nationalists began leaving
before the voting even started; but
the proceedings received wide
television coverage, and before he
departed Parliament, Karadžić
warned: “This road is the same
highway of hell and suffering which
Slovenia and Croatia took. Do not
think that you will not take Bosnia
and Herzegovina to hell, and maybe
[cause the] disappearance of the
Muslim people, because the Muslim
people cannot defend themselves if
war breaks out here.”23
Political leaders
of Serbs in Bosnia equated a
declaration of independence with an
inevitable partition of the state,
forcing Bosnian leadership to choose
between being absorbed into
Milošević's Greater Serbia or
confronting a Serbian aggression. By
the fall of 1991, a plan that was
developed to homogenize both Serb
people and Serb-claimed territories
in Croatia was also implemented by
Serb leaders in Bosnia: A separate
Bosnian Serb Assembly was formed and
a process of “regionalization”
undertaken, by which a Bosnian Serb
para-state would be organized via
Serb Autonomous Oblasts (SAOs).24 The
formation of SAOs in Bosnia had
begun in September 1991, then
intensified in mid-October, before
an early November plebiscite in
which Bosnian Serbs voted to remain
in Yugoslavia. A decision rendered
by the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb
Assembly on November 21, 1991
declared that all municipalities in
which Serbs had voted – even where
they were a minority – were an
integral part of a now-rump
Yugoslavia, and Serb municipal
bodies were established throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina in these
places.25
In late December
1991, following the Bosnian
Presidency vote to apply for
independence, Bosnian Serb
leadership approved secret
instructions meant to prepare these
municipal bodies for war.26 There were
two versions – Version “A” for
municipalities in which Serbs were
the majority and Version “B” for
municipalities in which Serbs were a
minority – outlining everything from
the creation of duty rosters, to the
establishment of crisis
headquarters, to the designation of
municipal-level Serb assemblies.27
These activities were a continuation
of clandestine preparations that had
started as early as August of that
year, when Karadžić had issued
guidelines that Bosnian Serb
municipal and regional committees
work in secret to insure that Serbs
were organized to react quickly to
calls for mobilization.28 Across
Bosnia and Herzegovina, such
preparations were concealed from
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
in the months prior to the start of
war.
Crisis
headquarters were established as
early as February of 1992, upon
implementation of “Level Two” of the
instructions, and were given orders
to cooperate with JNA leadership.29
Evidence from the ICTY reveals a
high degree of “interoperability of
Yugoslav, Serbian, Bosnian Serb, and
Croatian Serb forces.”30 It also shows
that municipal headquarters across
Bosnia were in direct communication
not only with the Bosnian Serb
Assembly, but also with Radovan
Karadžić and his closest associates
Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana
Plavsić.31
On February 28,
1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly
proclaimed the Constitution of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The first draft
described a Serb state that also
included non-Serbs; but by late
1992, this had been amended, and the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was envisioned as a
state of Serbs only. Dr. James Gow
testified at the ICTY that this
change was “a reflection of the de
facto reality on the ground, which
is that the overwhelming majority of
the non-Serb population… [had been
in] one way or another removed from
that territory.” Asked by the
Prosecutor if the Bosnian Serb
Constitution could itself be seen as
“one of the foundations” for a
policy of ethnic cleansing, Gow
affirmed that it was “certainly part
of that program of activity.”32
The “program of
activity” to which Gow referred
extended back to a mysterious plan
known simply as “RAM” (meaning “the
frame”), which existed from at least
early 1991 and outlined a Serb
strategy for maintaining a rump
Yugoslavia by letting Slovenia go
and conquering certain territories
in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. According to witnesses
at the ICTY, RAM originated among
top circles of Serbs within the
Yugoslav counterintelligence
service.33 In its initial stages, the
plan involved the development of a
network of secret operatives whose
aim was to arm Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia, in preparation for war.
Milan Babić, the former president of
the self-proclaimed Republic of
Serbian Krajina (in Croatia), also
testified about the existence of
such a plan, describing Karadžić’s
objectives to expel Bosnian Muslims
to the river valleys and connect all
Serb territories in Bosnia as a part
of it.34 Babić claimed that Milošević
had told him not to “stand in
Radovan’s way” and had instructed
both he and Karadžić to publicly
maintain their loyalty to
Yugoslavia, rather than to Serbia,
in order to conceal their true aim
to create a Greater Serbia.35
Full-blown war
began in Bosnia on April 6, 1992 –
the day the international community
recognized Bosnian independence. As
Serb forces and JNA artillery began
shelling the outskirts of Sarajevo,
residents gathered outside the
Parliament building and naively
applauded as JNA tanks passed by.
They failed to comprehend yet that
the JNA had become a de facto Serb
army. Those Serb forces would hold
the city in a monstrous siege for
three-and-a-half years, during which
11,541 people – many of them
children – lost their lives. The
siege of Sarajevo dominated
international discourse surrounding
the conflict in Bosnia, largely
because it was the focus of so much
global media coverage. The presence
there of international journalists,
who rarely travelled into the rest
of occupied Bosnia, brought
disproportionate attention to events
in Sarajevo and drew it away from
the genocide that had already begun
elsewhere in the country. As Gow put
it, “Sarajevo became a celebrity
city – known everywhere for its
predicament.”36
Between March and
May 1992, assorted Serb forces had
launched coordinated attacks,
securing main entry points into
Bosnia and taking over major
communication lines to establish
logistical corridors. In Eastern and
Northwestern Bosnia, the pattern of
these early attacks illustrates the
coordination and preparation of the
Serb forces involved: Bosanski Brod
on March 27th, Bijeljina on April
2nd, Kupres on April 4th, Foča and
Zvornik on April 8th, Višegrad on
April 13th, Bosanski Šamac on April
17th, Vlasenica on April 18th, and
Brčko and Prijedor on April 30th. As
Gow explained, these operations
“established a frame around the
periphery of the country, within
which the reminder of the campaign
was conducted.”37 This was the frame
for which the RAM plan had been
named.
Bosnian government
forces had neither heavy artillery
nor an organized army, and Serb
forces faced little to no resistance
in those springtime offensives.
Indeed, by early May, Serbs
controlled large parts of Bosnian
territory.38 Occupations of cities and
villages throughout Bosnia were not
only directed toward seizing
territory, but were meant to instill
a fear in citizens that would
“purify” demographics in the
long-term. By expelling and
exterminating non-Serbs, and
destroying their cultural and
religious monuments, the aim was to
ensure that any non-Serbs who
survived would never return to the
territories they inhabited before
the war.
On May 12, 1992,
with the aggression well underway,
Radovan Karadžić outlined Six
Strategic Goals for Serbs in Bosnia,
which Bob Donia asserts “served as a
guide for [Bosnian Serb leadership]
for the next four years.” They were
to: 1) separate Serbs from the other
two national (ethnic) communities;
2) establish a corridor between
Semberija (in the northeast) and
Krajina (in the northwest); 3)
establish a Drina Valley corridor
and eliminate the Drina River as a
border between Serb states; 4)
establish a border on the Una and
Neretva rivers (practically
encompassing Bosnia); 5) divide
Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim
parts; and 6) ensure access to the
sea for the Serb Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.39 By the time these
goals were announced, some had
already been achieved; and others,
Bosnian Serb leaders realized, could
not be attained without genocide. At
one session of the Bosnian Serb
Assembly, Ratko Mladić explained
that, because people “are not pawns
nor are they keys in one’s pocket
that can be shifted from here to
there,” the plan envisaged by Serb
political leaders could not be put
into practice without the forced
elimination of Bosnian Muslims.40 If
they had not already grasped the
likely consequences of following
through on the objectives laid out
by Karadžić, Serb military and
political leaders couldn’t help but
be aware of them after Mladić spoke;
for he actually said the word
genocide.41
Still, General
Mladić didn’t raise the issue of
genocide because he sought to
formulate less genocidal objectives
for Serbs in Bosnia, but because he
sought to educate Assembly members
about how to represent Serb
operations to international actors:
We mustn’t say that we are going to
destroy Sarajevo…. We are not going
to say that we are going to destroy
the power supply pylons or turn off
the water supply, but…well, one day
there is no water at all in
Sarajevo…. We have to wisely tell
the world, it was they who were
shooting, hit the transmission line
and the power went off, they were
shooting at the water supply
facilities…[and] we are doing our
best to repair this, that is what
diplomacy is.42
From the very
beginning of the conflict, Mladić
realized that by misrepresenting
reality and publicly denying
responsibility for crimes, Serbs
could prevent or deter military
intervention by the international
community. What’s more, Bosnian Serb
leaders seemed to believe that their
expansionist aims had the tacit
approval of European governments.
Over time, Karadžić made a number of
statements to the Bosnian Serb
Assembly that indicated he felt
Europe had given him the green light
for genocide; telling the Assembly
in the summer of 1992, for example,
that Europe did “not want any kind
of Islamic state in the Balkans,”
and that “this conflict was incited
so that the Muslims would not
exist.”43
The use of
genocidal rhetoric became almost
common in the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
with municipal leaders boasting
competitively about the role they
had played in expelling or killing
Muslims.44 And delegates objected to
the fact that peace negotiations
could result in Muslim refugees
returning to their prewar homes,
complaining, for instance, that they
would “have to compensate for
everything we destroyed and burned,
and the seventeen mosques that we
flattened.”45 By late in the war,
Bosnian Serb leaders talked brazenly
about genocide in Assembly sessions.
In October 1995 – just months after
the massacre in Srebrenica and with
a peace plan yet to be finalized –
Karadžić not only admitted that he
“stood behind plans for Žepa and
Srebrenica” and had “personally
looked over [them],” but said that
he had instructed General Krstić to
“proclaim the fall of Srebrenica,
and after that…chase the Turks
through the woods. I approved that
radical mission, and I feel no
remorse.”46
This ‘radical
mission’ to which Karadžić
acknowledged he had given approval
resulted in genocide; and yet no
delegates in the Assembly asked
questions, demanded accountability,
or raised concerns that grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention
may have occurred. Their failure to
prevent genocide makes them
accomplices and co-conspirators. But
world leaders were also largely
inert or inadequate in their
response; and just how far
culpability for genocide extends
remains an open question for
genocide scholars, who ascribe
varying degrees of responsibility to
international actors – for their
inaction, obstructionism, or even
outright bias in handling the Bosnia
crisis. Did these leaders look the
other way as genocide was
perpetrated and call it “ethnic
cleansing” in order to avoid their
duty to respond? Did some of them do
so, as Serb leaders suggested,
because they feared the creation of
an “Islamic state” within European
borders?47
These questions
and others continue to cast a shadow
over post-war Bosnia, which exists
in a state of uneasy peace that is,
ironically, challenged and strained
by the framework of the very
agreement that brought an end to the
war in the first place.
Domestically, it is impossible for
almost any issue to escape
examination through an ethnic lens;
and internationally, Bosnia plays
what feels like an endless game of
currying favor with Western leaders
to hopefully achieve Euro-Atlantic
integration, aware that even then,
it will always be seen by many
continental partners as not quite
European enough. This invalidating
sense of otherness is felt by
Bosnians, and especially perhaps by
Bosnian Muslims; and it is for this
reason that many had such strong
reactions to the verdict in the 2007
genocide case that Bosnia brought
against Serbia at the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The Court
did confirm that genocide took place
in Srebrenica and found Republika
Srpska leaders responsible for it,
but it did not view RS institutions
as “state organs” acting on behalf
of Serbia, and thus found Serbia
culpable only for a failure to
prevent genocide.48
Yet, the ICJ
judges admitted they had decided the
case with insufficient evidence
after documents from the Serbian
Supreme Defense Council were
withheld from the Court due to a
deal struck between the Serbian
government and the ICTY for
submission of those documents to the
Tribunal in the Milošević case. This
negotiation robbed Bosnians of one
of their last chances to hold Serbia
accountable for genocide in the
international legal realm, leading
many to feel even more disheartened
about an already fleeting sense of
post-war justice. But in Serbia, the
verdict was interpreted as
incontestable proof that Serbia had
no involvement in the genocide in
Bosnia, and even many “liberal”
Serbians joined the chorus of denial
that has marked Serbian discourse
from that point on.
In the ten years
since, Bosnia has faced many more
immediate issues, such as extreme
unemployment and the rising
influence of opportunistic foreign
powers; but if the ICJ case had
slipped to the back of Bosnians’
minds, it rose to consciousness
again in February 2017, when – just
days before the 10-year deadline – a
lawyer from Sarajevo who worked on
the original lawsuit filed a request
to revise the 2007 judgement, at the
behest of the Bosniak member of the
tripartite Bosnian Presidency. The
Court, which had already requested
that the lawyer in question be
re-appointed in order to act as a
valid representative of the Bosnian
government, responded by contacting
all three members of the Presidency
for approval.49 What ensued was itself
remarkably illustrative of the
dysfunction of the Dayton structured
Bosnian government, which split
along ethnic lines – with the Croat
and Serb representatives (the latter
of which chaired the Presidency at
the time) refusing to approve the
request. Lacking consensus from the
members of the Presidency, the ICJ
determined that no decision had been
made “by the competent authorities,
on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina
as a State,” and therefore rejected
the request.50 Once again, justice for
Bosnians fell victim to politics.
One might say that
any case before the ICJ is bound to
be political, but courts must
nonetheless make decisions on legal
bases, and renowned human rights
lawyer David Sheffer – who wrote the
request for revision in this case –
expressed deep disappointment with
the Court’s determination, calling
the explanation of the ICJ Registrar
and President “shallow exercises
that fail to explain the legal
reasoning of their conclusions.”51 He
challenged the Court’s assertion
that the lawyer who filed the
request did not have the authority
to do so, and said the issue “should
have been considered more carefully
and transparently.” Ultimately, he
chided the Court for failing to take
the opportunity to examine the
totality of evidence that amassed
from trials at the ICTY, “only a
fraction of [which] were before the
ICJ in 2007.”52
Bosnia and
Bosnians have had a number of
champions like Sheffer over the
years, but those of us who lived
through the war have long had the
sense that the trauma and genocide
we experienced – the suffering we
know took place – is rarely
acknowledged by the world, or is
downplayed. Indeed, I have even had
genocide scholars question why it is
so important to me that the word
“genocide” be applied to crimes in
Bosnia. It is important because it
is the truth of what happened,
because lives were stolen, and
because an ethos of multiculturalism
was destroyed by an ethos of
exclusivism. And, it is important
because, if we are ever to find a
way to prevent genocide, it will
never be through dismissal or
denial. |