Case
study
1
The Muslim Bosniak
population of Bosnia-Hercegovina was
in a state of ferment on the eve of
Yugoslavia’s entry into World War
II. The Cvetkovic-Macek ‘Sporazum’
(agreement) of 26 August 1939 had
dealt a heavy blow to the
traditional Muslim goal of autonomy
for Bosnia-Hercegovina, by
effectively partitioning the latter
between Serbia and a newly
established Croatian ‘banovina’
(province). This prompted the
mainstream Muslim political elite to
come together in the ‘Muslim
Movement for the Autonomy of
Bosnia-Hercegovina’, which demanded
that a Bosnian banovina be
established alongside the Croatian -
a demand that was launched by Dzafer
Kulenović, the president of the
‘Yugoslav Muslim Organisation’ (JMO)
- the political party enjoying the
support of the overwhelming majority
of Bosnian Muslims. This movement
brought together different political
currents among the Muslims. Not
least, this included formerly
‘pro-Serbian’ Muslims who had
subscribed to the strategy of
collaborating with the regime in
Belgrade; a strategy that had been
followed by the JMO leader Mehmed
Spaho until his death in June 1939,
but which had been completely
discredited by the Sporazum, when
the Belgrade regime sacrificed the
Muslims to reach an agreement with
the Croatian opposition. On the
other hand, the small dissident
‘pro-Croatian’ Muslim current that
had traditionally rejected
collaboration with the Belgrade
regime and that formed the ‘Muslim
Branch of the Croat Peasant Party’
(MOHSS) now found itself paralysed
by its adherence to a Croatian
national movement that had turned
its back on support for Bosnian
unity.
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