Case
study 7
Popper’s
observations1 about common tendencies
of the policies of contemporary
totalitarianisms as illustrative of
a closed society are almost
completely applicable to the culture
in Serbia from mid-1980s till the
late 1990s: and that is to prevent
any outside influence that could
jeopardize the rigidity of
collective taboos, anti-humanism
standing against all egalitarian,
democratic and individualistic
initiatives, anti-universalism and
particularism in the service of the
partition between “us” and “others”
that dams introduction of
universalistic tendencies. In the
cultures prone to closing themselves
up or have already been established
as such the idea of totality is
usually seen as something
embarrassing and superfluous as a
potential of an open and different,
changing and mobile world, which –
such as it is – unavoidably bans the
category of “other” as hostile.
Hence, all closed cultures that
stand against multicultural
dialogues are exactly the reverse of
a model of a good society as
considered in contemporary
sociologist theory: a society
unbounded by the territory of a
nation-state and unlimited to just
one institutional dimension of
modernity, and with a well-balanced
relation between individual and
collective ethics.2 The more so,
every closed culture will be
standing, unavoidably and always,
against the world (surroundings)
with ongoing process of modernity
conducing to, among other things,
global, intercultural communication
that creates a world without
unwelcome “others” and based on
planetary and imperatively
continuous dialogue between
cultures.
Closed societies
and closed cultures are, as rule,
afraid of contacts with other
cultures, are blocked in time, space
and history.3 As closed societies are
basically static, any pluralism
(ethical, aesthetic or existential)
and any critical thinking are alien
to them. What conserves their
closeness and enables it in the
first place is an absolute,
axiomatic conclusion, mostly
simplified and banalized (un untrue
as such) that is being dogmatically
recognized as true per se by the
majority – by the superfluous and
legislative collective. In closed
societies, whatever is true is
always functional and efficient in
the sense of preservation of
closeness, and always in a
collective, impersonal, conventional
and general form. The principle of
closeness, the fear of unknown, the
tendency towards everything
generally recognized and uniform in
theory and practice, the dam to
critical thinking in the name of
ready-made solutions and patterns as
guardians of collective identity
make up every cultural system prone
to produce and promote stereotypical
perceptions that – in this context
and as a rule – tendentiously and
stigmatizingly choke perceptions and
articulations, and are, as such,
built in the very foundations of
value systems as new mechanisms of
“valuation” and “reconsideration”
(Đerić, 2005).4 In closed societies,
political, religious, national and
cultural contexts always have a
common ideological prefix.
Ideological matrixes, in this sense,
could be defined as some semantic
substrate, mutually adjusted and
compatible sets of views, value
guidelines and commitments, and
stereotypical formations as sets of
stereotypical notions joined
together by the principle of
semantic and expressive closeness.
Stereotypical formation (especially
national stereotypes) could be
formalized as narratives exposed in
various areas of social and cultural
life (in science, educational
system, literature, arts, the media,
etc.). In other words, stereotypical
formations joined together
thematically and functionally, make
up the tissue of ideological
matrixes.
And these
stereotypical formations built in
ideological matrixes make up
nucleuses of manipulative
strategies, always value-based,
rigid and unchangeable,
instrumentalized in political and
(or) national contexts – and used as
such in cultures of closed
societies.
The closed society
model – especially in transitional
countries – permanently challenges
their cultures. Given that a
clear-cut ideological concept
wherein culture is usually assigned
the role of a state’s predominant
ideological apparat is a major
precondition for its (the model’s)
construction, instrumentalization of
culture is an inevitable product of
such cultural systems. However, a
culture as such - rigid, violent and
inflexible, and based on problematic
value-based postulates – turns out
as unsustainable and so triggers off
a reaction: the culture of change or
the culture of revolt with
ideological prefix of an open
society. Inasmuch as ideological
instrumentalization of culture is
inconceivable without cultivation
and distribution of ideological
matrixes, a change of ideology (as a
change of the established values) is
impossible without destruction and
deconstruction of the established
matrixes.
Manipulation – Simulation – Identity5
The research of
relations between ideological
matrixes and closed culture by
analyzing construction and
deconstruction of predominant
stereotypes in the Serbian culture
in the period 1986-2016 shows that
there are two ideological
principles, which are at the same
time two most efficient mechanisms
for closing societies and cultures:
simulation as production of new
realities or an appropriate
perception of the world; and
manipulation with thus produced
realities aimed at constituting
collective but also individual
identities (adjusted to the
ideological corps in power). The
type of thus planned, “welcome”
identities is always compatible with
new realities that have been created
to frame up the predominant
ideological practice. Doubly
adjusted ideological construct and
new realities on the one hand, and
new realities and their protagonists
- subjects on the other are used as
a mechanism (probably not always and
quite sufficient but certainly
necessary) that conserves the
desired social model and safeguards
its ideological vitality, as well as
its unchangeableness, which is the
ultimate goal of every closed
society. Saying in this context that
every closed society has its clearly
defined and strongly construed
“definition of realities” would not
be exaggerated. The construction of
new social realities based on
repressive ideological constructs
necessarily implies both the
principle and practice of simulation
to create “a new sense” or contents
that is always in the service of its
primary mission. Adjustment of the
truth and contents to experiences
and, above all, to interests and
needs of the ideologically
predominant group enables and
produces another, unavoidable
constituent of ideological cleansing
and closing up a society –
manipulation as the practice based
on the premise that veracity of the
offered idea or content does not
always guarantee that this idea
would be accepted and distributed,
and that the masses that are subject
to manipulation are not usually
aware of the difference between the
true and the false, constructed
content.
Therefore,
manipulation of social groups and
individuals is impossible unless
realities have already been
manipulated for “the use of ideas”
meant to produce and set the sense.
Both mechanisms have a common
denominator: misuse or
relativization of the truth.
Paradoxically, ideological
production and setting of the sense
has an integrative social function
as they are meant to achieve their
primary goal: to form, shape and
conserve a unique public opinion.
Usually ideological manipulations
are most intensive in the societies
wherein, due to the periods of
crises, the public is disunited,
i.e. marked by tensions within
social groups and their divergent
national, political and ideological
stands. In this context,
socio-psychological engineering of a
social group that is in the phase of
rise and growth (or is already in
power) is solely directed towards
artificial creation of a unique
public stand as a conditio sine qua
non of the establishment of a
desirable ideological model.
According to
Šušnjić, the primary action the
predominant social group takes to
create “ideologically healthy
masses” is occupation of “powerful
mass media,” and when it comes to
power it monopolizes ideas and
information and, consequently, takes
control over the flow of
information, which is major segment
of all ideological usurpations
(characteristic for all repressive
systems). The control over
information is exactly an
unavoidable method and source of
social power, based on the absence
of alternative voices and
“information dependence” on the
center of power; by producing a
desirable ideological code and
turning it into a meaningful code,
this center creates awareness that
crossing the red line of “the set”
ideological-information matrix
implies banishment. “In a society in
which major information (ideas) are
monopolized there is no possibility
for alternative thinking, while the
power an individual (group) has over
other individual (group) is fully
dependent on the existence of
nonexistence of alternatives. A new
form of dependency has been created
– the dependency on those in
possession of information (ideas).
Hence, the monopoly on information
(ideas) and manipulation of
information (ideas) proves to be a
powerful source of social power.”6
The flow of ideas
and information from a single center
of power simultaneously strengthens
the sense of collective cohesion,
inter-dependence, solidarity and
understanding among like-minded
people, and drastically lessens the
possibilities for social
confrontation between different
groups; and the other way round –
weakening of a single center of
power and disintegration of its
monopoly on information would – due
to social interaction – enable the
establishment of alternative,
parallel and independent centers of
power, which usually implies the
existence of a variety of
information corps and indoctrinated
or ideological codes. In this case
information could turn contradictory
and, as such, into a factor of
entropy of the existing ideological
system. Hence, in close societies
the public is rendered passive and
basically frustrated, excluded from
the building of the real-life social
order, and paradoxically substituted
by the omnipotent collective, i.e.
the people, the nation, once again
strongly indoctrinated and uniformly
ideologized.
Strong mass
perceptions that fabricated
half-truths have been accepted and
recognized “voluntarily” and
“freely,” and that decisions about
the content presented to people have
been made “independently” emerge as
characteristic consequences of
repressive-ideological modeling of
the reality. Consequently, agile and
continued fabrication of information
at the same creates the uncritical
public, social groups that,
regardless of evident and
understandable differences, remain
the like-minded mass, a
paradoxically disoriented (since
oriented towards the center of power
alone) political community deprived
of any political and ethical code.
This unhealthy
social community made of like-minded
people, instructed and destructed by
centers of power, could be defined
as “spoiled” and as a community of
people prone to the ruler’s
arbitrariness. Vukašin Pavlović
notes that a political community
without political ethos is a spoiled
community, the community of people
subjected to the mercy of centers of
power. As such, this community is
unhealthy and sick, and its power is
destructive, because while feeding
itself it devours the surrounding
social tissue and thus – itself.
Such unrestricted and destructive
nature of political power is most
evident in the periods of tyranny
and despotism.7
The Change of Paradigm: Functional
Counter-memory
After
disintegration of the Second
Yugoslavia – in parallel with
growing inflation, poverty,
unemployment and popular distrust in
the state leadership – uncontrolled
growth of the reaffirmed “Serbian
question” and national emancipator
aspirations, the process of
“re-coding of the past” resulted in
a change of paradigm. “The need to
speak out about the things that have
never been spoken aloud became too
strong to be restrained.
‘Counter-memories’ aspiring to rise
to the surface were not less
political than ‘memories’ promoted
at the time. Once against, ‘justice’
and interpretation of developments
and powers were questioned so as to
occupy the voids left or created
after the erosion of Yugoslavism and
socialism.”8
The process of
reconsideration and creation of a
new context, this time based on
reaffirmation of the Serbian
national question started with
promotion of new ideological
matrixes, intellectuals, scientists,
artist and writers. And the tissue
of these new ideological constructs
was made up of recreated
stereotypical notions about
collective trauma, heroism,
suffering, treason and, above all,
about a unique and jeopardized
nation. “In almost no time the topoi
of martyrdom and genocide…with
genocide at the top of the list
dominated in Serbia’s public
discourse. Hardly any term other
than genocide was so much used and
misused in the 1980s and 1990s.
Permanent repetition of the term in
various variants (physical,
political, judicial, cultural,
religious, administrative genocide,
etc.) created a pattern of
perception that suppressed almost
everything else.”9
These
Zundhaussen’s historical findings
are largely based on the facts taken
from literature and culture of the
time, when, in the early 1980s, the
radical policy was just in the bud:
a cultural U-turn preceded the
political. As demiurges of this new,
only hinted “nationally enlightened
order” Zundhaussen identifies
Dobrica Ćosić (and his novels The
Time for Dying and The Sinner), Vuk
Drašković (with his novel The Knife)
and Jovan Radulović (in his cult
play of the time Golubnjača)10: while
in these two novels Ćosić, from his
Serb-centric angle, writes about
World War I and laments creation of
Yugoslavia, Drašković and Radulović
deals with the traumas of World War
II: killings of the Serbs in the
independent state of Croatia.”11 In
the article “Media, War and Hatred”
published in the Kultura magazine in
1994 and dealing with the problem of
the media propaganda (which had
prepared the terrain for the war by
articulating public opinion,
circulating misinformation, and
brimming with fabricated
explanations and scenes saturated
with hatred) M. Dragićević Šešić
observes that cultural topics of the
time were almost all about cultural
history of the nation or inspired by
it. “I was very hard to publish a
book about the nature, and theory of
art that tackles not the injustice
done to ‘our’ people or unable to
prove that ‘our’ arts and artists
are best in the world.”12
From a historical
perspective this is a period, says
Zundhaussen, when the biggest
threats were extreme ethno-centrism
and fabricated spiritual atmosphere
marked by the poetics of
self-sacrifice, suffering and
clear-cut ethnically-based
partitions instead of overcoming the
past and dialogue. The earlier
ideological polarization (freedom
fighters vs. collaborators) was
substituted by the victims vs.
villains polarization, in this
specific case clearly identified as
the Serbs/victims and the Croats,
Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and the
“West”/villains. “The historical
topic about genocide against the
Serbs committed in World War II”
came into the focus of scholarly
studies.13 In his Book on Kosovo
published in 1995 historian
Dimitrije Bogdanović promoted the
thesis about the Albanians in
Kosovo, who were threatening the
Serbs with “biological genocide.”
Commenting on the book several years
later in the “Serbian Literature
Magazine” Milorad Pavić not only
recommended that it should be
translated into French and English
but also suggested that the Writers’
Association of Serbia officially
demand the Socialist Republic of
Serbia to bestow decorations on all
publishers worldwide that had
published at least one Serbian book
and that all university professors
who had lectured the Serbian
literature and all translators of
the Serbian literature receive the
newly established St. Sava Order.14
In the period
after 1985 came low-intensity
popular protests marked by
euphorically hued ideological
messages from scholars and
intellectuals. “In February 1986 160
Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins
submitted a list of complaints to
the People’s Assembly. A month
earlier, 216 Serbian intellectuals
(‘dissidents’) led by Dobrica Ćosić
signed a petition in which Kosovo
Serbs were proclaimed victims of
genocide.”15 However, Serbian national
program was concretely articulated
in 1986 in the Memorandum of the
Serbian Academy of Arts and
Sciences, which was understood and
interpreted as the Serbian people’s
road to the future. Final passages
of the Memorandum draft explain
scientific-cultural-ideological-political
ambitions of its authors. “The first
condition for our transformation and
renewal is democratic mobilization
of entire intellectual and moral
forces of the people, but not only
for implementing the decisions made
by political forums but also for
creation of a program for the future
in a democratic manner, which would,
for the first time in modern
history, truly combine knowledge and
experience, conscience and courage,
imagination and responsibility in a
general social task: on this
occasion the Serbian Academy of Arts
and Sciences expresses its readiness
to wholeheartedly and with all its
power work for those fateful tasks
that historically challenge our
generation (the draft Memorandum,
autumn 1986).16
The draft
Memorandum is structured in two
parts: the first is titled “The
Crisis of the Yugoslav Economy and
Society,” and the second “The
Position of Serbia and the Serbian
People.” Its final passages about
sense and purpose of its creation
the analysis of key words (our
transformation, renewal, democratic
mobilization, power of the people,
implementation of decision, creation
of a program, plan for the future,
imagination and responsibility,
knowledge and experience, conscience
and courage) suggest that the time
is ripe for a general national
renewal, while the first part deals
with deconstruction of the existing
ideological matrixes and
indoctrinated codes of socialist and
Titoist Yugoslavia, and the second
part – with the establishment of new
ideological-doctrinal coordinates
for the future.
According to the
authors of the Memorandum,
deconstruction of the predominant
and constant ideological matrix –
anti-Serbism, gives rise to new
ideological matrixes that can be
applied to all spheres of social
life, with special emphasis on
building and mobilization of
national collective and cultural
identity. What is particularly
indicative is the general
applicability of both critical
remarks and concrete suggestions,
with stress placed on their
paradoxality and their euphorically
and dramatically mobilizing tone
inapplicable to “scientific”
interpretation of context and
problems. Principled and generally
applicable suggestions about how to
dismantle the existing ideological
corpus were about systematically
neglected knowledge based on the
symbiosis between nationalism,
separatism, authoritarianism and the
practice of political voluntarism
that “unconsciously combines
ignorance with irresponsibility,
which not even self-government was
incapable of reining in.” In order
to have the necessary changes
implemented in practice,
prognosticate the authors of the
draft, the nation should get rid of
the ideology that prioritizes
nationality and territoriality and,
hence, separatism and nationalism,
but also of Stalinist and Kominform
legacy evident in labeling opponents
“enemies” and manipulating the
language, science and culture.
Paradoxically, in the name of
potentially nationalistic and closed
society, the authors of the
Memorandum have theoretically
destructed Yugoslavia’s political
system by qualifying it as an
unproductive and bureaucratic,
stalled or retrograde.
Noting that
citizens have been permanently and
skillfully politically manipulated,
the authors defined the existing
system as “a mixture of the remnants
of old and authoritarian state
inherited from the history of the
so-called ‘real’ socialism in the
East. Such mixed state is incapable
of creating, making necessary
changes and adjusting its
institutions and goals to the ever
changing society. A blocked
political organization becomes an
organization that safeguards status
quo and, hence, the unproductive,
uninventive professional politics
and negative selection of loyal and
incompetent officials.17 In a state as
such, claim the authors, “public
discourse became totally impotent
and ineffective even when it gives
voice vital truths…
“Not even
scholarly and expert opinions can
prevail, despite their well-argued
assessments and suggestions, if they
differ from political factors’ fixed
opinions and stances.”18 And, apart
from economy and ethics of “the
ideological society,” “scholarly”
and “expert opinion” by the group
that drafted the Memorandum focused
on the establishment of a new
(national) value system.
In this context
they also analyze “the crisis of
culture” and “destruction of the
value system” marked, as the authors
put it, by “unrestrained primitivism
fueled by consumer mentality and
proneness to trash in literature,
music, film and all sorts of
entertainment.” However, it was “the
general provincialism of culture”
the authors saw as the biggest
cultural problem of the then
Yugoslavia, its regionalization and
destruction of its Yugoslav and
universal meaning. “Deep-rooted in
provincial culture, separatism and
nationalism are becoming growingly
aggressive.”19 All the above-mentioned
neuralgic point of the existing
ideological corpus, say the authors,
make the situation “tense, if not
explosive” and with their
“dramatics” jeopardize not only the
Serbian people but also the
stability of entire Yugoslavia. For
all these reasons, the Serbian
people should be liberated from the
sense of historical guilt
(fabricated by the anti-Serbian
coalition) and the years-long
complot manifested in the Serbian
people’s expulsion from Kosovo – in
physical, political, judicial and
cultural genocide against them –
should be revealed. And since all
this is about the biggest defeat
suffered “in the wars for liberation
Serbia had waged from Orašac in 1804
till the rebellion in 1941” the
response to this “open war” is the
“one and only possible” – “resolute
defense of one’s people and
territory.”
However, since the
Serbian people in Croatia are cut
off its mother country, which is
prevented from taking care of their
economic and cultural situation,
“the integrity of the Serbian people
and their culture in the whole of
Yugoslavia becomes the vital problem
of their survival and development,”
conclude the authors. In this sense,
they proclaimed it imperative to
find a mainstay in their own history
and to prevent, at all costs,
further erosion of culture and
national identity of the Serbs. This
erosion caused by the ruling
ideology is evident in
appropriation, undervaluation,
neglect and decay of cultural
achievements of the Serbian people
through suppression of their
language, loss of the Cyrillic
alphabet, misuse of the literature,
and laying claim on and separating
into parts of the Serbian cultural
heritage, claim the authors. “Here
the domain of literature serves as
an arena of arbitrary rule and
anarchy. No other Yugoslav people
have been so brutally denied their
cultural and spiritual integrity as
it was to the Serbs. No other
literature and artistic heritage has
been so furrowed, messed up and
robbed as was the Serbian heritage.”20
Further on, the
usurped cultural and national
identity was also evident, claimed
the authors, in disintegration of
Serbian literature and culture.
“While Slovenian, Croatian,
Macedonian and Montenegrin cultures
are nowadays integrated, only the
Serbian is being systematically
disintegrated. It seems to be
ideologically legitimate and in the
spirit of self-government when the
Serbian literature is freely
distributed to Vojvodinian,
Montenegrin or Bosnian writers. The
best writers and major literary
works being torn from the Serbian
literature in order to artificially
establish some new regional
literatures.”21 The authors claim that
“disintegration” and “distribution”
of the Serbian literature are
followed, as a part of a precisely
thought-out plan, by “appropriation”
and “separation into parts” of the
Serbian cultural heritage, which
jeopardizes not only the nation’s
present and future but also its past
and, hence, the entire national
integrity and identity of the
Serbian people. “Appropriation and
separation into part of the Serbian
national heritage are so extensive
that students are taught that Njegoš
is not a Serbian writer, that Laza
Kostić and Veljko Petrović are
Vojvodinians, while Petar Kočić and
Jovan Dučić are Bosnian writers.”22
Along these lines,
the authors of the draft conclude
that this is all about consequent
and permanent ideological reshaping
that implies even bans and
reductions, and chauvinistic
interpretations. “The Serbian
culture has more unfit, banned,
ignored or unwelcome writers and
intellectuals than any other
Yugoslav literature; many of those
have been even erased from the
literary…” And while outstanding
Serbian authors have been the only
ones blacklisted in all Yugoslav
mass media, “in some republics and
provinces curricula has not only
brutally ideologically reduced the
history of the Serbian people but
also subjected it to chauvinistic
interpretations.”
Due to so
well-planned ways to destroy the
Serbian culture and the Serbian
national being, which are, claim the
authors, more than indicative, the
threat to the nation is beyond any
doubt. “In this way the Serbian
culture and cultural heritage are
represented as less significant than
they actually are, while the Serbian
people are being stripped of a major
pillar of their moral and historical
self-consciousness.” A score of
“proposals” follows this one, all of
them intoned dramatically and
mobilizingly, and aimed at
“changing” the existing situation.
The most comprehensive and general
among them was the proposal for the
establishment of “full national and
cultural integrity of the Serbian
people regardless of a republic or
province they live in.”23
An explanation was
given to this proposal the authors
saw as the one leading to exercise
of “historical” and “democratic”
right; “In less than fifty years, in
two generations in a row, twice
subjected to physical destruction,
forced assimilation, conversion and
denial of their own tradition, under
the burden of guilt imposed on them,
and intellectually and politically
disarmed all the time, the Serbian
people has been faced with
challenges too grave not to mar
their spirit, which should not be
overlooked at the end of this
century when human mind made such
enormous technological
breakthroughs.”24 Further on, conclude
the authors, if they aspire to the
future in the family of “cultural
and civilized nations of the world,”
the Serbian people will have to cope
with a historical and essential
challenge: to “find themselves once
again” and become “a historical
subject.” And to attain this goals
the Serbian people should “become
aware again of their historical and
spiritual being, and clearly
recognize their economic and
cultural interests” and so finally
chart their “modern social and
national program that would inspire
present generations and those to
come,” argue the authors.
In addition to
defining this final goal the authors
define the present situation as a
state of collective “depression,
marked by growingly violent
manifestations of chauvinism and
Serbophobia” that make this
situation potentially “inflammable”
and “threatening.” Finally, the
authors conclude that the fact that
the Serbian people do not have a
state of their own like other
peoples is the biggest problem, and
that Serbian should openly say that
the SFRY system has been imposed on
it, that the Serbian people could
not calmly look forward to the
future against the backdrop of such
uncertainty and should in no way
take “a passive stance” about this
matter.
This was the tone
of the final instruction for the
action members of the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the
scholarly community and cultural
circles should take: by explaining
that one ideological pattern has
come to an end and another has to be
established, the authors say, “One
stage in the development of the
Yugoslav community and Serbia is
evidently nearing its end with their
exhausted ideology, general
stagnation and growing regression in
economic, political, moral and
cultural spheres. Such state of
affairs calls for radical,
well-thought-out, scientifically
founded and resolutely implemented
reforms of the entire state
structure…”25
The SANU
Memorandum is important in the
research of the interrelation
between ideology and culture in
Serbia in 1987-2000, above all as a
document that had served as
ideological initiation as was the
first to explicitly formulate not
only the state of affairs at the
time but also outline the future as
well as the manner for realization
of the plan. Almost all relevant
ideological patterns used in this
period were based on the Memorandum
draft, and were, as such,
irrevocable dogmatic orienteers,
proclaimed at the time of
ideological preparations (until the
early 1990s) and just recreated and
thematically extended during the
wars and until the end of the 1990s.
The Memorandum
also hinted at the significance of
culture and cultural identity: in a
future, changed ideological picture
culture was assigned the role of a
predominant ideological apparat;
politically and ethnically motivated
crimes were committed in the name of
“cultural genocide” against the
Serbian people. Ideological matrixes
outlined in the Memorandum were
circulated, in the years to come, to
all the segments of social and
cultural system; grouped by the
principle of semantic closeness into
stereotypical notions and
formations, these matrixes had a
double function as nuclei of
manipulative strategies: first, they
were meant to reshape the reality
and imbue it with a new sense, and
then create like-minded masses
deprived of any possibility for
rational thinking, and unwilling to
resist the concept of a closed
society and authoritarian rule,
established and maintained
throughout the 1990s.
Ideological Codes as Nuclei of
Manipulative Strategies
As a system
established in a closed society and
in the service of a predominant
state apparat (including the media
and educational systems), the
cultural system in Serbia in the
1990s was ideologized – in all its
segments – by continued and
consequent creation, cultivation and
distribution of stereotypical
notions, formations and ideological
matrixes that were the nuclei of
manipulative strategies. Predominant
stereotypical notions in the Serbian
culture of the late 19th century,
mostly manifested in collective
myths and narratives, were
differentiated and grouped in
semantically thematic circles: the
nation’s unity, messianic and
uniqueness, its antiquity and
heroic, martyred past,
traditionalism, tendencies toward
mysticism and mythmaking, and
reasons behind treason (internal)
and hostilities (external) as
insignia of continued jeopardy, the
language cult and the cult of the
collective’s/people’s unquestionable
superiority.
Stereotypical
formations made up of combined
stereotypical notions – are grouped
by semantic and functional
similarity into three dominant,
thematically different but
ideologically harmonized and
mutually compatible groupings of
ideological matrixes: the matrix the
ideological construct of which is
formulated around the thematic
nucleus of the cult of the People as
the popular will and legislatively
superior collectivity (“the tribe in
God’s grace” and “the people is
everything, an individual is just in
their service”) and the matrix the
ideological construct of which is
formulated around the thematic
nucleus of culture, literature, arts
and science in the service of the
nation and collective, i.e. national
(state) identity and integrity.
And so the
stereotypical notion about a
permanently threatened nation was
added to a stereotypical notion
about lost but imperative national
unity (semantically close to the
former) to form a stereotypical
formation dedicated to jeopardy and
unity of the nation, which, together
with stereotypical notions about
messianic, antiquity and, hence,
unity makes up the ideological
matrix surrounding the thematic
nucleus of the nation that could be
interpreted, in a simplified form,
as follows: the nation is
permanently threatened from all
sides because of its undermined but
immanent historical, traditional and
cultural uniqueness and specificity;
hence, unification is exit strategy
and imperative at the same time.
Possibilities for
varying, combining, semantically and
functionally harmonizing
ideologically created stereotypical
notions and formations are almost
numberless. Following the period of
ideological preparations in the late
1980s (which implied engagement and
participation of elites, mostly
academicians and writers), this
collectivistic-ethnocentric version
of cultural production called for
intervention in its form but also in
manner of artistic expression: the
establishment of the cult of the
people also implied populist
“adjustment” and correction of
aesthetic norms; hence in the 1990s,
along with predominant stereotypes,
the cultural production was
permeated with reduced artistic
expressions, folk and populist
culture, and realistic forms that,
as appropriate “carriers” of
patriotic and national topics, fit
into the normative poetic
imperative: they were close and
understandable to the people and “in
their service,” unlike the hermetic
avant-garde, alternative or abstract
art that was “useless” and hardly
understandable to the people.
These two
influences, the influence of
“elites” that inspired and
instructed the masses through the
media and institutions, and the
influence of performers of populist
culture in which the masses were
both the audience and active
protagonists, were manifested in the
Serbian culture of the period as
mutually compatible and synergic.
The culture of elites and the
culture of the masses alike in
Serbia in the 1990s were
concentrated around the
establishment and safeguard of
national identity and integrity,
ambivalently perceived as
threatened, but also as superior.
Or, as Ivan Čolović concludes rather
ironically, “The demands for
recognition of cultural identity,
and for the safeguard of the
national being or national
spirituality, in the final analysis
boil down to a claim for a
privileged status of chose people;
for, not everyone seems to be
assigned with cultural identity
defined as the people’s being
embodied in the culture of an ethnic
community. That is an exclusive gift
from God, a quality reserved solely
for us. Others either have no
cultural identity at all or their
identity is in a bad and neglected
state. For instance, the Americans
have no identity because they are an
artistic community without true
tradition, without collective
memory, without a soul. What is left
to the West Europeans, deep in
materialism, humanism and
cosmopolitanism, is a kind of sick,
languid and untended identity.
Finally, the Muslims and Croats are
to Serbian nationalists the models
of people who have betrayed their
true (Serbian and Eastern Orthodox)
identity and accepted Islam and
Catholicism.”26
These
hetero-stereotypes, deeply rooted
and, as it will turn out, lasting in
the Serbian culture were later on
combined with auto-stereotypes,
constructed by the principle of
binary oppositions, which, in the
final analysis, gave birth to the
understanding of cultural identity
and national cultural action as a
necessary precondition to and
warrant of the establishment of
national identity, integrity,
wholeness and unity. As Čolović
observed, culture as a space in
which national unity and energy
needed for realization of political
and national interests are being
saved, is given a leading role. In
this context he quotes an
illustrative stance – the
cultural-organist theory of Čedomir
Mirković, literary critic and
Milošević’s first minister for
international cultural cooperation:
“I believe that with its culture, as
a driving force, a nation may be
like any living being – i.e. its
most vital and toughest organs are
taking over the role of other organs
or replace them and function in
their stead. There was no
opportunity for creative energy to
pulsate in all domains and,
therefore, many organs – from
economic, banking, trading,
proprietary to political – have
atrophied and deformed. And since
the energy of a historic nation, a
historically rich nation, is
indestructible, it has accumulated
and manifested itself in the arts,
in literature above all.”27
Such organist
understanding of culture and
literature as its most vital and
“most functional organ” is
characteristic of ideologized and
closed societies. Writers in Serbia
were assigned major roles in the
1980s and 1990s: they were expected
to be “language priests,” “guardians
of spiritual borders” and promoters
of the mainstream ideological
paradigm at the same time.
Therefore, the role and “function”
of writers is closely connected to
maintenance and safeguard of
“spiritual space” or “spiritual
territory” and, hence, of collective
and national spirit.
Almost all
stereotypical notions analyzed in
poems by most popular and
“outstanding” Serbian writers,
artists and cultural workers of the
time were fully and, in a sense,
officially materialized in the
addresses to the Second Congress of
Serbian Intellectuals held in
Belgrade on April 22-23, 1994, and
later on published in the collection
of papers “The Serbian Question
Today” (Srpsko pitanje danas) in
1995.28 Already in the opening remarks
linguist Pavle Ivić argued that
“history has formed a knot” and that
“the future of the Serbian people as
a whole” was in question, while
large parts of that people were
existentially threatened. “Should
the outcome of ongoing developments
be adverse, a sea of the Serbs would
not be able to survive in
centuries-old homesteads of their
ancestors. At bad times as such an
adverse web of circumstances would
leave us all alone, exposed to
hostile blows from so many sides.”29
Welcoming address
by Biljana Plavšić, the then
vice-president of Republika Srpska,
was much more explicit about
fundamental theses and priorities of
the Congress; she spoke about
dangerous times, the war and the
Serbian people the war had split
apart, and the times calling for
“Serbian wisdom” in the service of
vital national interests. “I hope
you would be brave as our fighters
at frontlines are, and would not
succumb to pessimism of certain
intellectuals who are unforgivably
lulling the Serbian people by
telling them that the time is not
ripe yet for unification, these are
still faraway goals, one should wait
and see, and control oneself. This
could leave a wrong impression about
the will of the majority of the
Serbian people and disappoint or
fighters who are ready to die for
the Serbs’ centuries-long dream to
life in a single state, exercise in
it their ‘sweeping’ talents and
create a democratic, progressive and
unique Serbian country.”30
Cultural Policy in Serbia in the
1990s as Ideological
Rationalization of the System
What earmarked
culture and cultural policy in
Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s was
nationalism: a characteristic
variance of “ideology without ideas”
the regime needed badly to
compensate for “rational and modern
form of legitimacy” on the one hand,
and to homogenize the masses on the
other.31 Most indicative in this
context were the warnings about
“political emptiness” of nationalism
and its ability to dangerously
adjust itself to a variety of ideas
and absorb them; this way how
nationalism in Serbia, as an
“ideology without ideas,” became a
useful for prescribing the desirable
type of collective and personal
identity (always colonized by the
former), forcefully homogenized and
adjusted to implementation of
manipulative strategies.
“Politically empty nationalism was a
most welcome frame to be filled by
diverse ‘doctrines’ the common
denominator of which was
anti-liberalism
(anti-individualism),
anti-rationalism and
anti-democracy.”32
However, when it
comes to culture in Serbia in the
1990s “the notion about patriotism,
its potential for “ideologically
rationalize the system” and, as
such, an ideological supplement to
and corrective of nationalism was
even more effective for “individual
identification” with the collective.
This was how the idea of patriotism
that authentically denotes an
individual stance, unlike
nationalism that always functions as
a collective emotion was
ideologically utilized. A special
form of reshaped patriotism
manifested in extreme
collective-patriotic sensibility was
established and seated in Serbia in
the late 1980s and 1990s as a
predominant and unavoidable
substrate of
cultural-artistic-media-scientific
production. At the same time
presence or absence of this
collective sensibility called
“patriotism” was of major
significance for categorization of
individuals into “politically fit”
or “unfit,” “loyal” or “disloyal,”
“belonging” or “not belonging” to
the prescribed, superior
collectivity. Of course, the regime
was the one to play the role of the
arbiter and coordinator of
collective emotion, the one that
decided who was and who was not a
patriot. This has always proved to
be a most repressive type of
ideological control over a society;
and Serbia’s political society has
gone through exactly this form of
overt or covert repression.33
“Covert”
repression was mostly generated
through cultural, media and
educational systems, and based on
“most dissimilar irrational
formulas” – the people, community,
founding myths and origin as
powerful manipulative instruments
that, apart from “being used to
cover up the true constellation of
power,” always “legally” lead to
“political depersonalization.”34 In
this context transformation of a
closed into an open society, a
closed to an open culture should
also be perceived as an opportunity
– provided by the culture of revolt
and civil disobedience – for
socio-cultural-political
reconstruction of a society and
redefinition of its fundamental
values. “These are the situations in
which members of a political
community are given the opportunity
to redefine collective identity.
Imprisoned in the political amalgam
that has resisted the values of
European political enlightenment for
a decade, Serbia now has the
opportunity to re-legitimize the
project (system) that is the sum and
substance of a modern,
constitutional democracy.”35
An Opportunity for Deconstruction:
Open vs. Closed Culture
Presence of
absence of motivation (collective
and individual) to accept, choose or
transform a social structure is also
connected with the domain of
“principles and values.” It is the
choice of value orientation that
individual or a social group’s
viewpoints and relations with their
surrounding depends on: they will be
either “deterministic/fatalistic
depending on whether perceived from
the angle of coincidence or freedom;
individualistic vs. collectivistic –
altruistic vs. egotistic; activist
or passive; one-sided vs.
multidimensional (pluralistic)
understanding of the world they live
in, etc.”36
It is the
criterion of a radically different
system of values on which the
possibility to differentiate
totalitarian systems from democratic
depends. Established and generally
accepted value systems in
totalitarian systems are based on “a
dependent, subjugated and sacrificed
individuality abused human dignity
and annulled principles of social
justice.”37 In this sense, it is
advisable to point out how
significant and necessary it is to
introduce an
anthropological/cultural paradigm in
understanding of the phenomenon of
modern social and cultural systems,
because only anthropological insight
into structures of cultural systems
and models makes it possible to
detect “in what way and which
aspects of culture have members of a
certain society accepted and built
into their personality structures as
‘a guide to life’.”38
The right time for
resistance to creation of national
and ethnic myths, repressive
ideological matrixes and
stigmatizing stereotypical notions,
as Hobsbaum put it, it the time they
have initially emerged, and the time
of first attempts at ideological
reshaping and identity usurpation.
An open/democratic/civil society –
hence, adequate, open cultural
models – can be established only
through annulment of prerequisites
of a totalitarian/authoritarian
society and overcoming a closed
political system the main and only
subject of which is a state apparat
based on ideological (mostly
nationalistic) indoctrination that
annihilates individualism in the
name of “the only proper”
orientation – “sacrificing an
individual for the benefit of a
collective.”39
It is in
vacillations between
civic-collectivistic/nationalistic
identity that the main barrier to
the establishment of an open,
democratic society and its
compatible model of open,
cosmopolitan culture based on
intercultural dialogue as a
predominant form of communication
that implies sensitivity to
differences, de-stigmatization and
deconstruction of the existing
stereotypes and ideological matrixes
resting on value postulates of a
closed society can be identified. A
group of authors points at these
vacillations in Serbia even after
2000.
Z. Golubović takes
that “the fact that the population
still vacillate between national and
the newly acquired civic identity
also indicates that the latter has
not been sufficiently constituted
yet – and that means a part of
population still subjects itself to
the authority of the nation, stays
within the bounds of authoritarian
interpretation of identity, while
the other part partially crosses the
border but has not yet developed all
necessary attributes of civilian
thinking.”40
B. Jakšić points
out at populist tendencies that have
been visibly renewed in the Serbian
society. “Not only political parties
that survived, even some of those in
power, are resorting to this renewal
but also the newly formed…This plus
one of most influential party’s
unyielding insistence on anachronous
nationalism…pictures contemporary
Serbia and its future in bleak
colors. Serbian nationalism and
populism have first brought the
Serbian people and other citizens of
Serbia in conflict with their
neighbors, even with the entire
world, and then, in those conflicts,
destroyed motivational and material
prerequisites for economic,
political cultural and moral renewal
of the society … New generations
will have to work hard, patiently
and for long for a so-so renewal of
the state and society.”41 (Jakšić,
2004, 178)
For him,
development of critical
self-consciences of all citizens,
and their consciousness about
destructive and always potentially
dangerous role nationalism and
populism have played in Serbia’s
culture and society are major
prerequisites to transformation from
a closed society and culture to open
ones.42
Lino Veljak also
shares this view. “Societies and
states in which not even basic
foundations of consensus on the
necessity for a clear breakup with
the past have not been established,
so that they are oscillating between
continuity and discontinuity, can
look at visions for the region’s
future, even at those moderately
optimistic, as rather shaky
promises.”43
Speaking of the
problem of development of cultural
system as an open one based on the
values of a modern civil society it
is obvious that everything is about
“mutual” preconditions: liberation
of the public sphere from the
influence of the administration,
constitution of a citizen as an
independent and free person,
constitution of a modern civil
identity and the rule of law
applicable to all citizens and
ensuring their equal participation
in public affairs, definition of
human rights as fundamental social
values and respect for these rights
in everyday life, development of a
democratic political culture,
encouragement of individual and
group imitativeness, development of
individualism in reasoning and
decision-making between various
options, establishment of a critical
distance from the regime and centers
of power, people’s tendency towards
critical assessment and the
possibility for resistance in the
case of usurped power, encouragement
of principles and values of
tolerance and respect of and
interaction with different ideas.44
When it comes to
the problem of continuity or
inability to fully and convincingly
overcome the old system and cultural
model, findings of the public
opinion poll on citizens’
value-orientation after 2000,
conducted in 2009, are most
indicative.45 They showed that “the
problem of continuity is
deep-rooted, while the old system
mentality changes at a snail’s
pace.” Most outstanding “forms of
continuity” were manifest in the
facts that the majority of
interviewees were still prioritizing
material needs, were not much
interested or not interested at all
in cultural needs, spoke about
standards of living mostly in terms
of material standards, perceived
culture as luxury one could do
without, “high culture” bored them,
the populist culture was still
entertainment they preferred, that
the existence of authoritarian
thinking was “the most staunch form
of continuity, that the taste of the
majority was still seen as a
benchmark of one’s preference, that
even when critical about that mass
taste he or she thought that
“standing by that taste” was
legitimate,” and that interviewees’
nationalistic views were less
explicit and aggressive than before
but still evident in their
stereotypical notions that used to
predominate in the 1990s: the
notions about superiority of the
Serbian people and suspicions about
the European Union, its ‘motives’
and ‘the benefits’ of ‘our
accession’.”46 Finally, despite “a
significant trend of understanding
and adopting modern values”
demonstrated by some citizens, the
findings testified that the value
system of the majority of
interviewees was not “radically
changed” since 2000. “Predominant in
the majority is the traditional
system combined with divine ‘values’
and resumed ‘traditional’/formal,
ritual ethno-piety. Cultural
institutions have not become yet
‘necessary’ and accessible to the
majority of citizens, while coffee
shops (as more modern pubs) the most
frequented institution for
relaxation, socialization and
information (many interviewees said
they were reading newspapers only in
pubs). Despite of their sporadic
criticism of turbo-folk culture,
they mostly watch commercial
programs, domestic and foreign TV
series, and singing and dancing
shows.” Accordingly Zagorka
Golubović concludes that culture is
still seen as a sort of escape from
existence.47
Revisionism after 2000: Historical
and (or) Cultural Policy
No doubt that the
problem that mostly stands in the
way of formulation and recognition
of a new value system, as well as
the adoption of a new cultural
paradigm is historical revisionism
incorporated in all the segments of
Serbia’s historical policy since
2000. In this sense, the authors of
the study “Historical Policies in
Serbia after 2000” offer the
examples of the hookup between
historical and state-run revisionism
(Milan Radaković, Center for Social
Research, Alternative Cultural
Organization – AKO) and point out to
the fact that the attempts at having
the past revised lay bare
ideological and political motives
based on old cultural deviations:
nationalism and radical
anti-communism, and the strategy for
gaining political points on the
correction of “historical
injustices” through rehabilitation
of true or alleged victims. In this
way, argue the authors, the new
system is provided a moral-political
dimension. Through ideological
revision of the past ideological
matrixes of the 1990s were
revitalized in 2000-16, while
Serbia’s mainstream culture, as it
seems, remains imprisoned in the
nation’s topoi: victims,
patriots/traitors, sacred
territories and centuries-old foes
who only want to destroy the
desired, unique
collective-gender-national identity.
Recent and
growingly frequent cases of
annihilated media and cultural
alternatives (in institutional and
contextual sense alike), mushrooming
extremism and extremist
organizations, restrictive measures
the administration takes to choke or
“merge” cultural institutions,
annulment or establishment of awards
and recognitions, and, most of all,
denial of fundamental cultural
rights through appointments of
ideologically suitable officials,
tendentious stigmatization and
undermining of civic initiatives as
platforms of ideological, political
and cultural diversity testify that
a hypothetically progressive
cultural policy not only implies
deconstruction of the existing
ideological matrixes but also their
substitution.
In Serbia,
unfortunately, culture and ideology
in 2016 seem to be doomed to eternal
restoration and endlessly vicious
circle that prevent a radical change
of paradigm and obstruct an
authentic breakthrough in the
culture of the civil society and
value systems native to it.
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