The
sovereign, democratic, welfare state
based on the rule of law
will be founded “on human liberties,
work and enterprise, on
social justice and security for all,
on ecological responsibility and
on the best democratic traditions of
Slovenia and Europe.”
From the
Statement of Good Intentions by the
Assembly of
the Republic of Slovenia, adopted on
21 November 19901
Case
study
1
The purpose of
this paper is not to discuss whether
it would have been better to remain
in Yugoslavia rather than attain
independence. Despite the current
crisis and lack of prospects faced
by numerous individuals and social
groups, gaining independence or, to
put it more precisely, timely
gaining of independence, was
undoubtedly a better option for the
Slovenians as a national community.
The events that could have taken
place in a sort of a disintegrating
Yugoslavia can be imagined
considering the example of Syria and
similar countries; as once stated
for TV Slovenija by Helmut Kohl who
liked to compare himself with and
quote Bismarck: “A statesman... must
wait until he hears the steps of God
sounding through events, then leap
up and grasp the hem of His
garment.”
What is more, such
discussions seem pointless from the
historiographical aspect in general:
Historians have no laboratories in
which to experiment with individual
components in order to find out what
processes might have taken place if
any of the components were taken
away, added or changed. We also know
that, after each social overthrow,
the current political leadership
substantiates itself on it, not
wishing to merely create the present
and the future, but also the past.
The previous situation suddenly
becomes absolutely black and
totalitarian, while the
post-overthrow situation is bright
and devoid of any doubt. In this
respect, the types of political
rhetoric present after joining the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the formation
of socialist Yugoslavia and the
attainment of independence do not
differ much from one another.
Differences could perhaps be
observed in terminology, or not even
there.
Nevertheless, this
should not defer historians, along
with other humanists and social
scientists, from drawing comparisons
between what was promised and what
was realised. It is a substantiated
fact that people were, unlike the
political elites, disappointed time
and time again after any overthrow.
The period following the
emancipation and joining the EU is
no exception.
Posing such
questions in Slovenia does, however,
unavoidably carry ideological
connotations.
The issue can be
considered from two aspects:
1. Assessments and self-assessments
of Slovenia’s role in the
dissolution of Yugoslavia
2. Present-day view of the
predictions, assumptions and
promises made at that time
Temporally, the
assessments and self-assessments of
Slovenia’s role in the dissolution
of Yugoslavia can be broken down to
contemporary (current and political)
and subsequent (partly political and
partly pertaining to social science,
humanities, history etc.)
assessments and self-assessments.
According to the then assessments of
a large part of the Yugoslav public,
politicians, journalists and other
writers (with partial exception of
Croatia), Slovenia wanted to secede
and this would cause the dissolution
of Yugoslavia. The estimates of when
this process began were varied. The
beginning was usually identified
with the approximately simultaneous
rise of the national (nationalistic)
opposition in Slovenia and the onset
of the reformist processes taking
place within the League of
Communists of Slovenia (ZKS – Zveza
komunistov Slovenije) with the rise
of Milan Kučan. Some of the
assessments stem from the viewpoint
that secession was the aim of all
Slovenian post-war political
leaderships. The opinion on
Slovenia’s guilt (with nuances in
interpretation) during the
disintegration of Yugoslavia was
also adopted by the majority of the
European politics and diplomacy, and
even more so by the United States.
This interpretation neglected to
consider the internal processes
taking place in Yugoslavia, which
Slovenia had little or no influence
over, as well as foreign-political
processes (e.g. the end of the Cold
War, decline of socialism,
dissolution of the Eastern-European
Bloc and the Soviet Union,
integration processes in Europe). As
the war in Yugoslavia continued and
the NATO forces intervened against
Milošević (1999), this opinion began
changing, with Milošević becoming
the main culprit behind the
blood-soaked dissolution of
Yugoslavia (also on account of
Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović
dying before they could be summoned
by the International Court of
Justice in the Hague).
The way Slovenia
went about attaining independence
became acceptable in retrospect and
the country came to be regarded as a
success story even by the diplomats
who opposed its emancipation. Upon
the 10th anniversary of Slovenia’s
independence, for example, some of
the main European personalities of
that time came to join the
festivities, including the foreign
ministers of Austria, Germany and
Italy, Alois Mock, Hans Dietrich
Genscher and Gianni de Michelis. De
Michelis, who strongly opposed
Slovenia’s independence and
maintained that it wouldn’t be
acknowledged for decades to come
(although he was later bestowed a
Slovenian national decoration), said
the following at the 10th
anniversary of independent
statehood: “I am very proud to have
been involved in Slovenia’s
attainment of independence. Although
our opinions on whether the time was
right and how the process should be
managed were different, this does
not mean I was not fully in favour
of independence.”2
Despite the
changed views in international
politics, the opinion on Slovenia’s
guilt or at least responsibility
with regard to the dissolution of
Yugoslavia remains frequent,
determining mutual policies between
Slovenia and former Yugoslav
republics in significant, sometimes
even decisive ways. Views on the
dissolution of Yugoslavia still
cause disagreements. The last such
case is the supposed (but actually
non-existing) “secret agreement
between Milošević and Kučan” which
they were rumoured to have reached
in January 1991 (in reality, it was
a public meeting of the Slovenian
and Serbian delegations on 24
January 1991, which the media
reported on and which saw the
adoption of a joint statement that
was interpreted differently by both
sides).3
The agreement was
said to have been confirmed by the
then President of the National
Assembly France Bučar and Minister
of Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel,
PhD, in August 1991 during a visit
(that was, in fact, secret) with
Dobrica Čosić in Belgrade.4 The
theory attributing the
responsibility for the dissolution
of Yugoslavia and the bloody war to
Slovenia was taken up with a severe
lack of criticism from the
controversial Croatian politician
and Tuđman’s adviser Slaven Letica,
PhD, by the journalist Blaž Zgaga
who advocates the premise that
Milošević and Kučan agreed, to the
detriment of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, for Slovenia to leave
Yugoslavia peacefully, while
Slovenia, in turn, acknowledged
Serbia’s right for all Serbs to live
in one state, i.e. Great Serbia.5 It
is a historical fact that has been
widely known for a long time and
substantiated by various witnesses
that Bosnia and Herzegovina was, in
fact, divided by Tuđman and
Milošević at meetings that took
place in Karađorđevo and Tikveš in
March and April 1991.
Zgaga branded the
meeting – one of the numerous
meetings taken by the Slovenian
leadership with representatives of
other republics and federation with
the aim of seeking an agreement on a
confederal Yugoslavia – as a “sordid
agreement”, “the day that changed
Yugoslavia’s fate” etc.6 In addition
to Letica, he refers to various
memoirs, newspaper articles,
interviews, documentaries and
similar records, from which he chose
the parts that attribute the
responsibility for Yugoslavia’s
dissolution to Slovenia (or are
simply interpreted that way by
Zgaga), while failing to cite any
primary sources. Zgaga also
maintains that Slovenia is isolated
from international information
flows, on account of which the truth
uncovered by foreign analysts
regarding the events in Yugoslavia
remains carefully concealed;
according to him, the Slovenian
public is only familiar with the
myths of independence and that he
himself has “disclosed only the
information on the Slovenian role in
the dissolution of Yugoslavia which
was published with numerous
world-renowned publishing houses and
media but was kept concealed in
Slovenia thus far”.7 (As a matter of
fact, the works cited by Zgaga are
available at every major Slovenian
library or online, while the
relevant foreign works have been
translated into Slovene). Zgaga’s
statements have provoked a number of
responses and discussions, first in
the Dnevnik newspaper in March and
April 2014, and once again in the
Delo newspaper in July and August
2014. The lead piece in Delo is an
interview by Anuška Delić with Anton
Peinkiher, former Head of
Intelligence at the Ministry of
Defence, dated 21 July 2014.
Peinkiher accused Janša (and Bavčar)
that he was completely unprepared
for the attack by the Yugoslav
People’s Army, and that he began, in
September 1990, sending high-quality
automatic, anti-aircraft and
anti-tank weapons owned by the
Territorial Defence and the Police
to Croatia. This was the result of
an August 1990 agreement reached in
the Kočevsko region by Janša, the
then Secretary of Internal Affairs
of the Republic, Igor Bavčar, the
then Croatian Minister of Defence,
Martin Špegel, and the then Croatian
Minister of Internal Affairs, Josip
Boljkovac. The weapons were sent by
the spring of 1991. Peinkiher
estimated these to be major criminal
offences as Janša endangered the
combat capability of the Territorial
Defence, thus putting Slovenia’s
safety at risk. (For over two
decades now, Janša has been putting
the blame for the disarmament of the
Territorial Defence on Kučan and the
presidency of the Republic of
Slovenia, saying that, in May 1990,
they failed to prevent the order to
store the TD weapons in the Yugoslav
People’s Army barracks on time).
Peinkiher is also critical of other,
subsequent Janša’s actions (e.g.
sale of weapons, misuse of the
military intelligence service and of
the military for political purposes,
the “discovery of weapons at the
Maribor airport, Depala vas etc.).
The interview caused a polemic among
the emancipators (i.e. Bavčar,
Janša, Lovšin and Peterle vs.
Peinkiher), which Zgaga used to
reiterate his theories from Dnevnik.
His writing also prompted a response
from Kučan among others (as was
already the case with Dnevnik).
The history of
Slovenia’s attainment of
independence is far from being
black-and-white and contains many
contradictions. After all, the
Slovenian political elite gave the
following promise in the Statement
of Good Intentions which was adopted
just before the plebiscite: “Thus
the Republic of Slovenia accepts its
share of responsibility for the
democratisation in the entire
territory of what is now Yugoslavia,
also before the international
community.”8 It cannot be said it did
not endeavour to do so through
negotiations and in various other
ways (also by taking the legalistic
approach to the attainment of
independence).
The views on
Yugoslavia and the future of
Slovenia in it were different. Even
the plebiscite question left the
issue open on whether Slovenia
should gain sovereignty and
independence within or outside
Yugoslavia. After intense party
negotiations and discussions in the
deputies’ clubs, a consensus was
reached at the second session of the
Constitutional Commission on 21
November 1990 as regards whether the
ballot paper should only contain the
question “Are you in favour of a
sovereign and independent Slovenia?”
or whether the wording should be
more specific and include terms such
as federation in the then form, a
confederation, or an independent
Slovenia with no affiliation with
other Yugoslav republics. In line
with the first option, the question
would read: “Should the Republic of
Slovenia become an independent
state?” The second option would
include the following addition in
brackets: “Should the Republic of
Slovenia separate from the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?”
This second part, which would make
the decision unambiguously clear,
was ultimately left out.9 What is
more, throughout the entire process
of attaining independence,
differences could be seen between
the consensual side of the politics
that was favourable to finding a
solution within Yugoslavia (or
advocating responsible departure)
(i.e. Kučan, presidency of the RS,
League of Communists of Slovenia –
Party of Democratic Renewal
(ZKS-SDP), Socialist Youth League of
Slovenia – Liberal Democracy of
Slovenia (ZSMS-LDS)) and the radical
side that supported unilateral
separation (part of Demos
(Democratic Opposition of
Slovenia)). Jože Pučnik, PhD, the
then President of Demos, represented
the most radical part. His
razor-sharp position (arising from
understandable personal reasons,
i.e. being convicted to a lengthy
imprisonment due to his critical
writings in Revija 57 and
Perspektive) stemmed from
anti-communism and anti-Yugoslavism.
He was not thoroughly familiar with
the situation in Yugoslavia and was
not in contact with the politicians
of that area; at home, his function
was limited to presiding Demos and
seemed increasingly anachronistic in
relation to those who held the
power. The victorious and
media-resounding statement he made
after the plebiscite was very much
in line with the context of such
politics: “Yugoslavia is gone,
Yugoslavia is gone! Now it is all
about Slovenia!”10 This, however, was
not the first of his direct
negations of the Statement of Good
Intentions. Pučnik took a stand
against said Statement and advocated
a nationally pure Slovenia (which
was supposedly to become that way
for economic reasons) even before
the plebiscite, namely on 17
December 1990 in Ljutomer.
He regarded the
plebiscite and the secession as a
chance to create a nationally pure
country, to “cleanse” Slovenia of
newcomers from other Yugoslav
republics, which he substantiated
through “economic” reasons: “Let’s
not fool ourselves, for this is not
a national but a social issue... I
am personally against automatically
adopting the current situation as of
the date of the plebiscite. If we
wish to ensure a solid social
structure in the Republic of
Slovenia, we will have to introduce
some sort of criteria for granting
citizenship. Let’s not enter a
seeming democracy that would create
problems we could not solve. We must
be aware of what can be solved
within the scope of Slovenia from
the social aspect and what cannot –
the national aspect of this issue is
of secondary importance.
We are
establishing a community here, which
must ensure living conditions for
itself from the very start; we must
be prepared to eliminate the
heritage of the Yugoslav federation,
perhaps even in an unpleasant way...
We will have to calculate –
demographically as well – what
problems could consequently arise
within five to ten years, together
with the demands for cultural
autonomy. I will personally use all
of my influence in the Social
Democratic Party to make sure that
Slovenia does not encounter problems
such as those of Knin. We do not
want a Knin of our own in Slovenia
and today we are given the chance to
settle these matters humanely,
socially, legally and
democratically. There must be no
rotten compromises and no democracy
of political rallies that would
create problems similar to those
faced by the British, the French,
the Germans and other countries
which had existed in the colonial
era. I believe that Slovenia should
not burden itself with these
additional problems.”11 The rally in
Ljutomer was one of the many
organised by politicians from both
camps and at which they appeared
jointly to promote the plebiscite,
but Pučnik and his stance were
completely in opposition with other
speakers, including those from the
Demos party. Rajko Pirnat, for
example, argued that the
non-Slovenians with a permanent
place of residence in Slovenia
should have the right to choose
whether or not they will take the
Slovenian citizenship, while those
arriving after the plebiscite would
have the status of foreigners. Miran
Potrč from the Party of Democratic
Renewal (SDP – Stranka demokratične
prenove) was of a similar opinion,
while Dimitrij Rupel believed that
the Slovenian state will, above all,
endeavour to provide all its
citizens, regardless of their
nationality, with the human rights
at an European level, and that the
situation in this area should remain
the same or improve after attaining
independence.12
Although Pučnik’s
aim of selectively granting
citizenships failed, it was
reflected in the erasure of
inhabitants from former republics
who did not request to be granted
Slovenian citizenship.13
The political
interpretations of the right-wing
politics as well as some writers
associated with this pole attribute
success in the attainment of
independence precisely to Pučnik’s
radicalism. According to the
border-line pathological
interpretations, especially those by
Janez Janša and his circles, the
gaining of independence has been
carried out in a struggle against
pro-Yugoslav “national traitors”
headed by Milan Kučan, on the
subject of which quite a few
pamphlets were published.
The Slovenian
internal flow in the process of
attaining independence (the
nationalism revealed in the process
and which, as seen by the example of
the erased, was not merely “passive”
as is also evident from the fact
that the population from the former
Yugoslav republics living in
Slovenia don’t have a minority
status), the subsequent and current
polemics and, last but not least,
today’s hypocritical attitude of
Slovenia in relation to the rights
of other nations similar to those
that the country itself demanded
upon attaining independence, do not
change the fundamental
historiographic findings. These
include the fact that Slovenia tried
to reform Yugoslavia and invested a
lot of its political energy as well
as resources in the process, but was
ultimately unsuccessful. The
Slovenian politics accepted the
concept of dissolution (determined
within the Slovenian presidency)
instead of secession, which was
eventually approved also by the
Badinter Commission.14 With the
exception of the Croats, the offered
confederate model was accepted by no
one as evidenced by numerous
meetings of republic leaderships and
federal bodies, both on party and
state level, between January and
June 1991. A somewhat reduced form
of the “asymmetric federation”
concept was of interest also to
Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia, but it was already too
late. To expect that, by remaining
in Yugoslavia, Slovenia could have
prevented its disintegration and the
blood-soaked wars that followed,
would mean a great lack of
understanding of the then
circumstances which were actually
determined by the Serbo-Albanian and
Serbo-Croatian relations along with
Croatia’s and Serbia’s aspirations
to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This went hand in hand with the
efforts by the Yugoslav People’s
Army to preserve the
(re-centralized) federation (as
understood by the leading generals)
at all costs.
The ideological
interpretation of the political
right was at the public forefront,
namely that the erased were opposed
to the emancipation of Slovenia and
that they counted on members of the
Yugoslav People’s Army being among
them as it attacked Slovenia etc.
Some of the erased appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights
which, in June 2012, ruled in the
matter of Kurić and others vs.
Slovenia against the Republic of
Slovenia as the latter had violated
the rights of the erased under
Article 8 (Right to respect for
private and family life), Article 13
(Right to an effective remedy) and
Article 14 (Prohibition of
discrimination) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The
Court instructed Slovenia to prepare
a special mechanism by which to
acknowledge compensation to the
erased within a period of one year.
Six (of the ten) appellants were
acknowledged compensation for
non-material damage. The judgement
was final and cannot be appealed.
Many strived to restore the rights
of the erased, namely individual
journalists, non-governmental
organisations, lawyer Matevž Krivic,
the erased themselves who
established an Association ten years
after being erased, and The Peace
Institute which issued a series of
expert publications in the Slovenian
and English languages on the matter.
Please see Kogovšek, Zorn,
Pistotnik, Lipovec Ćebron, Bajt,
Petković, Zdravković, Brazgotine
izbrisa (The Scars of the Erasure).
Attributing
responsibility for the
disintegration of Yugoslavia to
Slovenia thus stems from justifying
politicians from former Yugoslav
republics (especially Tuđman in
Croatia) or diplomats from abroad,
who failed to carry out their task
(!) either due to the lack of
knowledge of the situation at that
time or due to specific interests
(i.e. personal, media-related etc.).
The theory of
Slovenia being the “disintegrator of
Yugoslavia” has not resounded
significantly in the fields of
Slovenian humanities and social
sciences, and the same can be said
of the foreign scientific reference
literature. In Slovenia, the centre
of ideological and political
polemics regarding the attainment of
independence and democratization
revolves around another issue,
namely the issue of merits and,
consequently, of political capital
which can still be drawn from this.
The actions of certain emancipators,
committed either at that time or
later, which were brought to light
over the years (although they, as
for example the arms trade, had no
closure in court or even in the
political arena on account of
powerful connections within the
Police, the Office of the Prosecutor
and the judicial administration),
along with the convictions of some
of the leading players involved due
to corruption or commercial crime
(e.g. Janša, Bavčar) relativized the
act of emancipation, while also
consolidating the political and
ideological struggle between the
players as regards interpretation
and, among other things, division to
various opposing veteran
organisations, and boycotting and/or
organizing state celebrations.
Nevertheless, the attitude of the
national media towards the
attainment of independence has
become ritual, with established
evaluations, celebrations and other
forms of remembrance. The mutual
relationship between the players is
determined almost exclusively from
the viewpoint of post-emancipation
relations and, above all, any
current relations. Looking at the
entire picture, the attitude towards
the attainment of independence
revolves in a triangle of political
polemics: the mythicized view of
emancipation created by a part of
(mainly electronic) media and
(mostly right-wing) people involved,
and the efforts (of the majority) of
historiography to present a critical
and objective cause-and-effect
picture of the events that took
place at that time. A noticeable
turning point in the general
evaluation was brought on by the
crisis which sharpened the view of
the emancipation itself and even
more so of the misguided processes
that took place in over 20 years of
the independent Slovenia’s history;
although to a lesser degree, it also
strengthened the critical attitude
towards the EU, which part of the
non-critical servile politics
usually labels as “Euroscepticism”
and “Yugo-nostalgia”.
PRESENT-DAY VIEW OF THE PREDICTIONS,
ASSUMPTIONS AND
PROMISES MADE AT THAT TIME
The discussions,
predictions, assumptions and
promises of that time as well as the
then party programmes built on the
conviction that Slovenia did not
belong to the civilisation of the
Balkans; instead, it was supposedly
(Central) European. It was thought
that the Slovenians would do much
better in their own country as the
money would not flow to Belgrade.
It would have an
effective capitalist economy without
the interference of politics, and
would allocate far less resources
for its armed forces in comparison
to the amounts allocated for the
Yugoslav People’s Army. It would
even be neutral or without an army
as well as far less indebted and
with a higher standard of living.
After having established the
independent state, Slovenia would
supposedly do away with the
hysterics involved in the political
space and the permanent state of
emergency. The multi-party system
would allegedly automatically result
in democracy. To sum up, Slovenia
would be much better off in all
respects – in the fields of
education, culture, media, and all
other social segments. In fact, it
would become a kind of “Switzerland
of the Balkans”.
Let us compare
some of these promises with the
actual situation:
Departure from the Balkan
civilisation, independence and
Europe
“In
relation to other systems, we should
enforce our own specific (cultural,
economic, political) autonomy and
independence, but not with a degree
of exclusion that would lead to
stagnation.”15
“We
seek for the Italians, the
Hungarians and the Roma to have the
same rights as the Slovenians to
learn their own language and culture
... The option and the right for
people belonging to other nations to
take non-obligatory classes at
primary schools for additional
lessons of the Slovenian language
and familiarization with one’s own
culture and language.”16
The
National Assembly of the Republic of
Slovenia... “guarantees all people
belonging to other nations and
nationalities the right to a
versatile cultural and linguistic
development, while all those with a
permanent residence in Slovenia can
obtain the Slovenian citizenship if
they wish to.”17
“We
must be prepared to eliminate the
heritage of the Yugoslav federation,
perhaps even in an unpleasant way.”18
A dual
contradiction is at play here.
Politically, Slovenia functions in a
way that is very similar to the
former Yugoslav republics. The
attainment of independence and even
the country’s joining the EU brought
no significant differences, except
formal “adjustments”, i.e. copying
the European legislation. Slovenia
is ruled by partitocracy, alienation
of the political class from the
people, clientelism and corruption,
all of which bears a much stronger
resemblance to the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia than a socialist Yugoslav
country. On the other hand,
departing the “Balkan civilisation
circle” resulted in an intellectual
and cultural impoverishment as the
Balkan environment was not
automatically replaced by the
European civilisation, either
culturally or intellectually.
The audience for artists working in
film, theatre and elsewhere has been
cut down from twenty million to mere
two. The former Yugoslav
intellectual and cultural pulse,
polemics included, was not replaced
by its European counterpart. With
the exception of Slavoj Žižek, one
is hard pressed to find Slovenian
intellectuals on the European
newspaper pages, let alone them
making the cover pages. With 8
deputies among 766, Slovenian
politicians are insignificant in the
EU, except when – as in the case of
the European People’s Party –
providing ideological and political
protection to their respective
incriminated local leaders and
giving insulting lectures to the
Slovenian society. (In the current
European reality, the Slovenians are
taught democracy by the Rumanian
female politicians). Slovenian
lawyers take no part in the
formation of the European
constitutional organisation,
criminal law or any other law.19 It is
possible to prove for the Slovenian
politics towards Yugoslavia, at
least from the late 1950s on, that
it was based on “intellectual
nationalism” (which Thomas Piketty
regards as the main threat to the EU20
); it can just as easily be said
that the Slovenian politics towards
the EU, from the 2004 joining up to
today, is characterized by utter
servility and searching for
sinecures for individual politicians
rather than protection of the
Slovenian national interests as was
once the case in Yugoslavia.
At the same time, opinion polls show
that most Slovenians still consider
the erstwhile Serbo-Croatian to be
their first foreign language. Every
summer, 50 % of Slovenians migrate
to Croatia. At least once every
month, singers from the Balkan
region manage to fill up Slovenian
music venues, even the largest ones.
Belgrade and the village of Guča see
tens of thousands of Slovenian
visitors arriving by bus to the
annual meeting of trumpet players
(trubači).
Throughout the 1990s, Slovenia ran a
foreign policy along the lines of
“getting away from the Balkans”,
making conscious efforts to give the
impression that it has disassociated
itself from the former Yugoslavia.
During Pahor’s administration (7
November 2008 – 10 February 2012),
the situation saw some changes, but
it was too late, and the intentions
never went beyond a few photo ops.
The distrust stemming from the time
of the country’s breakup, the debts
left behind by the bank Ljubljanska
banka21, which cut off Slovenian
capital from entering the republics
of the former Yugoslavia, the
country’s conflicting and
inconsistent foreign policy gave
rise to deep distrustfulness which
will take decades to overcome. Other
countries, specifically Austria and
Germany, made a successful entrance
into the former Yugoslav territory
in terms of economy, politics and
expert knowledge. After its
disassociation from the former
Yugoslavia, Slovenia never entered
into any other similar connections
other than the formal membership in
the EU and NATO. Drnovšek’s
government turned down the
co-operation with the Visegrad Group22, at that time being convinced (and
rightly so) that Slovenia emerged
from socialism at a significantly
more advanced stage of development.
Due to ideological reasons and the
inaptitude of Slovenian politics,
the country failed to deliver on its
potential, today being on the same
level as the former Eastern Bloc.
The Slovenian foreign policy
servilely followed the USA: the most
symbolic act was the Vilnius
Declaration23 and it should come as
little surprise then that the US
Ambassador to the Republic of
Slovenia
(2010−?) Joseph Mussomeli was
involved in attempts at composing
Slovenian governments, and
interfered directly with Slovenia’s
internal politics on several
occasions – he correctly interpreted
the signals by the Slovenian
politics. Today, Slovenia has no
allies in international relations,
let alone friends. But having no
empire, unlike England, one also
cannot argue that it has only
interests.
Every programme written by Slovenian
political parties defined Slovenia’s
independence as independence from
Yugoslavia. The view of the European
Community was remote, romanticized,
glorified and uncritical. “Our
Europe will be economically
successful, politically and
culturally pluralistic, its values
steeped in freedom, human rights,
pluralism and democracy,” read the
programme documents of The Socialist
Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS).24
As a consequence of its uncritical
faith in Europe, Slovenia caved to
the demands of some member states
and showed submissiveness in the
alignment process. A historical
comparison reveals that the transfer
of sovereignty from the Slovenian
republic to the Yugoslav federation
was more clear-cut and well-defined
than with the EU, and that, in
retrospect, Slovenian politicians
had a much greater influence on
Yugoslav politics. At best, modern
Slovenia’s influence on the EU is
comparable to the one in the
Austria-Hungary period, and extends
merely to language equality and not
much else. Imagine any one of the
Yugoslav bodies daring to decide by
whom and how the water resources in
Slovenia should be used.25
Or perhaps trying to determine the
size (and indebtedness) of the
Slovenian budget or compiling lists
of companies Slovenia should sell.
On a humorous yet pointed note, just
imagine the former Yugoslavian
standard attempting to prescribe
that cucumbers and bananas should be
straight and have a precisely
defined size. Not to mention any
banking, fiscal or other similar
directives!
Such comparisons never fail to
produce cries of outrage. The usual
response is the claim that
Yugoslavia was an undemocratic and
totalitarian state, while the EU is
democratic. But how much actual
influence do the Slovenian people
have on the staff and other matters,
other than selecting a few Members
of European Parliament? How great
was their role in the election of
Commissioner Janez Potočnik? He was
sent off to Brussels by the Liberal
Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), a party
existing today only in name.26 To whom
does the Commissioner report and how
much does the public know about his
work even though he is (arguably)
the most powerful Slovenian
politician in Brussels? Well, he
reports to the bureaucratic Europe
and not Slovenia. Due to his
remoteness and air of mystery,
Potočnik was one of the most popular
Slovenians throughout most of his
two mandates according to opinion
polls, bringing to mind the imperial
cult of Emperor Franz Joseph I. of
Austria. The only notable difference
between the former Yugoslavia and
the present EU is that Slovenia
today tails after the big players,
having lost its position as the most
developed state in Yugoslavia. Much
like in Austria-Hungary, it has been
relegated to a dependent part of the
empire.
A SOCIALLY JUST, ECONOMICALLY
SUCCESSFUL COUNTRY
GOVERNED BY THE
RULE OF LAW
“We will build a modern social
state, governed by the rule of law,
which will provide its citizens a
free, and spiritually and materially
superior life.”27
During Drnovšek’s governments
(1991−2002/04), the Slovenian
politics relied on a successive
approach based on gradualism and
pragmatism, steering clear of
political and other pitfalls, and
pursuing gradual privatisation. Up
until 2004, this approach was
considered a real success story. But
denationalisation, which is an
important part of privatisation, was
rooted in ideology. The property was
returned in kind, including large
Church estates and other feudal
estates. Compared to other countries
where denationalisation took place
as an expression of nullifying
socialism, this was a distinctly
Slovenian occurrence. But by doing
so, Slovenia re-introduced feudal
elements into the young republic’s
legal order. The property-returning
process went down the legal rabbit
hole and the criteria for granting
Yugoslav citizenship to foreign
citizens, which was prerequisite for
getting back their property, were
dubious. The Slovenian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was sent “priority
lists” from the Embassies of Austria
and America, among a few others.28
The municipal authorities were
ill-prepared for the pressures they
were put under by teams of well-paid
lawyers. A similar thing happened
between the Roman Catholic Church
and the Slovenian state, which all
Slovenian governments informally
acknowledged as the national church,
acknowledging it even as a
discussion partner at state level.
Beyond having a say in matters of
property, the Church also had a
voice in terms of its participation
in national media, the school system
and other areas. But the Church
acted as a reckless capitalist and
its failed investments reached from
hotel facilities in Croatia to
television programmes broadcasting
pornography.29 Conflicts arising from
privatisation resulted in the
privatisation being carried out via
authorised investment companies
(PIDs), and most citizens profited
little or nothing from the process,
unless they were well-connected and
had the opportunity to buy the
stocks of the, admittedly,
increasingly smaller number of
propulsive companies. The last stage
was the so-called tycoon
privatisation which left public
banks with huge financial gaps of
several billions, to a large extent
also generated by the RCC. At that
time, the Slovenian Democratic Union
(Slovenska demokratična zveza – SDZ)
was convinced that “a privileged
position of foreigners in the
management would create a
semi-colonial economy.”30 ZSMS, the
later liberal party, which united
with a portion of SDZ, was convinced
that the “task of the
country/government is to enable and
promote lawful money-making.”31 In
reality, all parties cleverly
engineered “lawful” money-making for
the select few boasting political
connections. ZSMS had also planned
out an economy concept which would
be based on transport, tourism,
commerce and banking, instead of
industry. Industry in Slovenia is
today barely non-existent. There are
also hardly any research labs that
were once operated in the framework
of factories. What it does have is a
highly out-of-date railway network,
even though the Social-Democratic
Party, today SDS, which to this day
controls the railway, stated in its
programme: “It is necessary to
restore the standard and level of
technology of our railway traffic
system to the one we once had and
lost due to poor decisions, leaving
us lagging far behind Europe.”32 At
the same time, the country has the
most overpaid motorways in the EU. A
quote from SDS from 1989: “Road
management requires sound financial
foundations, and its governance must
be adjusted to contemporary European
patterns, without allowing daily
politics to interfere with the work
of road management bodies.”33
Today, Slovenia has tens of foreign
retail centres, and the only
Slovenian retail chain, Mercator,
was sold, after gruelling five
years, to the Croatian tycoon Ivica
Todorić, in moot circumstances and
after heavy lobbying, whilst the
governments feigned ignorance. In
terms of banking, Slovenian banks
were subject to at least three
recapitalisation episodes. The
“backbone of Slovenian economy”
sank, dragging the entire state
right to the edge of the abyss. “A
slow and painful death. For almost a
decade, our country has been
fighting an open crisis. It is a
systemic crisis which will go on for
years. The existing leadership
structures make no attempts at
addressing it. The powers that were
and the powers that be cannot, and
are in fact unable, to remedy the
economic crisis. This is not their
actual problem and the systemic
crisis is beyond their range of
thinking. Of course, it takes more
than just fresh faces -
it takes a whole new economic
programme. Our goal is to put in
place a social system with the main
attributes being market economy,
rule of law, a welfare state and a
society which is materially and
spiritually rich.”34 This is not a
quote from a current assessment of
the state of affairs; these words
were recorded in the fall of 1988 in
the programme document for the 13th
congress.
In fact though, the standard of
living only improved for a small
segment of the elite, but not for
the majority of people, and social
cohesion began to disintegrate.
Slovenia’s indebtedness (amounting
to 25 billion 307 million euro or
70% of the GDP)35 is almost the double
of the indebtedness of the entire
former Yugoslavia put together
(according to the World Bank, the
total indebtedness of Yugoslavia by
the end of 1991 amounted to 16.5
billion dollars, while, by the end
of 1990, Slovenia owed 1.798 billion
dollars).36 Today’s registered
unemployment rate in Slovenia hovers
around the 1993 level. “Inflation,
stagnation, indebtedness,
unemployment and inefficiency are
the result of an economic system
which drives economic entities to
make poor decisions that, instead of
driving progress, yield just enough
for bare survival.”37 Again, this is
not a quote from today’s newspapers
but a snippet from the SDZ programme
published in January 1989.
DEFENCE AND MILITARY
All political parties were in favour
of cutting expenses for defence.
Today, Slovenia’s defence expenses
are much higher than the country’s
share for defence in Yugoslavia
where a large part of Slovenia’s
industry, from steel works to the
manufacture of vehicles and highly
sophisticated equipment catered to
the defence sector. “In terms of
defence, the Democratic Opposition
of Slovenia will undertake to make
Slovenia a demilitarised zone”38 said
the Programme of the Democratic
Opposition of Slovenia (Demos)
issued in late 1989. “The foundation
of our defence policy is homeland
defence. This presupposes a
nonpartisan and non-ideological
military which is professionally
independent,” read the Programme of
SDZ.39
“In the long run, the Slovenian
social democrats will support the
proposal that Central European
countries be turned into a
demilitarised zone. The military’s
function is solely to defend the
country,” said the programme of the
Social-Democratic Union of Slovenia,
today SDS,40 its youth wing, the
Social-Democratic Youth
(Socialdemokratska mladina),
stating: “We consider the Army as a
public service the sole task of
which is to defend the national
territory against an outside
aggressor … In the long run, we
envisage Slovenia as a demilitarised
society and advocate the abolishment
of the military.”41
Slovenia switched from the
conscription system to a fully
professional army system. The army’s
image was tarnished by the sale of
arms and corruption scandals. Under
Janez Janša serving as the Minister
of Defence, the army, particularly
the military intelligence and
“para-intelligence” service, was
misused for political purposes.
After the country’s independence,
demilitarisation was never
considered as a serious political
project. Slovenia’s NATO accession
was pushed by Slovenian political
elites through well-financed
propaganda, media support and
connecting NATO accession with the
EU accession (there was a
simultaneous referendum on two
separate matters: accession to the
EU and accession to NATO, which was
met with dissatisfaction by the EU,
emphasising Euro-Atlantic
connections and lying that the
objective of Slovenian emancipation
was also entry into NATO). This
campaign was endorsed by all
politicians, including, at that time
already former, President Milan
Kučan, and even the Association of
Fighters in the National Liberation
Army (Zveza borcev NOV). An ardent
advocate, President of the Republic
of Slovenia Janez Drnovšek, PhD,
said in an interview: “I think
people already know this; we have
been saying that we want to join the
European Union and NATO ever since
our emancipation. The purpose of
both organisations is known – the EU
ensures us economic prosperity and
co-existence in Europe, and NATO
ensures us long-term defence
security. I suppose people
understand these two fundamental
elements. Most EU members have
memberships in the EU and NATO. The
accession processes into both
organisations were underway
simultaneously and I don’t see
anything wrong if the referenda take
place at the same time – it is a
sensible decision.”42 The Slovenian
Armed Forces operate in some crisis
areas in the service of the USA; in
reality, the occupation army is
directly involved in armed conflicts
(Afghanistan). Internally, the
Slovenian Armed Forces are
ideologically conflicted, which
mainly comes down to the active
minister and his world
views/political affiliation. At
certain times, the Armed Forces
sympathize with the Home Guard
Movement (domobranci), at other
times with the Partisan Movement –
and both whenever possible. Is seeks
tradition in everything and everyone
who ever wore a uniform in Slovenia.
In Germany, the army traces its
roots in the failed conspiracy
against Hitler, whereas in Slovenia,
army representative attend
celebrations commemorating the
collaborative Home Guard from WW2.
ENVIRONMENT
“It is more than clear that there is
no decisive comprehensive and
long-term environmental protection
policy in place in Slovenia. The
people responsible for the current
situation continue to hold on to
their obsolete view which sees
nature as an unlimited source of raw
material and energy, and a
convenient landfill, where the
purpose of human life is to take
full advantage of this.”43
“The environmental development
objectives can only be implemented
in a democratic, tolerant,
pluralistic, non-nuclear state
governed by the rule of law, which
respects human and minority’s
rights, freedom of political
organisation and public operation …
We live in an increasingly polluted
country, where the large part of the
population has to face a decline of
its already low material standard of
living. Not only do we need a
different environmental policy, but
a greener economic, social and
environmentally suitable social
strategy which fits the spatial and
environmental features of Slovenian
regions and their modest and
depleted natural resources.”44
“Nuclear power plants are the
ultimate symbol of human belief in
its own omnipotence. ZSMS therefore
advocates the closing of the Krško
Nuclear Power Plant and the Žirovski
vrh Uranium Mine.”45 ZSMS, a precursor
to LDS, set out to have the nuclear
power plant closed by 1995 at the
latest, and pass an act to ban
coal-fired power stations or those
running on fuel oil.46 The Krško
Nuclear Power Plant is still in
operation, whereas the billion euro
investment in Block 6 of the Šoštanj
Thermal Power Plant, which was
ordered by the authorities in 2006
and has had the support of every
government since, proved to be one
of the most costly and controversial
undertakings in Slovenia since its
independence. The decision was made
at the time of Janša’s government;
the initial cost of 536 million euro
eventually rose to a staggering 1.3
billion.47
Let us recall some other matters
addressed and promised by parties
which were created before the first
multi-party elections in the period
from 1988 to 1990:
The housing policy:
“The state should help citizens
realize their right to housing by
means of housing policy measures.
This process must not give rise to
special privileges for certain
categories of residents. Housing for
all, especially young families.”
(SDZ).48 The money from the Jazbinšek
Act which was adopted to regulate
the privatisation of socially-owned
dwellings was spent for other
purposes, and the housing policy
effectively became the source of
personal enrichment of various
political upstarts from the newly
created elite.
None of the political leaderships
set out to balance the housing fund
with rental dwellings and a systemic
solution to the housing problem of
young people seems more remote than
ever.
“Health care is significantly
underfunded no matter what
applicable indicator for comparison
we consider: our society allocates
at least two- to three-times less of
the national product to this area
compared to the developed European
countries … Slovenia has no concrete
plan for the long-term development
of health care nor an expert
institution with the authority and
power to handle the coordinated
development of health care
throughout the republic … This state
of facts (author’s comment:
fragmented health care system)
combined with the chronic
underfunding created a certain
degree of discrimination in terms of
one of the fundamental rights: the
right to health … We have to put in
place the option of private health
care providers. However, private
providers must be closely connected
with the public health care to form
a uniform system which is subject to
the same set of criteria for
professional competence and
control.”49
“We propose a pension insurance
system in which the solidarity
pension fund, which is obligatory,
will provide a pension that will
suffice to cover one’s basic needs …
The calculation shows that, at the
current pension allocation scope, at
a 5% capitalisation rate of the real
interest, the pensions could be
higher by 100%. We will push forward
to abolish the age limit for
retirement and to introduce
alternative retirement plans (e.g.
gradual retirement, contract work
etc.).”50
“SDZ opposes a research policy which
results in brain drain.”51 In 2013
alone, Slovenia saw the emigration
of 13,384 people, mostly young and
highly educated.52
In the same vein, one could
critically confront almost all
relevant areas of society which are
not covered herein, ranging from the
administrative organisation of
Slovenia (instead of division into
regions, it favoured municipalities,
leading to the 60 municipalities
existing in 1991 being fragmented
into 212, after the Constitutional
Court founded the Ankaran
Municipality in 2011), to promises
on a straightforward political
language which turned out to be even
less understandable then the
self-government political gibberish,
in which today’s politicians seem to
have an even poorer understanding of
the terminology they employ than the
ones back in the socialist regime.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, both the real or alleged
emancipators and the most ardent
advocates of a nation state as the
“end” of history mostly agree with
the criticism of the country’s
development over the last twenty
years, at least with regard to its
economic situation and democracy.
However, they do not see the reasons
in their own greed, the
privatisation of the emancipation,
corruption and clientelism which
they brought on; instead they turn
to Yugo-nostalgia, the dominance of
old forces, conspiracies designed to
block the so-called political spring
option to follow through with the
processes.
The political elite that led
Slovenia to its independence was no
better than the two elites that led
it into the embrace of both
Yugoslavias. Admittedly, it had more
legitimacy thanks to the plebiscite
and the elections, but had
ultimately misused it. Its mindset
was equally biased, self-centred and
focused on its own interests. It had
no other vision other than creating
a nation state, and no other goal
than to reign supreme in the
country, just like Anton Korošec and
his SLS supporters had governed in
the Drava Banovina in the years
preceding WW2. Despite Demos’s
pledge that its attitude to the past
will not be built on anti-party
revanchism, today this is the
central point of the political
activities on the right side of the
political spectrum, especially of
SDS, but also NSI and RCC, and the
media associated with them. There is
a permanent psychological war
underway. The last two decades saw a
greater hysterisation of society
than the Yugoslav period.
The urge for revanchism did not
subside and remains just as intense
as it was immediately after WW2, the
actions are proportional to the
respective events. In the latter
case, the action was to “only”
administratively erase those who
were, and still are, labelled as
enemies. Through some politicians,
who had influence at that time,
these reflexes linger on. After more
than twenty years of an independent
and autonomous Republic of Slovenia,
after a whole generation had been
born and grew up in an independent
country, those people still seek out
lustration in the country with the
help of right-wing European friends.
The rift in the country is the same
or even deeper than in the 1930s and
during WW2. Despite their systemic
attacks on the prosecution and
court, important figures from the
emancipation set have been convicted
res judicata on account of their
corruption and tycoonism. They were
convinced (and still are) that the
people, their fellow citizens,
should be eternally grateful for
bestowing upon them an independent
country and that their court trials
are a way of settling political
scores and elections merely a ritual
designed to institute them as
lifelong rulers based on their
alleged merits. When this doesn’t
happen, there must be a conspiracy
underway.
There is no use in asking the
emancipators about the past and the
achievements of the past. They have
no answers, merely excuses. Slovenia
is cemented in its independence
relationships and is now witnessing
its post-independence generation
drifting away – either leaving the
country or drifting through life
without a future. In conclusion,
allow me a quotation from the
programme documents of the 13th
congress of ZSMS, specifically from
the chapter Liberation from the
Liberators: “Worshipping of figures
and their destruction is foreign to
us … The future we seek, we see
beyond the empty iconography, and
the continuity of history moves
beyond the confinement by narrow
horizons and alternatives to the
past.”53
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