Case study 4
Summary:
The difference between the
right-wing and the left-wing
populism is that the former is a
class populism while the latter
nationalistic. However, there are
some similarities between the two
when it comes to means and sometimes
to final objectives. In the
situations with sharpened
ideological competition and,
especially, territorial disputes
between states the rightist populism
has a bigger power of mobilization
and, therefore, better chances to
win the struggle for power. Although
both are authoritarian, it is much
harder to democratize the rightist
one. They both should be
distinguished from totalitarianism
although they often lead towards it.
Some form of institutionalization of
international relations is
imperative for curbing the spread of
populism. As illustrative examples
this paper focuses on the cases of
Yugoslavia and Serbia.
Introduction
Democracies are
not unconditionally stabile. Whether
or not they will be depends on three
circumstances at least. One of them
is pluralism of interests. The other
are lasting, stable value system.
And the third is security: physical,
legal and social. How are
democracies being destabilized? And
what role does populism play in
this?
Pluralism of interests
Theoretically,
three mutually competitive outcomes
in three domains of public policy
have been harmonized. In the first,
political domain distribution of
power is crucial and the power is
manifest in the level of support
given to it no matter how this
support has been mobilized
(Gligorov, 1985). The second domain
is ideological and hence implies
value systems endorsed by
individuals or groups. The third is
economic in the largest sense of the
term, but here focused on just and
equal or unequal distribution.
These three
dimensions have different structures
or, to put it other way, their
competition – political, ideological
and economic – leads to different
distributions in each. For instance,
in politics they compete for
amassing popular support since
having the majority of any sort
ensures stronger influence on, say,
governmental decision-making and,
therefore, usually does not give an
upper hand to peripheral or minority
interests. Unlike political
ideological competition is after
strengthening authentic, original,
true or consequent stances and,
therefore, may favor minority but in
certain sense true and moral value
systems. Finally, inequality incites
disputes between, say, the middle
class and the poor, let along
between these two and the wealthy.
So we have three
competitive dimensions of
decision-making: one in which people
with similar interests join hands in
order to become more politically
powerful, the other that confronts
consequent with, say, pragmatic
stands, and the third which is
redistributive on, say, class basis
(Acemoglu, Egorov, Sonin 2012).
For instance,
democratic decision-making,
decisions that are being made by the
majority, confronts the majority and
the minority; ideological disputes
bring about the split between
orthodox and revisionists; economic
competition results in separation of
those who are poorer and those
richer. If interests, for instance,
are diverse enough, the majority set
of interests, majority coalition of
interests, which should also stand
for governmental program in
democratic decision-making, is
usually concentrated around the
center of political arena. However,
since ideological stands aspire to
propriety and credibility, aim at
being reliable, ethic and true to
themselves, it is only logical that
they are far apart; it is quite
possible, therefore, that the
minority defends certain stands, and
that’s why those genuinely committed
to an ideology are more likely to be
the advocates of extreme than
moderate values vis-à-vis, say,
supporters of predominant political
interests. On the other hand,
distribution of benefits should
usually favor more those who are
richer, and the interests and values
advocated by the majority, although
not to the extremes the ideological
division may reach.
More precisely, we
can see how the distribution of
values in those three dimensions
functions in some of stable
democracies. Interests should not be
polarized but pluralistic and
relatively equally distributed in a
political space; therefore those
interests that are somewhere in the
center should be the interests the
majority would vote for in elections
(Aristotle’s idea of a middle class
or, later on, a civil class).
However,
ideological values have to maintain
some distance between each other
(what is it that makes us different
from them); that is why they will
be, say, more to the left or more to
the right of those suited to the
political majority.
On the other hand,
the distribution of benefits would
reflect some inequality: there would
be more those who are poorer than
those well to do, so that an
averagely rich person would be
wealthier than someone representing
a democratic majority (this is the
sum and substance of the so-called
theory about a middle, average voter
that leads to the conclusion that
democracies do not exactly tend
towards favoring the poorer).
Should we divide
the space of those three dimensions
into a left and a right segment,
ideologically confronted people with
more extreme stands would be to the
left and to the right of a political
center, while a middle voter would
be in the majority, the same one
both sides need to win over to
ensure majority support, while an
averagely rich person would be, say,
to the right from that middle voter.
The majority
obviously depends on whether, let’s
call it in general, public space is
stable or not. Shifting it to the
left or to the right is one of the
ways of changing its relations. If
interests are, say, relatively
stable due to overall social and
economic stability and, hence, the
level of inequality also relatively
stable, the space can be shifted to
the left or the right through
ideological competition. Since
ideologues are almost professionally
more consequent or dogmatic than
most of their followers, in the case
political and economic interests are
subordinated to ideological because,
say, it is taken that political and
economic decisions have to be more
clearly and consequently justified,
the entire space could shift to one
side or the other.
And so the
possibility for political extremism
is to be found in the very nature of
ideological competition.
Moreover, because
of the possibility to have a
political space shifted through
ideological competition, the latter
could be played on for this very
purpose. Therefore, besides
advocating proper interpretation of
a political teaching, ideologies
could also stand for rationalization
of certain political or economic
interests. And indeed, the term
ideology is used in both senses: as
an authentic interpretation of
certain values and as promotion of
political or economic values to the
level of true values. We could call
them either inherent or
instrumental. In both cases they
aspire towards proper
interpretation, opposite to a wrong,
dogmatic or revisionist one, which
is why they want to be more extreme
or less prone to compromise than,
say, political or economic
interests. Their goal is to separate
commitment to values from commitment
to interest realization or from a
concern that endorsing an ideology
may cost one giving up one’s
existing or attainable benefits.
The public space
will shift to the extent of a
success of an ideological
competition; so, for instance, it
will be more adjusted to the
interests of those better to do or
those who are poorer. This requires
having the influence of pluralism of
interests reduced or at least
polarized in accordance with
ideological division.
Desirable and attainable
Division into an
ideological and political
competition sources from the very
nature of public activism that has
to determine how desirable and
attainable a goal is and take into
account that social contribution
could be differently distributed.
Each of those three elements of
public assessment and activity can
be a matter of independent choice; a
choice of a goal need not be made by
its attainability, while the
attainability itself may depend on
readiness and not only on capability
for reaching it, on strong will and
not only on available resources. For
instance, a goal can be binding even
if unattainable at the moment but
will be in the future, while
hesitating to start realizing an
attainable goal as it implies, say,
unequal distribution of
responsibility could make the very
goal undesirable.
Let’s take, for
instance, Rawls’ realistic utopia
(1971): a set of goals and means to
realize them, which is conceivable
and attainable only if distribution
of rights and duties changes in a
major way. That would be an
ideological offer extreme vis-à-vis
a political or any other system and,
therefore, utopian; but not
necessarily unattainable should an
ideological space shift enough to
this side and ensure mobilization of
political support.
So, this is a way
for ensuring legitimacy to
alternative political project though
ideological competition.
It is assumed here
that this is about a desirable goal
that is attainable if the necessary
readiness to invest necessary
resource in its realization is
ensured. At least one form of
populism can be determined when
compared with a real utopia. It
relates to a set of desirable goals
that are unattainable and not only
because of the absence of the needed
readiness or, to put it otherwise,
political support.
Now it probably
makes sense to digress to the sphere
of economic understanding of
populism. Researches of political
developments in Latin America in the
1970s and 80s are probably most
thorough (Dornbush and Edwards,
1991). In them, populism referred to
economic policy for redistributing
income from those better to do to
those who are poorer. These
researches were after analyzing
attainability of such redistribution
either by usual measures of economic
policy or systemic changes. They
resulted in criticism of populism as
an unattainable economic policy.
The simplest
example of this – not to bother
ourselves with detailed analysis of
this theory of populism – is
probably the so-called original sin.
A government, for instance, decides
to finance public expenditure with
inflationary policies or, to put it
simply, by money printing. This will
lead towards replacement of domestic
currency by foreign (which is the
“original sin”) and reduction of the
amount of taxable income, which
stands – so to speak – for total sum
of domestic currency; and to ensure
a desirable fiscal result this will
necessitate a speedier and speedier
inflation.
For instance, this
is how Serbia’s wars financed in the
early 1990s. Finally, a
hyperinflation testified of
impossibility of such monetary and
economic policy. Here we have the
original sin since replacement of
domestic currency by foreign turns
into a permanent tool of restricting
the use of inflationary taxes. This
original sin is being “inherited” as
it results – as it did in the case
of Serbia – in long-term use of
foreign currency – first the German
mark, and Euro now – in changed
circumstances, which remains the
same even when inflationary taxing
is given up. This is how monetary
policy becomes unavailable, which,
in turn, restricts fiscal and hence
practically every other
redistribution policy to the
advantage of the poorer and puts a
brake on the leftist populism making
it unfeasible.
It could be said
here that a reason behind the said
unfeasibility is the fact that
foreign currency is available at
all. A strict control of
cross-border financial transactions
would simply make it impossible for
domestic currency to flee into
foreign. More generally speaking,
protectionist measures of one sort
of other would make populist goals
attainable. This is in the basis of
teaching – like that of Dani Rodrik
– that economic nationalism, or
democratic in his case, ensures
economic progress while reducing
inequalities in distribution of
wealth and income. In Serbia’s case
– to be discussed more in the
paragraphs below – we had the
argument against signing the
Stabilization and Accession
Agreement with the European Union.
It should be
noted, without further analysis of
economic sustainability of economic
populism, that we are faced here
with two different types of
populism, which are somewhat
mutually connected if connected
around the idea of protectionism or
shunning competition with foreign
states or foreigners in general. One
of the two, so to speak, is leftist
or class populism that aims at
reducing the gap between the poorer
and richer, while the other, also in
a way, rightist or national meant to
increase “our” wellbeing rather than
“theirs” or, as they usually say
over here, to pursue the economic
policy that is in the service of
national or public interests.
Ideologues of both populisms aspire
at blending class and national
interests, which in itself questions
not only desirability but also
feasibility of so “blended”
populism.
Generally
speaking, economic studies of
populism, primarily in Latin
America, in the second half of the
past century mostly indicated the
incompatibility of political goals
and available resources, while
concluding that populism, leftist in
this particular case, rather paves
the way to regression than to
economic and social progress. This
is still a predominant analysis of
economic populism despite the fact
that some findings and conclusions
have been corrected in the meantime
(Rodrik, 2017).
Two populisms
As stated above,
most economic studies of populism
have been focused on Latin America.
One of the reasons why is that Latin
America’s experience resulted in the
so-called Washington consensus
(Williamson, 1990), notably
criticized by leftist economists and
commentators although not them only.
However, the experience of the 1930s
when advocates of the leftist, class
populism and those of the rightist,
national came into real conflict is
probably more relevant. Such
conflict is nonexistent in the
studies of Latin American populism
in the 1960s and 70s because the
advocates of autocracy or
dictatorship who were not directly
connected with the rightist,
nationalistic populism were on the
right.
The main
difference between the leftist and
rightist populism is in the policy
for redistribution of property and
income – in other words, whom it is
desirable to take from and whom to
give. The leftist, class populism
takes the rich are those to be taken
from and the poor to be given to.
The rightist, nationalistic populism
argues, “Take away from them and
give to us.” In the 1930s – under
considerable influence of Russia’s
October Revolution but also of the
ideology of revolutionary changes –
the right-wing did not perceive
democracy as an efficient tool for
reducing the class gap. It was
argued that class conflicts could
not be settled in elections but in
the streets only.
On the other hand,
the rightist populism advocated
ethnic cleansings and international
conflicts aimed at changing ethnic
fabric and state borders. The
rightist populism simply needs
enemies on racial, ethnic, cultural
or territorial basis. Therefore,
what matters the most in the
competition of the rightist and
leftist populism is a conflict to be
given the upper hand and whether
“national” is stronger than “class,”
so to speak.
For instance, the
1930s testify that the rightist
nationalism – in mobilization,
ideological and, after all, economic
sense – is more attractive than
class nationalism, especially when
argued, as it was, that national and
class are one and the same, i.e.
that nationalism is actually
concerned with the poor and
discriminated against; and that is
stands for a concern for national
territories or territories in
general that would ensure better
living to those humiliated and
insulted.
The main reason
why the rightist populism has more
political potential than leftist is
that its mobilization power is
bigger. It’s only logical that there
are more of us, members of a
national, than us as members of a
class, which is why it is, say,
easier for us to ensure directly, by
democratic means such as referendum,
support to national than to class
interests; and the more so – and
most importantly – since the means
for meeting those interests –
ideological, political and economic
means – are mostly the same.
But what is by far
most important is a difference in
expectations: the rightist populism
is seen as attainable while the
leftist is not.
The rise and
success of the Serbian nationalism
in the 1980s exemplifies the
rightist populism victory over
leftist. While criticism of the
regime - at least by dissident
circles and especially after 1968 –
was hued by the leftist populism
that mostly insisted on the growing
inequality, in the mid-1980s it
turned nationalistic as it became
obvious that the rightist populism
was not a proper answer to the
persistent economic and political
crisis of the era. So it happened
that the advocacy for better living
conditions for the poor and
criticism of “a new class” was
replaced by the advocacy for
national, not only economic but
mostly political, and territorial
interests. It turned out that unlike
consequent socialism nationalism has
a bigger mobilization power. Besides
and characteristic to every
populism, this mobilization goes
hand in hand with authoritarianism
and can be used to change the
establishment and justify
discrimination against minorities on
various grounds.
What is not populism?
In the 1930s
Stalinism and Nazism (as well as
fascism) were invoking masses or a
nation (people) while spreading
propaganda against foreign and
domestic enemies. For Stalinists the
enemies were private proprietors,
especially kulaks, but also the new
class of the privileged alienated
for the people. This also included
“unreliable” nations; the latter,
however, played by far more
important roles in Nazi ideologies
and regimes. About the same could be
said for subsequent fascist regimes
in Spain and Portugal. But these
were not populist regimes in literal
sense but most of all were
ideological, political and economic
foundations of totalitarian and
autocratic regimes that used
nationalism and the masses to
justify dictatorship and warring
goals. The rightist populism is
resembles very much these regimes
but is not, in principle,
totalitarian.
Besides, in the
period after they abandoned the
worst forms of Stalinism the
so-called people’s democracies were
not populist though this was how
they referred to themselves. They
just formally legitimized their
alternative systems of allegedly
direct democracy, which was
autocratic and dictatorial by usual
criteria for liberal democracies. To
those regimes the people were means
rather than goals. The people were
there just to demonstrate their
massive support to political and
economic goals of the ideological
avant-garde either at manifestations
or in elections. Regimes as such
could be labeled plebiscitary
one-party dictatorships.
This is why
totalitarian regimes, no matter how
soft or softened, should be mixed
with populist either with rightist
or even less – leftist.
The argument that
populism can end up not only in
authoritarianism but also in
totalitarianism is a different
story. Indeed, there are nuances of
populism-totalitarianism kinship
that have to be taken into account.
And once again, the difference
between leftist and rightist
populism should also be noted given
that, in the nature of things, it is
harder to establish totalitarianism
on class basis than on national: the
former involves a conflict within a
state while the latter between two
states. Consequently, there are – at
least in principle – ways to settle
conflict of interests in the first
case by, say, democratic means,
while in the second case it is
always about this type of hostility
or another, which may involve
violent methods for settlement,
especially if the two countries are
in dispute over territories.
Democracy in crisis
Although
totalitarian regimes in the 1930s
were not the same as those populist,
the crisis of democracy helps both
to emerge. This is why when
considering the crisis of
representative democracy in the
period between two world wars it is
rather important to understand the
problems democratic countries of
today are faced with. This is the
point of one of Schmitt’s most
influential books (1923). His theory
of the crisis of representative
democracy seems to be most modern
even to this very day. Namely,
according to him, debates in
representative bodies – as their key
means – do not result in political
decisions and, actually, a paralysis
of representative bodies is to be
realistically expected but not
necessarily their polarization.
Therefore, investing power into one
person or a group or a party through
democratic procedures or in the
streets could be the consequence of
disagreement within representative
bodies or their decision-making
incapacity.
Hence, the
paralysis of representative bodies –
Schmitt sees as an inevitable trait
of representative democracy – may
strengthen the roles of
authoritarian leaders enjoying
peoples’ direct support.
Therefore, it is
also inevitable that populist
regimes grow into totalitarian given
that the latter requires certain
ideological and accompanying
economic footing. These
preconditions were fulfilled in the
1930s with the ebb of ideological
liberalism and deep economic crisis
liberal and democratic institutions
and policies were blamed for.
Besides, territorial disputes
between states were not settled
despite the outcome of the WWI.
Finally, the paralysis was also
caused by polarized, extremely
rightist and leftist ideologies and
not only in representative bodies
but most of all - in the street.
So, all
preconditions for the rise of
populism were there: mass
unemployment resulted in endorsement
of nationalistic ideology and
protectionist and interventionist
measures, all of which not only
encouraged authoritarianism but also
the use of such power for mobilizing
the society and homogenizing
national goals.
This last step is
not imperative and probably not that
easy to make in the absence of an
external enemy. When it comes to
totalitarian regimes between the two
world wars, they grew out from
ideological and economic populism as
their goals were either ideological
or economic nature. An external
enemy is needed not only for
national homogenization but also as
a major support to a totalitarian
regime once people stop trusting it.
A war – be it cold or real – is one
of the ways for abandoning
democratic decision-making as was
the case in the 1930s.
The case of Serbia
clearly illustrates political
paralysis and ideological
radicalization of nationalism, along
with warring goals, resulting in
populist and authoritarian rule. As
usually the case, Serbia’s fate
depended on the outcome of war. And
while defeats left political and
territorial goals unattainable, the
predominant nationalistic ideology
survived and remained as such in
public life; along with accompanying
proneness to authoritarianism.
Different goals, similar means
In order to come
to power populists need a change in
public sphere. In principle,
democracy enables individualization
of interests as everyone has one
vote so that those individual votes,
summed up in elections, are
sufficient for taking over the
power; and they also encourage
pluralism in political sphere into
the majority and minority. Besides,
neither individual nor collective
consistency are necessary – at least
as times goes by – as democracy is a
system in which the people and the
government may change their minds
(for instance, once in four years).
The latter is important as it
ensures the needed flexibility in
changed circumstances. And when
circumstances change – and when
democracies function properly –
pluralism of interests and partisan
competition based on it stabilize
regimes and strengthen their
legitimacy.
And the other way
round: to ensure support in
democratic systems populism
necessitates a coalition between
those sharing same goals but are
actually ideologically very
distanced one from another: say,
some belong to the left and others
to the right wing. This populist,
leftist-rightist coalition may
result from mutual consent not so
much about goals as about means.
Namely, both leftist and rightist
populisms tend towards protectionism
and privileges for some strata of
the society vs. those considered
anti-people elements on this grounds
or other.
For instance,
populism of the right and left wings
in both the US and Europe is a
response to globalization.
Protective measures are more or less
the same when it comes to trade and
cross-border investments. Guest
workers and immigrants in general
play a most important role in all
this. Regardless of differences in
motives and justifications, let
alone in goals, both leftist and
rightist populisms advocate bans on
jobs for foreigners or their
immigration.
Though such
attitude towards foreigners and
their rights may seem logical as
they are not citizens of one’s
state, the same attitude towards
strengthening of rights within own
nation actually unites leftist and
rightist populists; for, in practice
and independently from goals aspired
to, protection from more rights for
some strata or categories of
population is identical to that from
foreigners: equalized rights
encourage competition in limited
resources, be they jobs that are of
special interest to the left-wing
or, say, cultural heritage rightist
populist may be notably concerned
with.
Therefore,
protective measures against
foreigners – either when it comes to
imports or investments, or to inflow
of immigrants – are basically so
much the same when directed against
equal rights to one or another group
of citizens of one’s own state,
members of the same nation – that
populism is not all-encompassing; in
other words, there are always some
segments of people that do not
belong to it, this way or another.
Denial of rights to foreigners or
certain members of one’s own nation
is common to rightist and leftist
populisms, regardless of the fact
that their goals may be quite the
opposite.
Populisms of no
matter what kind need not only
foreign nations but also
“foreigners” within one’s own nation
– alienated elites or unassimilated
minorities, or minorities having the
same rights and the nation itself.
Fear of an open society
Naturally, this
fear is evident in two cases; first
specifically characteristic for
rightist populism targeting, above
all, the so-called establishment;
the other marks leftist populists
who implicitly see social
homogeneity as contrary to the
devastating effects of an open
society, to put it so.
Criticizing the
alienated social strata as much too
cosmopolitan or auto-chauvinist, or
both, probably best illustrates
nationalistic populism, at least in
Serbia. These allegations in a small
and underdeveloped country such as
Serbia associate auto-colonialism
and this or that type of
intellectual corruption allegedly
because of their sense of
inferiority but more frequently due
to actual, overt or covert
corruption. Usually they are all
unspecified and opposed to true
interests of the people – of the
real, right-minded or orthodox,
authentic and patriotic people.
Persistent criticism of Radomir
Konstantinović’s Filosofija palanke
(Provincial Philosophy) may best
testify of this. Here the author
dissects the fear of an open
society, exemplified, above all, by
Serbian poetry. His critics, on the
other hand, either directly or
indirectly advocate a closed society
of this sort or other, while
emphasizing the necessity of
permanent dedication to national and
state interests in cultural policy,
let alone domestic and foreign.
Unlike its
rightist counterpart, the leftist
populism rests on the assumption
about a homogeneous society that
disintegrates when capitalism
infiltrates it, at home and abroad
alike. Karl Polanyi’s The Great
Transformation is probably most
influential in its criticism of
liberalism and market economy (Dani
Rodrik is the author’s today’s
follower). According to the two of
them, what keep up societies are
territories and their specific
social relations that disintegrate
once countries’ markets – markets of
capital and labor markets – open.
While barter is something natural,
trade in fictive goods such as
labor, capital and land are not. The
trade in the latter brings about
social differentiation and destroys
traditional and homogeneous human
relationship. Often quoted in the
context of Serbia, for instance, are
social relations in the system of
self-government, the adoption of
market and capitalist economy have
destroyed.
While leftist and
rightist populisms use the same
means regardless of their different
goals, leftist and rightist populist
are much closer in goals then in
means when it comes to their
attitude towards an open society.
Both populists stand for their
specific political and social
homogeneity, they just differ one
from another in means for its
realization. One of their
similarities is in the way they see
the alienated elites: either as
cosmopolitan or selfish, and as
responsible for adverse cultural or
social developments. Both of them
aspire to achieve national or social
homogeneity and advocate policies to
be used; although they have
different means in mind, those means
are, generally taken, protectionist,
since meant to protect a nation or
society from foreign influences of
this kind or other.
Embarrassing similarity
Many advocates of
leftist populism are embarrassed
with similarities – either in means
or in goals – with their rightist
counterparts. In this, the position
of the left-wing is worse than that
of the right: both ideologically and
politically.
This is especially
evident in trade policy. Given the
significance of this sphere it makes
sense to elaborate a bit the point.
Namely, it is important for a small
economy to be open to international
trade since there is no doubt that
great global market provides better
opportunity for more production and
sales than a domestic. However, an
open market implies specialization:
one cannot compete in everything,
especially with limited resources a
small market has at its disposal.
The said specialization also keeps
changing according to developments
at the global market; some countries
can strengthen their competitive
edge exactly in the areas one’s own
economy has specialized in. Under
such circumstances more developed
small economies, especially in
Europe, need insurance programs
against such structural shifts, to
put it so. This, above all, refers
to protection of business and income
of those who have not been in the
position to predict the said shifts.
So, if someone has invested in
certain qualification that is no
more competitive, this risk needs to
be insured against with public means
for adjustments through, say,
re-skilling one’s labor force or in
some other way that ensures adequate
employment.
Public authorities
in bigger countries need not offer
such forms of insurance since
possible effects of structural
changes – ergo, potential loss of
competitiveness in some sector of
production – are relatively
negligible when compared with
overall production. Besides, as a
rule, bigger economies are less
open, which means that exports and
imports have a smaller share in
total production. Authorities may be
pressed to protect domestic
production against foreign
competitors if and inasmuch as these
forms of insurance against risk –
unpredictable, at least from the
standpoint of employees - are
inadequate. And protectionism may
win considerable political points if
structural changes produce negative
effects on some region or industrial
towns; and such support is the more
so important if it can be used for
mobilization on class or national
basis.
The above
illustrates differences between
mobilization powers of the right and
the left. In cross-border
competition the right-wing populism
can rely on patriotism by claiming
that interests of “our people” are
opposite to those of foreigners.
Besides, along with corrupted
businessmen and cosmopolitan elites,
other cosmopolitans and
auto-chauvinist may be pressed to
face up their patriotic duties. On
the other hand, the left-wing
populism would probably rather
advocate strengthening of social
state, ergo, stronger rights and
forms of insurance against
structural changes at the global
market, but mobilization power of
such demands would be weaker when
the number of persons affected is
smaller. No wonder, therefore, if
voters affected by foreign
competitiveness vote to the
right-wing populists. This, in turn,
influences their program as they
practically adopt populist means –
closer economies – of the right-wing
populists.
Though a small
economy that hardly benefits from
economic policy of isolationism,
Serbia exemplifies what happens in
such political developments.
However, for a longer period of time
– and certainly ever since
provisions on foreign trade of the
SAA with the EU have been in force –
the right-wing populists have been
mostly influential; they have spoken
of workers’ and social rights though
they have had in mind national
interests when calling the SAA
harmful to economic activity and
especially to state budget because
of income lost on tariffs. But such
criticism ended when it turned out
as time went by that Serbia’s
economic activity has been kept
alive only thanks to free access to
Europe’s markets. Such effects on
bigger economies are smaller, hence
enabling more persistence on such
populist mobilization.
This is evidenced
by findings of the research of the
effects of globalization – in other
words, the effects of more liberal
trade and cross-border movement of
finances and capital both in the US
and Europe (the author et al. 2016;
Algan et al. 2017). This probably
the most referential study -
actually a collection of studies -
on the effects of China’s membership
of WTO on American market of labor
and goods found that this impact was
unexpectedly big in some regions and
manufacturing sectors and relatively
small from the standpoint of economy
as a whole. According to the
findings, the effects on European
economies were about the same or, to
put it precisely, even smaller. On
the other hand, political
consequences were bigger since the
affected voters were mostly
supporters of right-wing populists
and, as such, had even more
distanced right-wing populist
agendas from traditional leftist
political programs. Hence, the
support to closed markets grew
stronger, and demands for better
social and property protection less
influential.
Those from the
left-wing who had advocated
protectionism seem to be embarrassed
by the fact that the right-wing
populism is now promoting the same.
Those who have studied populism on
the South American case were after
detecting industrial policy as a
developmental alternative that would
be easier to implement should there
be market protection. This
assumption was valid in most South
American countries given that bigger
countries in this region had not
been much exposed to foreign trade,
while having probably the highest
degree of inequality in the world;
therefore the leftist populism
prevailed over the rightist
(besides, territorial disputes
between these countries are rare).
Everything is
different when stronger protection
from foreign competition is placed
on the agenda in traditionally more
open countries. Justification of
such measures goes hand in hand with
populist mobilization and the line
drawn between “us” and “them,” which
plays into the hands of rightist
populism. And so it happened that
leftist populist had to argue for
measures of economic protectionism
they had advocated themselves at the
time right-wing populists had
already taken over such economic
program; like, say, in America and
Britain.
The fact that the
left-wing has democracy as its major
ally since there has always been
more those who were poor or working
for salaries than the right living
on their wealth or properties was a
reason for extra embarrassment.
However, populisms, as a rule, lead
towards authoritarian regimes, at
least temporarily. Therefore, it is
hard to stand up to, say, Roderick’s
democratic nationalism when the
national economic program is mostly
in the hands of rightist, autocratic
populists.
So it is a most
complex task facing the advocates of
leftist populism and economic
protectionism to distance themselves
from the prevalent rightist
populism; and especially now when
leftist populism is not even
influential in South America. In the
of Serbia populist and protectionist
economic policy – i.e. protectionism
against the European Union – has
gradually died out due to the
benefits from exports to EU markets
and the time of the country’s
economic and fiscal crisis. However,
this is somewhat to the advantage of
rightist populists to whom
ideological, cultural and national
protectionism is by far more
important than trading protectionism
especially if it is oligarchic or,
as they like to put it, in national
and state interest.
Attraction of extremes
Why populisms lead
towards or support authoritarian
regimes? The above-mentioned
paralysis of representative bodies
can be one of the reasons why. The
use of resources that can barely
ensure support in pluralistic
conditions may be another. The third
may be in the very nature of
ideological competition that is
somewhat to advantage of extreme
stands.
An analysis of
ideological competition should
distinguish different forms of
rationalization of interests – the
initial Marxist understanding of
ideology – and comprehensive
interpretations of political goals
and means inherent to them as, say,
in the case of ideologies based on
religion. The latter lead towards
extremism or can be used, as least,
to justify extreme stands.
This is nothing
new. Actually, this is the bedrock
of understating of European history,
especially if expanded to all the
parts of the world that have been
under Europe’s influence and that
have been either Westernized or have
opposed to it in the meantime.
Referring to multiculturalism or
secularism on the one hand and
Serbia’s political integration into
Europe on the other makes sense
here. It goes without saying that
referring to the case of Yugoslavia,
its emergence and reasons behind its
disintegration, also makes sense in
this context.
It is well-known
that religious conflicts had been
among the problems plaguing Europe’s
stability and security. This is why
as the time went by European policy
has been secularized. About the same
refers to nationalistic conflicts
that influenced the idea about
creating some sort of European
political union. Finally,
ideological conflicts between
extreme right-wing on the one hand
and Stalinism on the other
influenced, no doubt, better
understanding of the significance of
democratic decision-making.
It is also known
in Europe’s history and politics
that ideological competition incites
extremism, which is the reason why
we need the context of public
debates and decision-making to
undermine its influence if it cannot
be rationalized. The said context is
secular and pluralistic.
Ongoing
developments in Europe somewhat
resemble political developments on
the eve of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration. Here, one should
also take into consideration
similarities of economic
circumstances since Yugoslav economy
has stagnated in its the last decade
while considerable parts of the EU
are now faced with similar economic
challenges. The difference is, to
put it straight, that there have
been no territorial disputes in
Europe so far while territorial
disputes were crucial in the case of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration
(Gligorov, 1994).
Nevertheless,
revival of ideological disputes in
Europe – either nationalistic or
religious by nature – incites
extreme stands. However, the latter
are more influential at the
right-wing than on the left. The
leftist populism would move to the
territory of its rightist
counterpart should it resort to
religious or national extremism,
which would be contrary to political
interests of the left-wing as such
cases testify of. Generally
speaking, in the case of Europe at
least, the left-wing populism has
contributed to the growth of the
rightist while the other way round
has not been the case – at least not
up to now.
And yet,
Yugoslavia and the states emerging
from it provide a good example or
good examples. Although the
left-wing usually blames liberals or
neo-liberals for more or less
everything, unwillingness to draw a
clear ideological line between
leftist and rightist nationalistic
populism is basically the reason why
the political space trends towards
the right in all the states, and why
the right prevailed on the eve of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration.
Therefore,
ideological competition not meant to
mobilize voters’ support but
believers of this sort or another
usually tends towards extremism,
especially when it invokes
collective goals – national,
religious, cultural – and thus
usually provides an upper hand to
rightist and authoritarian populism.
Conclusion
Populisms resemble
one another as they trend towards
protectionism, although the left,
class populism differs from the
right one by its goals or attainable
goals at least. The goals of the
rightist, nationalistic populism are
usually territorial, which is why it
is often hostile to neighbors. But,
generally speaking, populisms are
undemocratic either because their
representative bodies are paralyzed
or because they emerged against the
backdrop of ideological
polarization. The latter results
from ideological competition aimed
at erasing pluralism and, therefore,
trends towards inciting extremism.
In addition, mobilization,
ideological and political power of
nationalism is bigger than any the
power of any version of the leftist
populism. This is especially so in
economic crises and, even more, in
the situation of long stagnations.
Serbia is a good example of the rise
of the rightist populism and its
ideological survival of defeats
suffered even in a war. It is easier
to democratize the leftist populism
than the rightist since the former
is pluralistic, at least when it
comes to social classes, while the
latter is not being based on
homogenization enabled by an
ideology, which is, as a rule,
extremist by its national,
statehood, cultural and historical
goals.
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