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The Albanians of Kosovo in
Yugoslavia – the Struggle
for Autonomy |
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Case
study 2
In his memoirs,
Fadil Hoxha recollects how terrible
he felt when Milivoje Bajkić had
yelled at him for writing the
recruits’ names in Albanian while
they were mobilizing men to fight
for Yugoslavia’s final battles.1
Being slammed for using his mother
tongue, he claimed, had made him
aware of the unitarist tendencies
that were becoming evident among the
Serbs in Yugoslavia. This fear of
unitarist approaches, a pejorative
term meaning Serbian centrist
tendencies, was prevalent among the
internationalists, who opposed the
formation of one nation from all the
nations in Yugoslavia.2
Kosovo was
incorporated into Yugoslavia rather
than Albania because of the
influence that the Serbian
communists had, because of the
indifference of Tito on this matter,
and ultimately because of the
inability of the Albanian Partisans
to do anything about it. At a
meeting in Belgrade in 1944, Fadil
Hoxha recalls, Edvard Kardelj had
transmitted Tito’s decision to the
former, that it was perhaps best to
leave Kosovo as part of Serbian
territory to appease the Serbs,
whose insurgence at such a time
would cause a great deal of trouble.3
At one point, even the Montenegrin
Marko Vujaćić had argued to Tito
that the Dukagjini Plain (Metohija
in Serbian) belonged to Montenegro,
but Djilas had countered this
argument by drawing attention to the
fact that if the Dukagjini Plain
were to be incorporated into
Montenegro, thereafter the
Montenegrins would become a minority
in their own republic.4
The worst
incidents after the Partisans
secured control over Kosovo, were
the events that occurred in Tivari,
where 1,670 Albanian recruits were
killed on their way to the Syrmian
front.5 This contributed somewhat to
fostering anti-communist sentiments
in the rural regions of Kosovo,
especially in Drenicë, from where
the majority of recruits were
drawn.By September 1945, the Serbian
Parliament passed a law on the
formation of two autonomous regions
within the republic, namely
Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija.6
The Party’s
Agitprop (the Agitation Propaganda
issued by adepartment at the Central
Committee witht he same name)7 seemed
barely successful in Kosovo, nor
significantly so elsewhere.8 However,
the emergence of schools in 1945
teaching in Albanian were welcomed -
where books and teachers came from
Albania proper–and this met with a
positive response and represented a
step forward in embracing the
newly-formed government in Kosovo,
an approach which had not been
practized under the previous
Yugoslav government.9 The calls to
action were mostly led by local
communist cadres, who had the
charisma to go from village to
village and convince the local
peasants about the necessity and
benefits of a united Yugoslavia. It
is evident that there were no
attempts at ideological
indoctrination of the local
populace, at least not until 1947.10
This rang especially true for Kosovo
–indoctrination with
Marxist-Leninist concepts was a
rather strange thing for the local
peasants who had not yet fully
surpassed feudalism. However,
economic and social differences
existed between the semi-urban and
rural groupsand this perhaps
contributed to the fact that urban
classes were more rapid in adopting
Marxist-Leninist theses. In
connection with this assertion,
Ströhl eobserves that the prevalence
of social disparities in socialist
Yugoslavia among the rural and urban
classes was noticeable even during
the later decades of socialist
Yugoslavia.11
After the
establishment of the Federation, the
State Security Department (OZNA)
already began retaliating against
“enemies of the people”. While
initially formed to discover war
crimes, it very swiftly transformed
into the Party’s weapon to eliminate
political enemies. While those
groups that had been considered
enemies during the war such as the
Ustašas, Chetniks, active Germans,
and šiptari,12 were eliminated to some
extent, the latter remained a
perennially stigmatized group within
socialist Yugoslavia.
Having established
political control, the communists
sought to put into motion an
economic revolution by 1947, aimed
at changing Yugoslav society from an
agrarian into an industrial society.13
However, due to extremely backward
and stagnant development, the
process lagged far behind in Kosovo
– it finally occurred in 1957.14 The
initial emergence of socialism and
the formation of cooperatives were
welcomed in Kosovo.15 They were
considered the first step upthe
ladder of economic development. The
cooperatives eventually grew into
small, modern factories.16 There were
not that many families who owned
large pieces of arable land, but
those who did own land, certainly
had to give it away to the state.
And this was not necessarily a bad
thing – indeed, it assured the
instalment of socialism to some
extent and a fairly equal
distribution of goods. It made
certain that the average peasant
could be sustained without having to
work the land of some landowner with
minimal reparation. However, on a
general scale, it became evident
within the second half of the ‘40s
that agricultural production was
insufficient to sustain the general
populace in Kosovo, an issue which
most likely resulted from the
inability to stimulate efficient
production.17 This changed slightly
for the better when modern
agricultural technologies were
introduced and with the introduction
of land production based on
self-management during the period
from 1950 until 1952.18 The peasant
resistance that erupted in
Yugoslavia in 1954 pushed the
government to oust the peasant
workers’ unions as a form of
collective ownership.19
The ideological
monopoly which the Party, renamed
the League of Communists of
Yugoslaviain 1952, enjoyedelsewhere
in public life20 translated poorly to
the average Kosovar Albanian and the
alienation that a great number of
Albanians felt in relation to the
Yugoslav state remained intact.
The emergence of
Yugoslav socialism21 also brought to
light the potential dichotomy of
centralism versus federalism.
Although these political
inclinations were clearly evident on
governmental levels, they took on a
completely different nuance in
Kosovo. The centralist approach of
the Serbian republic, which aimed to
expand its power and influence
vis-à-vis other republics in the
federation, was viewed as a
continuity of Serbian oppression to
Kosovar Albanians. This became
increasingly evident in 1948, where
Kosovo was seen as the proxy
ideological battlefield between the
Albanian Stalinists and the Yugoslav
Communists. Ironically, Enver Hoxha
accused Tito in 1948 of attempting
to incorporate Albania in the
Yugoslav Federation in a blatant
attempt at imperialist colonization,
at the height of the Stalin-Tito
conflict.22
Admittedly,
Albania sent spies to Kosovo, which
conversely transformed the latter
into the “most dangerous place in
the country”.23 In the meantime, some
Kosovo Albanians also left for
Albania.24 In effect, this excused the
state-organized usage of violence
against Kosovar Albanians accused of
treachery, in the form of forced
imprisonment and beatings.25 Fear of a
counter-revolution grew
exponentially, thus legitimizing the
actions of UDBA to raid Albanian
homes for weapons – and those who
didn’t have any weapons would be
forced to buy them so that they
could hand over something when
requested.26 In the meantime, a secret
trial was held in Prizren in July
1956, against nine people charged
with engaging in espionage against
Yugoslavia for Communist Albania.27
Their execution was followed by
rising nationalistic irredentism,
albeit latent.
In his memoirs,
Fadil Hoxha says that this benefited
OZNA28 and Serbia financially –
because according to him “the
weapons were being bought from
Serbia to hand over to OZNA|”.29
Aleksandar Ranković played a major
role in using state mechanisms to
suppress the Albanians, which
resulted in furthering local
inter-ethnic grievances.30 He was of
the opinion that the state security
apparatus was a tool for destroying
“internal and external reaction”.31
Therefore, it comes to no surprise
that harsh action was taken against
Albanians – they were considered
foreign bodies within Yugoslavia who
neither fitted naturally into a
South Slavic state, nor made any
significant attempts to adapt to it.
It is highly likely that ethnic
stigmatization contributed to the
status they earned as a reactionary
force against communism and the
state.
Credible
historical sources regarding this
period and this issue, in
particular, are scanty. However the
action of arms requisition triggered
another reaction -persecution and
subsequently fear among the
Albanians, a factor that might have
influenced some of them to emigrate
to Turkey.
The reconciliation
with the Soviet Union in 1955
increased Yugoslavia’s importance in
the international arena. However,
relations with Albania remained bad.
This resulted in further estranging
Kosovar Albanians, and the ‘50s
stand as a historical testimony to
this inability to adapt. The issue
of the national and ethnic identity
of the Albanians in Kosovo
re-emerged, equating them once again
with the Turks. This resulted in
about 50,000 Albanians emigrating to
Turkey between the years 1953-1954.32
This wave of migrations was
initiated after the Split agreement
between Tito and the Turkish
Minister for Foreign Affairs Mehmet
Fuat Köprülü.33 Granted, a number of
Albanians spoke Turkish in their
homes, a tradition thatsome Albanian
families had absorbed from the
Ottoman past and maintained it as an
oriental remnant. What might have
further contributed to this
situation was the prohibition of
Albanian schools throughout the
existence of the First Yugoslavia.34
In his memoirs,
Fadil Hoxha recalls his meeting with
Aleksandar Ranković in an attempt to
explain that identifying themselves
as Turks was a cultural remnant
rather than an actual ethnic
appellation for the Albanians. He
discussed it further to resolve this
issue with Ranković, who thereafter
agreed that Albanians should not
leave Yugoslavia, but only Turks
could do so.35 This evidently referred
to the “free migrants” who were
leaving for Turkey on a voluntary
basis in accordance to Turkey’s Law
on Settlement and who identified
themselves as belonging to the
Turkish ethnicity or identity, which
in itself under the law was not a
clearly defined concept.
Turkish-speaking communities like
the Bosniaks, Pomaks, Circassians,
Albanians and Tatars had benefited
from this law.36 However, the
exclusion from key public positions
and marginalization that Albanians
faced in Yugoslavia certainly pushed
them further into emigrating to
Turkey. The reasons for emigrating
were numerous and varied in nature –
discrimination, persecution and lack
of economic prosperity which
resulted in social and cultural
exclusion from Yugoslav society
seemed to have been the major
incentive behind these migrations.37
It is estimated that more than
80,000 emigrated to Turkey between
1953 and 1966.38
Adem Demaçi, a
young Albanian man, had raised his
voice against these resettlements,
which he believed were attempts by
the Serbian authorities to cleanse
Kosovo of Albanians. He was
imprisoned in 1958 and was released
three years later. In a series of
suppressive measures, as a sign of
vigilance against what was assumed
to be cradles of Albanian
nationalism, the Albanology
Institute was closed in 1955, having
been established only two years
prior.39 These oppressive actions also
contributed to the growing
irredentism amongst Albanians, who
interpreted the closing of the
Albanology Institute as a clear sign
of national oppression against the
development of Albanian
consciousness.
After Adem
Demaçi’s release, he founded the
Revolutionary Movement for the
Unification of Albanians, a
clandestine organization which, as
the name suggests, promoted
unification with Albania proper.40 In
1964, he was again put on trial as
the leader of a pan-Albanian
movement (the National Movement for
the Annexation of Kosovo to Albania)
and was sentenced to jail for 15
years.41 Adem Demaçi went on to become
the symbol of Albanian national
resistance.
The discontent of
the Albanians was growing, and as a
sign of resistance, some youngsters
began to unfurl the Albanian
national flag as a gesture of
opposition towards the regime
throughout 1956. This action was
again followed by arrests and
interrogation of the accused by
UDBA.42
Although
principally against irredentism,
Albanian politicians continued their
attempts to promote the wellbeing of
Albanians within the federation.
With the revisions of the Federal
Constitution in 1963, Kosovo was
given the status of an autonomous
province, as opposed to an
autonomous region.43 This was a
positive development for Kosovo,
much to the dismay of some Serbian
authorities, who interpreted it as a
sign that Serbia was losing
dominance over Kosovo. Matters
deteriorated further at the Fourth
Session of the Central Committee of
the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia, where Ranković was
ousted, although this occurrence
paved the way for advancement of the
Kosovo case on a federal level. The
meeting also set into motion the
course of further federalizing the
republics.44 Internal polarization was
already evident in the ‘60s, but the
meeting sent a clear signal to
Serbian high-ranking officials.45
While the student
demonstrations that erupted in
Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere
in Yugoslavia represented a
rebellion against the ruling
oligarchies46,the demonstrations that
erupted in October and November of
1968 in towns throughout Kosovo were
motivated by a slightly different
agenda. The majority of the
protesters who were Albanian
students demanded a republic and an
Albanian university.47 Although there
were reprisals against the
demonstrators, with one demonstrator
even ending up dead and some 22
others who protested in Tetova being
imprisoned, the effect of the
demonstrations helped elevate the
Kosovo case within the political
echelons of Yugoslavia.48 Three years
later, the University of Prishtina
was established in 1971.49 For Hydajet
Hyseni, who would later become a
member of Grupi Revolucionar
(Revolutionary Group) and a
political prisoner, the
demonstrations of 1968 influenced
his national fervor.50
In the meantime,
progressive steps were being taken
to elevate the status of Albanians
within the Yugoslav Federation.
Albanian was acknowledged as an
official language in 1971.51 The
Congress for Unification of the
Albanian Language was held in 1972
in Tirana, where Kosovar Albanian
delegates were sent to participate
at the meeting. The latter supported
the application of a standardized
Albanian language that would be used
in Kosovo, which was mostly based on
the Tosk dialect of Albanian.52
Acceptance of this standard signaled
a national unification of Albanians,
at least within linguistic margins.
The final event that had an
everlasting effect on the
deterioration of Serbian-Albanian
relations was the revisions to the
Constitution in 1974, which
confirmed the status of Kosovo as an
autonomous province.53 This granted a
vast amount of rights to Kosovo in
terms of self-government, much to
Serbia’s defiance.
Demanding a Republic of Kosovo
True to his
fundamental communist beliefs,
Miroslav Krleža was of the opinion
that the right to
self-determination, including
secession as a manifest of rhetoric,
is easily transformedinto
nationalism and irredentism.54 As
such, the national irredentism of
Albanians in Kosovowithin the
Yugoslav communist framework was
ideologically a betrayal of the
communist foundations of denouncing
nationalism as a destructive force
in the communist social system, and
therefore was treated as a
counter-revolutionary force that
must be met with proper retaliation.
However, in the greatdebate on the
sustainability of Yugoslavia as a
multi-ethnic country, it is
historically relevant to acknowledge
the growing nationalism and
irredentism that was being fostered
and nurtured in the other republics
as well, even if they were more
latent in development. These were
crucial impediments to Yugoslav
integration.
The movements in
themselves invited a further
increase in national polarization
and ultimately stimulated the
antagonized parties who, by and
large, rejected the overt centralism
of the federation gravitating
towards Serbia. While the
destruction of Yugoslavia is a
multi-faceted historical debate, to
which one would not do justice in
attempting to analyze it as anything
else but a treatise when discussing
Kosovo’s place in Yugoslavia, one
must confine oneself to addressing
the political role of the communist
cadres and their counter-ideological
colleagues in the historical
developments that occurred in Kosovo
during the last decade of
Yugoslavia’s existence.
Central to this
debate are the irredentist
nationalist organizations, or
clandestine groups, who arguably
laid the foundations of a unified
resistance against Serbian
oppression in Kosovo. However, just
like any other historical event, the
political movements and the Albanian
resistance were not linearly
unified, where many ideological
hurdles had to be overcome and
numerous political alignments
shifted to achieve independence from
Serbia. In this historical
discussion, it would be inaccurate
and superficial to assume that
Kosovo’s history in Yugoslavia was
limited solely to a perpetual
inter-ethnic feud, the Serbian vs.
Albanian duel, and even further
irreverent to adopt the humdrum
“ancient hatreds” as the ubiquitous
reason behind Albanian-Serb
tumultuous relations.
Therefore I adopt
Todorova’s negation that the bloody
history of the Balkans begins within
the geographical realm of Kosovo in
138955, an assertion which wrongfully
asserts that socio-cultural groups
are unchanging and eternal, hence
the medieval hatreds deriving from
fluid ethnic identities in the
Balkan context stand immutable. To
take a position on this issue seems
to be imperative when discussing the
role of Kosovo in the Yugoslav wars,
whose geographical importance in the
medieval context was invoked to stir
up the masses.
In similar
atavistic vein, it has been argued
that the demonstrations of 1981
initiated a domino effect that
exposed the brittleness of the
federation. Meier is quick to
repudiate this assertion by calling
the attention to the “Croatian
Spring” and the following spark of
state repression in Croatia.56 This
assertion is not intended to divert
the reader from the importance and
the effect that the 1981
demonstrations hadon the history of
Yugoslavia’s demise, but rather to
point out that tensions in
Yugoslavia evidently predated the
inter-ethnic feuds in Kosovo, and
that the latter were not prevalent
exclusively in Kosovo.
Nonetheless, it is
also important to address the
argument that national sentiments
were not suppressed in Yugoslavia,
but that they were merely utilized
by national groups to regress entire
social groups into previous feuds.57
While partially true, and perhaps
more valid within the context of
inter-ethnic hatred between the
Slavic nationalities of Yugoslavia,
to negate the existence of ethnic
hostilities between the Serbs and
Albanians prior to 1974 would simply
be historically inaccurate. Frankly,
the argument does not do justice to
the discourse of Albanians in
Yugoslavia – a surplus of historical
evidence suggests that while
national sentiments were utilized to
incite specific political behaviors
at certain periods, the inter-ethnic
feud between the Serbs and Albanians
was in many ways pervasive
throughout Kosovo’s history in
Yugoslavia.
This assertion is
strongly supported by the evident
persecution that Albanians faced
when expressing irredentist, i.e.
nationalistic, stances in the
immediate examples after the
creation of socialist Yugoslavia.
Whether the intent was to persecute
them solely on an ethnic basis or
because nationalistic stances were
incongruent with the reigning
communist ideology is difficult to
assert with certainty. One must note
that the public statements and
official approach of Serbian party
officials in the late ‘80s and early
‘90s justified their actions
precisely by calling on the latter,
and then went on to install a police
state in Kosovo. Perhaps in this
case, the figure of Dobrica Ćosić
provides an excellent example of how
inter-ethnic antagonisms were shaped
throughout the second half of the
20th century, even among the truest
of communists.58
The student
demonstrations of 1981 marked a
turning-point in Kosovo’s history.
The demand to elevate Kosovo’s
status to a republic indicated that
the Albanian masses had grown so
great in numbers that they felt
sufficiently comfortable in their
right to demand such a position
within Yugoslavia, an appeal which
had been thought impossible only
decades earlier. The factors leading
to such a tumultuous situation are
numerous and most likely
complemented each other. The
economic downfall of Kosovo, or
rather its stagnation, had a great
impact on the prosperity of Kosovo’s
young people. The accumulation of
tensions between ethnic groups
furthered the overall grievances,
and left both groups immensely
polarized. The Serbs, on the one
hand, anticipated the ramifications
that a Kosovo comprised of an
absolute majority of ethnic
Albanians would bring – and the
Albanians felt secure enough in
their numerical strength that the
time had come to raise their voice
against what the majority of them
considered to be centuries-long
Serbian oppression.
While there were
Albanians who were vehemently
anti-Yugoslav in their conviction
and furthermore demanded unification
with Albania proper, a great number
of Kosovar Albanians had submerged
within the social and cultural
threads of Yugoslavia, and remained
at least fairly firm in their
beliefs that Yugoslavia could
prevail as a state provided that
Kosovar Albanians would be
recognized as a nation59 and given the
rights they believed they deserved.
The latter usually occupied public
offices and were members of the
League of Communists. While it might
be easier in this discourse to
employ absolute terms and proclaim a
certain group anti-Albanian (or
collaborators with the Yugoslavs)
and deem the other groups devout
nationalists who fought for the
Albanian cause, as seems to be the
current trend in Albanian
historiography, the truth is that
both groups fall somewhere in
between. The existence of
irredentist clandestine Albanian
organizations who proclaimed
themselves Marxist-Leninists60
provides a great example as to how
these political identities were not
clearly defined, and rather than
portraying a division between
ideological alignments among the
Albanians, they best represent the
historical development and
ideological approaches which paved
the way for a political
consciousness of self-determination.
Ultimately, it can be argued that
both the left and the right were
willing to fight for a common cause.61
The fusion of the Marxist-Leninist
and nationalist groups occurred in
1993, when both groups were willing
to set aside their ideological
differences to fight for a common
cause and participate in the Kosovo
Liberation Army.62
The irredentist
Albanian organizations63 operating
during previous decades, had
certainly left a mark on a growing
national consciousness in the
Albanians, and in many ways
influenced forthcoming political
developments by instilling and
promoting nationalistic and
anti-Yugoslav sentiments among the
youth. At the same time, they serve
as a great historical guide on how
the Albanians’ struggle for
independence began from modest
demands to use Albanian as an
official language, to use the
national flag, from establishing the
University of Prishtina, and lastly
to demand independence. The illegal
organizations represented a mainly
latent ideological resistance
against the Yugoslav establishment
because their activity in itself was
limited to an ideological one,
especially so in the previous
decades. While numerous scholars
agree that this struggle was
continuous – in a sense, it was –
such conclusions might indicate that
this struggle had been continuous,
unified and unchanging since the
establishment of the Yugoslav
Federation, which it certainly
wasn’t. While irredentist Albanian
organizations were profoundly active
during the ‘60s, a number of them
ceased their activities during the
‘70s, only to regroup and ignite
another wave of activities in the
‘80s. While most of these
occurrences correspond directly to
cultural, economic and social
developments in Yugoslavia, it is
the demonstrations of ’81 and the
activity of the illegal
organizations of the same decade
that truly mark the social and
cultural developments most specific
to Kosovo. Although the party
officials in Kosovo attempted to
keep these movements under control,
the cohesion gap between the Serbian
authorities and the local Kosovar
Party representatives resulting
under circumstances of Kosovo’s
autonomy64, aggravated the
retaliation of the Serb authorities
against the irredentist movements.
Irredentists, who were labeled
nationalists in Kosovo, were
persecuted throughout Yugoslavia.65 By
1975 and onward, UDBA was arresting
people indiscriminately, which in
itself ignited reactionary
rebellion.66
The riots of 1981
were particularly brutal. They
initially erupted in Prishtina on
the March 26 1981. That same
evening, the then president of the
League of Communists of Kosovo,
spent hours with the students
ensuring them that conditions
wouldimprove at the university.67
However, in the upcoming months they
spread to other cities such as
Podujevë, Gjilan, Vushtrri, Lipjan
etc.68
By April 6, a
state of emergencywas declared in
Kosovo.69 The police retaliated
brutally, with as manyas 300people
beingkilled during these
demonstrations and some 1,000 others
wounded.70 Almost 1,700 people were
imprisoned and 154 awaited trial.71
In 1981, another
nationalist Albanian organization
was established, which was named
Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e
Kosovës (the Popular Movement for
the Republic of Kosovo), founded by
Hydajet Hyseni, Mehmet Hajrizi and
Nezir Myrtaj.After its fusion with
other clandestine organizations, the
LPRK would play an indispensable
role in forming the Kosovo
Liberation Army. A similar
organization, the irredentist
organization “Lëvizja për Republikën
Socialiste Shqiptare në Jugosllavi”
(The Movement for a Socialist
Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia) was
formed in 1982,initially in
Switzerland by Xhafer Shatri, and
later in Kosovo by Gafurr Elshani
and Shaban Shala.72 The Movement,
which sought the elevation of
Kosovo’s status to a republic within
Yugoslavia, was accused of plotting
unification with Albania proper.73 The
activity of these groups
intersected, yet they often merged
into one group within a geographical
region.74
Between the years
1981 and 1986, around 4,000
Albanians were imprisoned75,
allegedlyfor being involved with
irredentist nationalist
organizations. By 1988, the number
of those imprisoned had reached
584,373.76
This decade also
marks the period when initial
attempts to organizearmed resistance
were being put into effect. Jusuf
Gërvalla, Bardhosh Gërvalla and
Kadri Zeka attempted to organize
armed Albanian resistance based in
Germany, but they were quickly
uncovered by the Serbian police
service in cooperation with the
secret service in cooperation with
the German police.77 They were killed
in Germany in 1982.78 The Albanian
diaspora becameincreasingly active
for the national cause, forming
clubs and societies that would later
serve as a basis to financially
support the Kosovo Liberation Army.
By July 1983, around 55 illegal
groups had been uncovered.79
Political alternations in the
Communist League of Kosovo
and the revocation of autonomy
In a speech held
at the Ninth Congress of the Union
of Associations of the Veterans of
the National Liberation War, Pavle
Jovićević addressed the unrest in
Kosovo. He referred to it as
counter-revolutionary activity that
was disrupting the brotherhood and
unity of the people in Kosovo. He
drew attention to the indoctrination
of young Albanians with irredentist
and nationalistic ideas. His
closingremarks called on the ability
of the socialists’ power to
stabilize the situation in Kosovo.80
Undeniably, on an
institutional level, efforts were
made to keep the situation somewhat
under control. The new wave of
Albanian communists was hopeful
abouttheir ability to maintain peace
and stability without furthering
inter-ethnic hatred.However,
tensions were on the rise. The
Albanians were no longer viewed as a
group that belonged in Yugoslavia –
the alienation the former had felt
since Yugoslavia’s inception was
acknowledged by Serbian public
opinion. An article written by
Zvonko Simić in July 1985
calledattention to the low numbers
of Albanian participants in the
National Liberation War.81 The
intention was to argue that
Albanians did not fight for
Yugoslavia, and as such did not
deserve to be part of it.
At the 14th
Conference of Communists in Kosovo
heldin April 1986, Azem Vllasi, who
was previously the leader of the
League of Communist Youth in
Yugoslavia, succeeded Kolë Shiroka
as provincial party chief. A month
later, Sinan Hasani became President
of the Collective Presidency.82 This
political power that was given to
the Albanians allowedthem some power
in exercising their own authority in
the province. Kosta Bulatović, a
Serbian Kosovar, was arrested in
April 1986 because the police found
a copy of a petition that demanded
constitutional changes to Kosovo’s
status in order to stop the alleged
terror of Albanians against Serbs, a
text thathad previously been
published in the press. It turned
out that the police could not say on
whose authority Bulatović was
arrested –eventually it was
understood that he was arrested on
the orders of someone from Belgrade.83
It soonbecame
evident to the Albanian communist
leaders that tensions were being
played on intentionally.84 However, as
Clark noted, it was too late at this
point for the Albanian communists to
turn to the people – they already
were far too antagonized.85 The
released Memorandum of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Art of
September 1986, which drew attention
to alleged genocide against the
Serbs, made the ultimate
contribution to the worsening of
inter-ethnic relations up to that
point.86
The President of
the Presidency of Serbia, Ivan
Stambolić remained largelyhesitant
in involving Serbian nationalism
regardingnationalistic sentiments
for Kosovo as a political tool to
garner support and this was used
against him and the other liberals
by Slobodan Milošević in 1987,
subsequently accusing them of having
taken the soft option on Kosovo.87
Dragiša Pavlović, who had warned
about what might happen in the event
of Serbian agitation in Kosovo, was
forced to resign.88 Shaping his
political authority among the
masses, in April 1987 Miloševič
visited Fushë Kosovë (Kosovo Polje)
where Serbian demonstrators were
rallying against alleged oppression
by the Albanians.89 In his speech,
Miloševič referred to the situation
in Kosovo as another exodus since
medieval times of the European
nation from Kosovo, alluding that
Albanians were of oriental heritage.90
During the same period, a vicious
media attack was being launched on
Fadil Hoxha – at the time retired
-who had been a leading Albanian
politician during the demonstrations
of 1968 and 1981. In effect, he was
accused of having supported the
development of nationalist and
irredentist currents.91 The attack on
first-wave communist politicians of
the Second Yugoslavia came at a time
when the Tito era was being
portrayed as a period of oppression
for the Serbs.
By December 1987,
Milosević was still co-operating
with Vllasi on a state level in what
Vllasi assumed was an attempt to
appease the tensions in Kosovo.
However, it quickly became obvious
that Milosević had no realistic
expectation of solving the Kosovo
problem through collaboration with
the local Kosovo leadership.92
After annulling
Vojvodina’s autonomy in 1988,
Miloševič set his sights on Kosovo.
In November 1988, the day the
provincial party board was preparing
to dismiss Kaqusha Jashari, who had
replaced Vllasi in May and stood
also for defending the status of
Kosovo,93 3,000 miners from Trepça
marched to Prishtina in a peaceful
protest. They inspired others to
join the march, which swelled to
almost 300,000 people in total.
Their requests were to retain
Kosovo’s status as an autonomous
province.94
After dismissing
Jashari, Rrahman Morina, Hysamedin
Azemi and Ali Shukriu replaced the
former in party positions. The
newly-appointed officials remained
loyal to Milosevič and helped by
appeasement in the process of
revoking Kosovo’s autonomy.
In February 1989,
revolting against the revocation of
Kosovo’s autonomy, 1,300 miners went
on strike in the mines of Stan Tërg.
Three days later, Morina promised
the miners that he would resign,
which ended the strike. However,
Morina did not deliver his
resignation and the miners admitted
that they had been duped.95 In the
meantime, 215 Albanian intellectuals
signed a petition,which they
addressed to the Serbian Parliament,
where they expressed their
opposition tothese constitutional
changes. A number of them were
dismissed from their jobs or
arrested thereafter.96 Those who were
sent to the prison in Leskovac
endured brutal torture by the
Serbian police.97 By March 1989, Azem
Vllasi, too,had beenarrested.98
The proposed
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy was
approved in the Parliament of
Kosovo, where 126 delegates were
Albanian out of a total of 190. The
session exerted extreme pressure on
the Albanian delegates, with the
voting being completed in a
completelyerroneous manner. In what
was superficially supposed to be a
democratic session, in utterly
illegitimate and staged settings,
Serbia overruled Kosovo’s autonomy.
The latter regressed to being under
the complete authority of Serbia,
which paved the way for further
oppression and ultimately Serbia’s
attempt to cleanse Kosovo of
Albanians.
Mass protests were
organized in various towns of Kosovo
during early 1989, which met with
harsh retaliation by the Serbian
police. In Podujevë, the Albanian
protesters used stones against the
Serbian police, as well any hard
object they could find, some also
used firearms, and indeed one police
commander was shot dead. Thereafter,
the police began using dumdum
bullets.99
Peaceful resistance and the
emergence of an armed insurgency
In December 1989
the Democratic League of Kosova
(Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) was
established, with Ibrahim Rugova as
president. Rugova was a writer who
had finished part of his education
at the University of the Sorbonne –
he was chosen as a president
precisely because he was thought to
embody the typical Western
intellectual. The party would serve
as the herald for leading political
matters in Kosovo during the ‘90s.
Their approach centered onpeaceful
resistance – an objective which they
hoped would ultimately garner
international support for the
Albanian issue. They also hoped that
the domino effect of the fall of
communist regimes would hit
Yugoslavia before anything tragic
happened.100 While there were other
political parties that were
operating during the period, the LDK
amassed the most support from the
people.101
Maliqi contends
that during this critical moment
between January and February 1990,
the LDK had a major impact on the
sudden change of pace from violent
unrest to peaceful resistance.102 The
peaceful resistance managed to
deflect the riots, which would have
most certainly been used as a casus
belliby the Serbian military.
Although the pacifist resistance was
not embraced by the illegal
organizations that were already in
the early stages of preparing armed
resistance – it did buy them
sufficient time to prepare for the
guerrilla warfare that was to fully
erupt in 1998.
However, by 1989
the first armed group was formed by
the LPRK in Llap.103 The group changed
their name to LPK (Lëvizja Popullore
e Kosovës) in 1991, the same year
when the group wassetting up its
headquarters in Zürich. At the same
time, its members Xhavit Haliti,
Xhavit Haziri, Ahmet Haxhiu met with
the president of Albania at the
time, Ramiz Alia.104 Ties with Albania
proved to have been extremely
important in the process of training
recruits for the KLA and smuggling
weapons.
By closing down
the Kosovo parliament, on July 2,the
Serbian authorities attempted to
annihilate any legitimate Albanian
authority within Yugoslavia’s
framework. However, the 114 Albanian
delegates held a session in the
courtyard of the Assembly building,
where they declared Kosovo’s
independence.105 The Serbian parliament
dissolved the Kosovo parliament, and
on July 26, the former approved
the Law on Labor Relations under
Special Circumstances, which among
other things, enabled the dismissal
of workers at short notice.106 By 1991,
more than half the Albanians were
dismissed from their
jobs.Thereafter, a police state was
instituted in Kosovo.107
In September 1991,
the Albanian delegates of the Kosovo
parliament called for a referendum
to declare Kosovo’s independence.
99.87% of the voters (constituting
87% of the electorate) voted for
independence.108
By January 1992,
Yugoslavia had already begun to
disintegrate when the European
Community recognized the secession
by Croatia and Slovenia.109
The ‘90s also
correspond with the establishment of
an Albanian parallel system in
Kosovo. This included state
institutions as well as schools that
operated within the framework of the
self-declared independence. The
emergence of Albanian schools within
the parallel system had become
imperative since 1989 when the
Serbian authorities introduced
ethnic-based segregation in schools
– Serbian pupils were not to be
taught in the same classes or
according to the same schedules as
Albanian pupils.110 The establishment
of Albanian schools outside the
Serbian curriculum also meant that
teachers and professors operatedas
units within the institutions of an
independent Kosovo. This also bore a
symbolic importance to Albanians
because it embodied defiance against
Serbian oppression. The academic
staff and the students of the
University of Prishtina were also
banned from using the University’s
property and were therefore forced
to hold classes in private homes.
At the same time
in 1993,serious preparations for
armed resistance were set in motion
in Kosovo. Aware of these
developments, the Serbian police and
military initiated attacks against
people they suspected were involved
in organizing the territorial
defense of Kosovo.111 Between 1992 and
1995, around 135 attacks were
organized against Yugoslav forces.112
The peaceful resistance did not give
up its activity despite harsh
retaliation from the Serbian police
– a peaceful student demonstration
was held in 1997 organized by the
Students’ Union of the University of
Prishtina (1997-1998)113 where police
arrested the leaders of the
Students’ Union and even the rector
of the University of Prishtina at
the time, Ejup Statovci.
In the meantime,
armed resistance was gaining
momentum. The Dayton Accords did not
foresee Kosovo in the peace
agreement – which left the Albanians
disheartened. In such circumstances,
the emergence of the KLA was not
considered merely an alternative
plan for promoting the Kosovo issue
among international opinion, but
rather the only force that could
make any substantial change. Between
the years 1994-1996, the clandestine
LPK organization was training
soldiers for the Kosovo Liberation
Army and on the November 28, 1997,
marking Albanian National FlagDay,
the KLA made a public appearance at
the funeral of Hasan Geci in Llaushë
of Drenicë.114 The emergence of the KLA
marked the beginning of a
fully-fledged war betweenSerbian
forces and the KLA in Kosovo.
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1
Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në
veten e parë, (Prishtinë, 2010), p.
259. 2
Dejan Jović (ed.), ‘The Kardelj
Concept’, in ‘The Kardelj Concept’:,
Yugoslavia (Purdue University Press,
2009) p. 54.
3
Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në
veten e parë, pp. 266–270.
4
Rilindja, 12.01.1988, p. 16.
5
Aleksandar Ranković addressed this
issue at a Party session in May
1945, where he remarked that the
incident was a mistake by the
Partisans. Osnivacki Kongres KP
Srbije (8-12 Maj 1945), (Institut za
istoriju Radnickog Pokreta Srbije,
1972), p. 158. Source courtesy of
Anna di Lellio. See also a
survivor’s testimony
http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SHABAN-PAJAZITI-ENG-REAL
FINAL_August-4.pdf. See also Howard
Clark, Civil resistance in Kosovo,
(2000), p. 31. See also Miranda
Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian :
A History of Kosovo, (Columbia
University Press: New York, 1998),
p. 143.
6
Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang
Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten des
Balkan, (Europaverlag: Wien; Zurich,
1992), p. 57. Vojvodina was settled
as an autonomous province and Kosovo
as an autonomous area.
7
Fred Warner Neal, ‘The Communist
Party in Yugoslavia’, The American
Political Science Review, 51 (1957),
p. 90.
8
Carol S. Lilly, ‘Problems of
Persuasion: Communist Agitation and
Propaganda in Post-War Yugoslavia,
1944-1948’, Slavic Review, 53
(1994), pp. 396–397.
9
Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në
veten e parë, p. 310.
10
Carol S. Lilly, ‘Problems of
Persuasion: Communist Agitation and
Propaganda in Post-war Yugoslavia,
1944-1948’, p. 398.
11
Isabel Ströhle, ‘Of Social
Inequalities in a Socialist society
- The Creation of a Rural Underclass
in Yugoslav Kosovo’, in Rory Archer,
Paul Stubbs, and Igor Duda, eds..
Social Inequalities and Discontent
in Yugoslav Socialism (2016).
12
Zdenko Radelić, ‘The Communist Party
of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of
the Multi-party System’, in Gorana
Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds.,
Revolutionary Totalitarianism,
Pragmatic Socialism, Transition
(Palgrave Macmillan UK: London,
2016) p. 24. In the revised
constitution of 1968, the Albanian
nation was recognized and the term
‘šiptar’ was replaced by ‘Albanian’.
See Gorana Ognjenović, Nataša
Mataušić, and Jasna Jozelić,
‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as
a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’,
in Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna
Jozelić, eds., Titoism,
Self-Determination, Nationalism,
Cultural Memory (Palgrave Macmillan
US: New York, 2016) p. 24. The
contemporary usage of the term
“šiptar” is meant as a pejorative.
13
Holm Sundhaussen, Jugoslawien und
seine Nachfolgestaaten 1943-2011:
Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des
Gewöhnlichen, (2012), p. 142.
14
Howard Clark, Civil resistance in
Kosovo, p. 37.
15
Agrarian reform was introduced in
1945, where it was lauded that the
“land belongs to whoever is working
it”. See Ognjenović, Mataušić, and
Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic
Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute
Modernity”’, p. 29.
16
Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në
veten e parë, p. 301.
17
Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil Hoxha në
veten e parë, p. 305.
18
Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel:
The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
from the Death of Tito to theFall of
Milosevic., (2002), p. 5.
19
Ognjenović, Mataušić, and Jozelić,
‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic Socialism as
a Pursuit of “Absolute Modernity”’,
p. 13. See also John R. Lampe,
Yugoslavia as History: Twice there
was a Country, (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge; New York, 1996),
p. 233.
20 Sergej Flere and Rudi
Klanjšek, ‘Was Tito’s Yugoslavia
totalitarian?’, Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, 47 (June
2014), p. 238.
21 Which deemed it
‘self-managing socialism’ and
‘nonaligned’. See Zachary Irwin,
‘The Untold Stories of Yugoslavia
and Nonalignment’, in Gorana
Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds.,
Revolutionary Totalitarianism,
Pragmatic Socialism, Transition
(Palgrave Macmillan UK: London,
2016) p. 140.
22 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 58.
23 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 59.
24 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil
Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 321.
25 Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një
mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’,
in ‘Një mikrosintez për Kosovën
1945-1997’, Përballje
historiografike (Instituti
Albanologjik - Prishtinë: Prishtinë,
2015) p. 113.
26 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 59. See also
Howard Clark, Civil resistance in
Kosovo, p. 37.
27 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, (1999),
p. 26.
28 By March 1946 OZNA was
already reorganized, and the section
responsible for civilian
counter-intelligence was transformed
into the Directorate for State
Security (Uprava državne
bezbjednosti, UDBA). See Zdenko
Radelić, ‘The Communist Party of
Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the
Multi-party System’, p. 18.
29 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil
Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 298.
30 Frederick F. Anscombe, ‘The
Ottoman Empire in Recent
International Politics-II: The Case
of Kosovo’, The International
History Review, 28 (2006), p. 760.
31 Zdenko Radelić, ‘The
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and
the Abolition of the Multi-Party
System’, p. 18. |
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32 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil
Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 297.
33 Nikolina Rajkovic, ‘The
Post-Second World War Emigration of
Yugoslav Muslims to Turkey
(1953-1968)’, (Central European
University), p. 63.
34 Vickers, Between Serb and
Albanian : A History of Kosovo, p.
103.
35 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil
Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 297.
36 Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Post-Second
World War Emigration from Balkan
Countries to Turkey’, New
Perspectives on Turkey, 12 (April
1995), p. 61.
37 Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një
mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’,
p. 114. Rozita Dimova, From past
necessity to contemporary friction:
Migration, class and ethnicity in
Macedonia, (Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology: Halle/Saale,
2007). See also Hajredin Hoxha,
Arsyet, faktorët dhe pasojat e
lëvizjeve demografike dhe migruese
të popullsisë së Kosovës dhe të
pjesëtarëve të popullsisë shqiptare
në Jugosllavi, Përparimi, nr. 7,
Prishtinë, 1976.
38 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 26.
100,,000 according to Emine Bakalli.
See Emine Arifi - Bakalli, ‘Një
mikrosintez për Kosovën 1945-1997’,
p. 114. |
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39 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 37. |
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40 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 38.
41 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 26.
42 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 38.
43 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 59.
44 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 63. See also
Četvrti plenum Centralnog komiteta
Saveza komunista Jugoslavije,
(Komunist, 1966), pp. 70–74.
45 Latinka Perović, ‘Dobrica
Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito—A
Political and Intellectual
Relationship’, in Gorana Ognjenović
and Jasna Jozelić, eds, Titoism,
Self-Determination, Nationalism,
Cultural Memory (Palgrave Macmillan
US: New York, 2016) p. 115.
46 Hrvoje Klasić, ‘Tito’s 1968
Reinforcing Position’, in Gorana
Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds.,
Revolutionary Totalitarianism,
Pragmatic Socialism, Transition
(Palgrave Macmillan UK: London,
2016) p. 168.
47 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 67.
48 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 39.
49 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die
politische Geschichte des Kosovo’,
in Dunja Melčić, ed., Der
Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu
Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und
Konsequenzen (VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden,
1999) p. 128.
50
http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/Hydajet-Hyseni_ENG_Final.pdf,
p. 8.
51 Ognjenović, Mataušić, and
Jozelić, ‘Yugoslavia’s Authentic
Socialism as a Pursuit of “Absolute
Modernity”’, p. 22.
52 Veton Surroi (ed.), Fadil
Hoxha në veten e parë, p. 325. See
also Robert C. Austin, ‘Greater
Albania: The Albanian State and the
Question of Kosovo, 1912-2001’, in
John R. Lampe and Mark Mazower,
eds., Ideologies and national
identities the case of
twentieth-century Southeastern
Europe (Central European University
Press, 2004) p. 239.
53 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 63.
54 Albert Bing, ‘Tito(ism) and
National Self-Determination’, in
Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić,
eds., Titoism, Self-Determination,
Nationalism, Cultural Memory
(Palgrave Macmillan US: New York,
2016) p. 82. |
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55 Mariia Nikolaeva Todorova,
Imagining the Balkans, (2009), p.
186.
56 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, pp. 16s–17.
On a similar vein, Isa Blumi
contends a similar approach in
refuting the “powder keg effect” of
Albanians in the Balkans, which had
become the epitome of publicist work
in regards to the Balkans. See Isa
Blumi, ‘The Commodification of
Otherness and the Ethnic Unit in the
Balkans: How to Think about
Albanians’, East European Politics
and Societies, 12 (September 1998),
p. 535. In refuting the
“ancient-hatred” hypothesis see also
Noel Malcolm, ‘What Ancient
Hatreds?’, Foreign Affairs, 78
(1999), pp. 130–134., Arjan Hilaj,
‘The Albanian National Question and
the Myth of Greater Albania’, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies,
26 (July 2013), p. 397.
57 Dejan Jović, ‘The
Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A
Critical Review of Explanatory
Approaches’, European Journal of
Social Theory, 4 (2001), p. 104. |
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58 Latinka Perović, ‘Dobrica
Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito—A
Political and Intellectual
Relationship’. In regards to this
issue see also Thomas Bremer,
Serbiens Weg in den Krieg:
Kollektive Erinnerung, nationale
Formierung und ideologische
Aufrüstung, (Berlin-Verl. Spitz:
Berlin, 1998). |
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59 Then again, the concept of
nation and nationality were never
clearly defined in the
constitutional system. In 1981 alone
there were 1.7 million Albanians in
Yugoslavia, 570,000 Montenegrins and
1.3 million Macedonians, however the
first group was considered a
nationality and the two last groups
a nation. See Viktor Meier,
Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise,
pp. 8–9.
60 For example Organizata
Marksiste-Leniniste e Kosovës (the
Marxist-Leninist Organization of
Kosova), established in 1969, which
promoted the establishment of the
Republic of Kosovo. See Sabile
Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe
grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989:
Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave
ish-jugosllave, (Instituti i
Historisë - Prishtinë: Prishtinë,
2003), pp. 101–108. Similar to
‘Partia Komuniste
Marksiste-Leniniste e shqiptarëve në
Jugosllavi’ (The Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party of Albanians in
Yugoslavia), who sought unification
in one territorial unit of
Albanian-inhabited lands in
Yugoslavia. See Sabile
Keçmezi-Basha, Organizatat dhe
grupet ilegale në Kosovë 1981-1989:
Sipas aktgjykimeve të gjykatave
ish-jugosllave, pp. 169–87.
61 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, (Onufri:
Tiranë, 2013), p. 75.
62 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 92.
63 Nominally referred to as
‘illegal Albanian organizations’ in
Albanian. |
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64 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito
to the fall of Milosevic.,
p. 12.
65 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 17.
66
http://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
04/Hydajet-Hyseni_ENG_Final.pdf, p.
12.
67 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 78.
68 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha,
Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në
Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve
të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, pp.
62–63.
69 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 22.
70 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha,
Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në
Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve
të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 66.
See also Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 42.
71 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha,
Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale
në Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas
aktgjykimeve të gjykatave
ish-jugosllave, p. 64.
72 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 301.
73 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha,
Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në
Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve
të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 151.
The movement transformed several
times, initially being named Zëri i
Kosovës (The Voice of Kosovo),
thereafter Fronti i Kuq (The Red
Front), and lastly Fronti i Kuq
Popullor (The People’s Red Front).
74 Sabile Keçmezi-Basha,
Organizatat dhe grupet ilegale në
Kosovë 1981-1989: Sipas aktgjykimeve
të gjykatave ish-jugosllave, p. 152.
75 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 32.
76 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 43. |
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77 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 75.
78 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 301. See
also Howard Clark, Civil resistance
in Kosovo, p. 43.
79 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito
to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 315. |
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80 Rajko Goranović, Deveti
Kongres saveza udruženja boraca
Narodno Oslobodolilačkog rata
Jugoslavije, (Četvrti jul: Beograd,
1982), pp. 139–141.
81 NIN, 7.07.1985. The article
also criticizes the Albanian
publication series of the publishing
house Rilindja, entitled Në flakën e
revolucionit (At the hearth of
revolution), with the first volume
published in 1966. It claims the
publication falsified the number of
Albanian victims fallen during the
National Liberation war.
82 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 35.
83 Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting
Slobodan Milosevic: The Unfinished
Trial, (2016), p. 50.
84 Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting
Slobodan Milosevic: The Unfinished
Trial, p. 50.
85 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 47.
86 Enver Hoxhaj, ‘Das Memorandum
der Serbischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften und Künste und die
Funktion politischer Mythologie im
kosovarischen Konflikt’,
Südosteuropa, 51 (2002), p. 6. See
also Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration of
Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to
the Fall of Milosevic., p. 20. The
Memorandum was contemporary with a
petition signed by some two hundred
Serbian intellectuals which called
for attention to the supposed
genocide committed against the Serbs
in Kosovo specifically by Albanians,
and which urged for ‘deep social and
political changes’ to halt the
genocide in Kosovo. See Branka
Magaš, The destruction of
Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up
1980-92, (New York : Verso: London,
1993), pp. 49–52.
87 Branka Magaš, The De
struction of Yugoslavia: Tracking
the break-up 1980-92, pp. 109–110.
88 Viktor Meier, Yugoslvia: A
History of its Demise, p. 38. The
rift within the Party was more or
less not centered solely on the
manner of tackling the Kosovo issue.
Magaš argues that the crisis was a
result of conflicting ideas on how
to deal with the economic crisis
that had overtaken the country
combined with the struggle of
overcoming nationalist
counter-revolution prevalent in the
republics. See Branka Magaš, The
Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking
the Break-up 1980-92, p. 203.
89 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A
History of its Demise, p. 38.
90 Zekeria Cana, Apeli 215 i
intelektualëve shqiptarë, (Rilindja:
Prishtinë, 2001), p. 11.
91 Rilindja, 21.10.1987, p. 5.,
Rilindja, 9.12.1987, p. 5.,
Rilindja, 10.12.1987, p. 5. For the
role of the media in inciting
antagonistic stances amongst the
masses in Yugoslavia see Sabrina
Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The
Disintegration of Yugoslavia from
the Death of Tito to the Fall of
Milosevic., pp. 40–41.
92 Borba, 9.12.1987, p. 3.
Branka Magaš, The Destruction of
Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up
1980-92, p. 109.
93 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito
to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 29.
94 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 48.
95 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, pp. 112–114. See
also Branka Magaš, The destruction
of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up
1980-92, p. 180.
96 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die
politische Geschichte des Kosovo’,
p. 129. See also Zekeria Cana, Apeli
215 i intelektualëve shqiptarë, p.
286. See also Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 118. See also
Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Why the Peaceful
Resistance Movement in Kosovo
Failed’, in ‘Why the Peaceful
Resistance Movement in Kosovo
Failed’, After Yugoslavia:
Identities and Politics within the
Successor States p. 45.
97 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, p. 118.
98 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration of
Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to
the Fall of Milosevic., p. 31.
99 Christine von Kohl and
Wolfgang Libal, Kosovo: Gordischer
Knoten des Balkan, pp. 116–118. For
the demonstrations of 1988, 1989 see
also Blerim Shala, Kosovo - krv i
suze, (Zalozba alternativnega tiska:
Ljubljana, 1990). |
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100 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Die
politische Geschichte des Kosovo’,
p. 130.
101 UJDI (Udruženje za
jugoslovensku demokratsku
inicijativu), founded by Shkëlzen
Maliqi and Veton Surroi in 1988 did
not garner mass support in contrast
to LDK. By the end of 1990, there
was a pluralist system of political
parties established in Kosovo.
102 Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Why the
Peaceful Resistance Movement in
Kosovo Failed’, p. 45. Hajzer
Hajzeraj who was accused by Serbian
authorities for serving as Minister
of Defense for Kosovo, later
admitted that the LDK had issued an
order to construct a territorial
defense. See Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 65.
103 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 302.
104 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001, p. 303.
Pettifer contends that Ramiz Alija
was interested in styling the Kosovo
Liberation Army along the lines of
the Irish Republican Army. See James
Pettifer, Ushtria Çlirimtare e
Kosovës: Nga një luftë e fshehtë në
një kryengritje të Ballkanit
1948-2001, p. 78.
105 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito
to the Fall of Milosevic.,
p. 31.
106 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 73.
107 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, pp. 74–81.
108 Howard Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, p. 82.
109 Bette Denich, ‘Dismembering
Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies
and the Symbolic Revival of
Genocide’, American Ethnologist, 21
(1994), p. 368.
110 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, pp. 95–98. |
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111 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 62. James.
Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation
Army : underground war to Balkan
insurgency, 1948-2001, (Columbia
University Press: New York, 2012),
p. 90.
112 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 95. *Picture courtesy of Milot
Caka and Rina Krasniqi
113 Howard Clark, Civil
resistance in Kosovo, p. 152. See
also Bujar Dugolli, 1 tetori i
kthesës - Lëvizja studentore
1997-1999, (Universiteti i
Prishtinës: Prishtinë, 2013). |
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114 James Pettifer, Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Nga një luftë
e fshehtë në një kryengritje të
Ballkanit 1948-2001,
p. 127. |
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