Introduction
The concept of
(Yugo) Slavism or Slavdom
(Yugoslavism or Yugoslavdom) is a
neologism of German origin
(Slawentum) which points to the - by
origin and meaning - comparable
German concept of Deutschtum,
Germanness, created around 1770
within the Sturm und Drang, (Storm
and Stress) movement, that is,
during the formative period of
modern German nationalism. It was
Johann Gottfried Herder (born in
Mohrungen on August 25, 1744– died
in Weimar on December 18, 1803), who
in thinking about the relationship
between thought and language,
developed the concepts of ‘national
genius’ and ‘national language’,
thus laying the groundwork for the
Romantic concept of the nation. In
his philosophical history of
mankind, he highly valued the future
of Slavdom, and as he was one of the
leading German/European thinkers who
developed the concept of
Kulturnation, that is, the model of
thinking about nationhood in terms
of philological-literary concepts
(e.g. “national rebirth”), he is
unavoidable in any attempt to
understand the process of the
national integration of the majority
of (south) Slavic nations. He is all
the more relevant in so far as he
anticipated the later much developed
principles of Slavic
interconnectedness and Pan-Slavism.
Jan Kollar (Mosovce, July 29, 1793,
– Vienna, January 24, 1852), then
developed these principles which, in
the entire Slavic world – but
particularly in the South Slavic –
wielded enormous influence (On the
Literary Reciprocity of Different
Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic
Nation, 1837 / Über die literarische
Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den
verschiedenen Stämmen und Mundarten
der slawischen Nation).
However, nations,
understood primarily as a sovereign
people, had in the „long 19th
century“,already after the French
Revolution of 1789, become
historical subjects that had
appropriated the experience of the
national past, the national present
and future, so that (Yugo) Slavism,
too, originally a phenomenon of
South Slavic interconnectedness, had
conceptually changed its meanings
dramatically in different national
traditions. From that standpoint,
(Yugo) Slavism cannot be an
analytical concept, but nevertheless
can be the subject of analysis,
including in all its distinct,
particular historical
manifestations, meaning also as an
ideologeme.
Even though Duden
now interprets
Slavdom/Slavism/Slawentum as “the
character and culture of the Slavs (
Wesen und Kultur der Slawen)”, while
taking Germanness / Deutschtum to
mean: “1.the totality of Germanic
manifestations of life; German
character / Gesamtheit der für die
Deutschen typischen
Lebensäußerungen; deutsche Wesenart;
2. belonging to the German people /
Zugehörigkeit zum deutschen Volk;3.
the totality of German national
groups abroad Gesamtheit der
deutschen Volksgruppen im Ausland)“,
for an historian these definitions
are merely „archeological“, since,
in a reductionist way, they merely
follow the shifts in meaning of both
concepts from the 18th to the 20th
century.The duty of the historian is
to deduce meanings from both text
and context. In this regard,
something should first be said about
the South Slavic context of
Yugoslavism from the perspective of
long-term history.
I
Even though the
topic of early Slavic „ethnogenesis“
is being innovatively debated today
(for example, F. Curta, D. Dzino, V.
Sokol), the South Slavs are the only
Slavs who, at the crossroads of Late
Antiquity and the early Middle Ages,
were to be found within the borders
(limes) of the Roman Empire,
settling in the regions between the
Mediterranean and the Danube basin.
They inhabited regions that by sea
and/or land connected and/or
separated its western from its
eastern parts – the one
predominantly Romanized, the other
predominantly Hellenized, that is,
regions that seperated Rome from
„New Rome“ (Constantinopole).
Nevertheless, this is a unique and
contiguous space in which, according
to epigraphic findings, Greek and
Latin parts can be found within the
same text or, in other instances,
Latin texts written with Greek
letters can be found. At the same
time, this was the only European
area that was, after the Slavic
migrations and by the end of the
first millennium, settled by the
last migratory waves of peoples from
Eurasian regions (Bulgarians and
Hungarians), but also a unique area
in which the Romanization of Late
Antiquity endured, even where it was
weak and relatively the furthest
away from its Roman epicenter
(Romanians). Furthermore, it was the
only European region where, side by
side, “Greeks” and “Barbarians”, and
“Romans” and “Barbarians” endured
simultaneously. It was also unique
by the fact that Christianization
began very early and ended very
late, with numerous jurisdictional,
ritual, confessional and
ecclesiastical controversies
characterizing the shifting borders
of the Christian West and the
Christian East, which was also
marked by deeply rooted paganism,
heresy and, from the 15th century
onward, its own autochthonic version
of Islam. There is in fact no
European monotheistic religion that
did not become autochthonic in this
region. This was a unique European
region that spawned and maintained
Glagolitic, Cyrillic, Roman and even
Arabic Slavic literacy, parallel
with Greek and Latin language
culture.
And there is
another aspect, perhaps the most
important. This was the only
European region in which, first, the
epicenters of hegemonic power always
lay elsewhere, outside of the region
itself; and second, from Late
Antiquity onwards it was never
controlled by only one empire. There
was no European or global power in
the “long” 19th and the “short” 20th
centuries that did not try its hand
out in the region, precisely during
the era of South Slavic and Balkan
national integrations. To all
empires this region was peripheral,
but also, in different ways and at
different times, it was the be all
and end all of everything! Between
circa 1500 and 1800 the
socio-demographic, ethno-demographic
and confessional-demographic
circumstances in the entire region
changed so much and became so
complex that the already belated
European processes of modernization
and national integration among the
South Slavs faced challenges that
were rarely as great elsewhere in
Europe. In a multitude of different
versions, already by the 19th
century Yugoslavism had far
surpassed the limits of concepts,
linguistic and cultural practices
implied by “Slavic
interconnectedness.” However, it
became a realistic, but still
equally diverse, political option
only - in circumstances initiated by
World War I - after the empires of
the European “ancient regime” had
disintegrated (the Habsburg
Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire,
together with the Russian Empire).
There is no South
Slavic nation, or for that matter
any other nation in the region,
that, from the perspective of the
19th and 20th centuries, did not in
their medieval epoch have their own
“golden age”. For modern Slovenes it
was (the Duchy of) Carantania(626 –
745 CE), for the Croats it was the
era of national lords [end of 8th
century to 1102 – King Tomislav
(925?), King Peter Krešimir IV], for
the Montenegrins, but also the
Serbs, in different ways, the era of
the Vojislavljevic dynasty
[1168-1371 – King Mihajlo
Vojislavljevic (10770], for the
Serbs again in the era of the
Nemanjic dynasty [1168-1371 – King
Stefan Prvovenčani (the
‘First-Crowned‘ King, in 1217) and
Stefan Dušan (emperor in1346)], for
the Macedonians and Bulgarians (also
in different ways) Samuel’s
Empire(976-1014), for the Bosniaks,
Croats and Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, again in
different ways, the Kotormanić
dynasty [cca. 1250-1463 – duke and
king Tvrtko I (1353-1377 and
1377-1391)]. On the other hand,
there is no South Slavic nation that
does not nurture the tradition of
various historical defeats
(paradigmatic example – “Kosovo”)
and that, during the 19th and 20th
centuries, did not aspire towards
the national renewal of its
erstwhile “greatness”, with the
protection and support of one or
more of the European or global
powers, secular and/or spiritual. At
the same time, the mutual borders
between the South Slavic peoples
always more or less overlapped (and
still do), and as far as tradition
goes, everything was or could become
contentious (ethnicity, language,
culture etc.). Furthermore, in
contra-distinction to the Middle
Ages, the modern South Slavic
nations of the 19th and 20th
centuries, as soon as they were
constituted as territorial
nation-states – founded on the
principle of inviolable sovereignty
– were inevitably faced with the
harsh and complex realities of their
own societies and cultures. There is
hardly any boundary within them – of
whatever nature – that coincides
with the state boundary!
Additionally, precisely because of
this complexity, there is no South
Slavic nation-state that does not
have a polycentric geographical,
social, economic and cultural
morphology that from the “inside”
resists national hegemony tailored
to the interests of the epicenter of
state and national power.
Yugoslavism was
essentially the only attempt among
the South Slavs in mid-south-eastern
Europe to use endogenic processes
from “below” to go beyond the (sub)
regional logic of survival at the
periphery of imperial regimes, to
secure a better future for all by
constituting a multifaceted complex
state union according to the measure
of its own needs. However, such an
ideal type of Yugoslavism never, in
fact, existed. It could not have
existed anyway, since the dynamics
of interconnected changes
“externally” and “internally”
prevented all nations individually
in their development in central and
south-eastern Europe. They were
forced to earmark large portions of
their potential for the armed forces
or police units because of the
disputes and conflicts within their
own borders or with their neighbors,
in peace or in war. Once again,
Yugoslavism as an alternative saw
its first opportunity only when, in
the course of World War I, the
empires that had previously enjoyed
hegemonic status during an extended
period of time in the region
disintegrated. Nevertheless, the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes received its international
legitimacy from the powers
victorious in the war that had no
borders with it (the United States,
Great Britain, France), while the
one power that had – Italy – was at
the same time the single biggest
external threat to the international
survival of the Yugoslav state. At
the same time, with the partial
exception of Greece, there was not a
single neighboring state with which
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes did not have open or
potential territorial disputes. In
conclusion, the Yugoslav alternative
in mid-south-eastern Europe in its
end result could not escape
peripheralizing effects – precisely
of the kind it was conceived to
prevent.
II
With the
proclamation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on
December 1, 1918 – through the hasty
unification of the State of
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the
Kingdom of Serbia – the majority of
Serbs and Croats, but also, at the
time, the majority of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak
Muslims, found themselves within the
borders of the same, South Slavic
state, for the first time in
history. The same was true of the
Montenegrins, who, by the
unification of the Kingdom of
Montenegro with the Kingdom of
Serbia at the Podgorica Assembly on
November 24 and 29, 1918, entered
into the new state deeply divided as
a nation. The Slovenes, who were
constitutionally recognized – and
who were also, like the Croats,
vitally short-changed victims of the
1915 Treaty of London – and the
constitutionally unrecognized
Macedonians, became citizens of the
new state only in part. Basically,
the Slovenes became citizens through
the principle of self-determination,
and the Macedonians by the logic of
international recognition of the
borders of the Kingdom of Serbia in
1913. Macedonians and other
residents of Macedonia were denied
the right of self-determination, not
only by the Serbian side, but also
by the Bulgarian and Greek sides.
Bearing in mind that the members of
the largest national minorities –
Albanian, Hungarian, German and
Turkish – also became residents of
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes without having any say in
it, a crucial question - still open
for debate even today - is what
Yugoslavism meant to each mentioned
nationality and to what degree their
historical expectations were
fulfilled or denied on December 1,
1918?
This question is
all the more pertinent also because
the so-called Habsburg Monarchy
South Slavs (Slovenes, Croats and,
to a degree, Bosnians – trans.) were
deeply involved in the war against
Serbia and Montenegro and also
played an important role in the
occupation regime in these two
countries.On the other hand, there
were also many Austro-Hungarian
South Slavs who participated as
volunteers on the Serbian or
(Triple) Entente side – something
that also needs to be taken into
consideration. South Slavic
political émigrés from the Habsburg
Monarchy from 1914 to 1918, along
with the Yugoslav Committee as the
key player, but also with the
Yugoslav movement among the South
Slavic émigrés from Austria-Hungary
abroad, essentially modified the
picture of World War I as a
fratricidal war between the peoples
and the nations that in 1918 had
opted to live in a common state.
Without this it would have been very
difficult to legitimize
internationally the character of
World War I among the South Slavs as
anything but fratricidal.
III
By December 1,
1918, the Croats and Serbs were
already old European peoples. All
the other, Slavic and non-Slavic
peoples within the borders of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes were also deeply rooted in
the regions of central,
south-eastern and Mediterranean
Europe, regardless of how and when
they were given ethnic attributes or
to what degree they were constituted
as modern nations at the time of
Yugoslavia’s establishment.
Regardless of their enormous mutual
differences, they all held in common
the fact that in 1918 they were at
the periphery of modernization
processes that had in the “long 19th
century” transformed the
civilizational morphology of Europe
and the world. Therefore, the
question of history before the
establishment of Yugoslavia had, in
each individual case, been posed –
in the terminology of Koselleck – on
the one hand, as a question of
cultivating the experience with
which each nation joined the new,
common state (‘experience’,
Erfahrungsraum) and, on the other,
as a question of their expectations
from the newly-proclaimed state at
the time of joining it (‘expectation
horizon’, Erwartungshorizont).
From this
standpoint, the problem of
Yugoslavism before the creation of
Yugoslavia is, above all, a problem
of the epoch of constituting the
modern South Slavic nations –
something that took place from the
late 18th century onwards. Yet it is
also a problem of the epoch of
transformations in Europe and the
world through modernization, in the
end result, even independently of
how and to what extent individual
South Slavic communities
participated in these processes.
Both the cultivated experience and
the horizon of expectation are
phenomena and processes that demand
concrete historical analysis. They
are thus subject to both endurance
and change and so the history of
Yugoslavism before the creation of
Yugoslavia was also subject to
change and re-creation in every
historical situation, if and when
Yugoslavism was at all historically
relevant. Therefore, Yugoslavism, in
all its different manifestations,
was always somewhere in between the
experiences of the conceived and the
unattained in the historically
open-ended South Slavic
national-integrative and
modernization processes. Just as
societies in the Slavic south
modernized in a convulsive way,
equally so the South Slavic nations
went through the process of national
integration burdened by a multitude
of “delays” when compared to
different European models and
patterns of integration, at the same
time going through various forms of
contradictory (self) recognition,
inclusion and exclusion, different
territorial logic etc. All these
phenomena and processes were
likewise reflected in the experience
and practice of Yugoslavism before
the creation of Yugoslavia.
At the same time,
it is important to bear in mind that
the developmental logic of both the
Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman
Empire from the second half of the
18th century to the beginning of the
20th century could in different ways
accelerate and/or delay the
processes of modernization and
national integration among the
individual South Slavic nations –
and frequently in contradictory ways
[the Ottoman Patriarchate of Peć,
1557-1766, and the Habsburg
Metropolitanate of Karlovci versus.
the trans-regional dispersion of
Serbian Orthodoxy; the Habsburg
imperial Illyrian Movement vs.. the
ideology of the Illyrian Movement of
the Croatian National Revival; the
Habsburg-Ottoman trade relations
after 1718 vs. the trade and
communications networking of the
South Slavic countries etc.].
From this
viewpoint, the modernization and
national integration processes of
the Croats and Serbs were more
complex as they were the subjects of
both empires – of course, much more
complex among the Serbs than the
Croats, because proportionally there
were many more Serbs on the Habsburg
side than Croats on the Ottoman side
and because the two autonomous
states, and later kingdoms – Serbia
and, irrespective of certain
reservations, Montenegro – were the
main spearheads of national
integration. Both were
internationally recognized at the
Berlin Congress in 1878, Serbia
becoming a kingdom in 1882 and
Montenegro in 1910. Both had
autochthonic dynasties, which in
south-eastern Europe of the 19th and
20th centuries was more the
exception than the rule (the
Petrović, Obrenović and
Karadjordjević dynasties). None of
these dynasties had noble ancestry,
which was truly a special case
without precedent in the Europe of
the time. On the other hand, the
Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia
and Dalmatia (i.e. Triune Kingdom of
Croatia-Slavonia – trans.) was the
only entity among the South Slavs
that had maintained intact
legal-state continuity for
practically a millennium, regardless
of the fact that after 1102 it was
not a recognized international
entity and that territorially it was
not integrated under the authority
of the Habsburgs (1527-1918).
IV
A special research
problem is Yugoslavism avant la
lettre, that is, Yugoslavism before
Yugoslavism as it is being discussed
in this paper. What are involved
here are the phenomena and processes
that anticipated (South) Slavic
reciprocity/mutuality or (South)
Slavic inter-connectedness. It is
sufficient for the moment to confine
ourselves to several examples.
In 1768, Jovan
Rajić (Sremski Karlovci, 11 November
1726 – Kovilj Monastery, 11 December
1801), a theologian, philosopher
and, above all, historian educated
in Europe, concluded the manuscript
of his long, four-volume work with a
title without precedent: “A History
of Different Slavic
Peoples,especially Bulgarians,
Croatians and Serbians” (История
разныхъ славенскиъ народовъ наипаче
Болгаровъ, Хорватов и Сербовъ …).
After much delay it was finally
published in Vienna in 1794 and
1795, through the perseverance of
the Metropolitan of the Karlovac
Archbishopric Stevan Stratimirović.
Realizing that he could not write
about Serbian history if he followed
the territorial principle, Rajić
opted for a history of the nation –
an approach that had already gained
legitimacy in European
historiography. Having
simultaneously in mind the Slavic –
but not in the confessional
(religious) sense – framework of
Serbian history, he joined Serbian
history to the history of its
neighbors, the Bulgarians and the
Croats: “At first, Rajić wanted to
connect the history of the Serbs to
the history of all Slavic peoples,
especially the Russians, but soon
had to desist from this plan,
confining his narrative to the South
Slavs. He went on, in the
introduction, to give an overview of
knowledge about the Slavic peoples
in general, their beginnings and
their homeland, their name,
language, customs and beliefs,and
then moved to present the history of
the Bulgarians from the beginning to
the fall of the Second Bulgarian
Empire, also briefly outlining the
history of the Croats. The remainder
of the work (three out of four
volumes) was devoted to Serbian
history…” (Ćirković – Mihaljčić
1997: 614). The secular approach of
the work, laid out in the, albeit
limited, South Slavic context, was
ahead of its time in Serbian culture
and Serbian historiography, in terms
of a working model and there was no
viable alternative to his work for a
long time afterwards.It was a
Serbian history in a South Slavic
context.
When Josip Sipus
(Karlovac, circa 1770 - ?), in his
Basis of the Wheat Trade (Temely
xitne tergovine polag narave y
dogacsajev), published in Zagreb in
1796 – a work otherwise dedicated to
Zagreb bishop Maksimilian Vrhovec –
opened up the issue of the modern
standardization of the Croatian
language, he did not confine himself
to Croatian linguistic traditions:
“Many are familiar with the
different ways of speaking (German)
by residents in Upper and Lower
Saxony, and again how both speak
differently from Swabians,
Austrians, residents of the Lower
Rhine region (Niederrhein) and the
Swiss – they speak differently to
such a degree that they can barely
understand each other. Nevertheless,
their scholars and writers
everywhere speak a uniformly pure,
compatible and comprehensible
language, unified by rules and
pronunciation. Our glorious nation,
I think, still has a long way to go
to such concord. If it were not so
dispersed and huge, it would already
have disappeared a long time ago,
given how forces from every side
impede it, and in some cases even
destroy it.” (Sipus 1993: 8,
translated by Dr. Mijo Lončarić).
Referring to the German linguistic
situation and talking about
“our…dispersed and huge…glorious
nation”, Sipus was obviously
appealing to his readers not to turn
a deaf ear – when considering a
modern Croatian linguistic standard
– to the Slavic incentives that were
already coming from people like
Josef Dobrovsky (Gyarmat, July 17,
1753 – Brno, January 6, 1829), the
Czech philologist, Slavic scholar
and key figure of the early Czech
National Revival.
With its petition
of May 19, 1790, addressed to the
Croatian Assembly, the Zagreb Royal
Academy of Sciences requested the
“powerful protection” of the upper
classes and ecclesiastical orders in
an appeal to be given university
privilege (Sidak 1969: 317-319). The
faculty initiated this after the
breakdown of the regime of Joseph II
and the renewal of constitutionality
in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as
in the face of tectonic changes in
the European “ancien régime” after
the French Revolution of 1789. It
did so at a time when it was
expected that the Habsburg Army
would continue its anti-Ottoman push
towards Bosnia and Serbia, which had
begun in 1788 and continued through
October 8, 1789 when it managed to
take Belgrade. In asking for
university privileges (extended
teaching rights, status for faculty,
funds for the university etc. –
trans.), the Royal Academy argued
its case thus: “…if we bear in mind
the present circumstances, when
serious thought is being given not
only to the removal of impediments
to science but also to the
appointment of citizens of our
homeland to all offices in these
kingdoms, and if we also take into
consideration future circumstances
in which not only those parts of
Croatia that still suffer under the
Turkish yoke, but also the kingdoms
of Bosnia and Serbia – as favorable
omens so far seem to indicate – will
be liberated and thus that these
glorious kingdoms will even be
expanded, we consider that it is not
only right and useful, but also
absolutely necessary to have in our
midst a university in which – once
impediments to scientific work are
removed and once proper funds are
secured for its development – our
domestic youth will gather in great
numbers and acquire an education in
all sciences and noble skills
enabling them to work in different
fields in our homeland” (Sidak 1969:
318). At a time when the nationalism
of the Hungarian upper classes was
in full swing, and when the
preservation of the status quo ante
was of tantamount importance to the
Croatian upper classes, the
professors’ faculty of the Royal
Academy made its voice heard stating
“we are of the view that, with this
humble proposal to the upper classes
and ecclesiastical orders, we have
in part fulfilled our duty as
citizens respectfully concerned
about the greater good of all”! This
was anticipation of the modern
Croatian national revival, but in a
context that was not exclusively
Croatian because it also included
the kingdoms of Bosnia and Serbia.
The leading Vienna
Slavic scholars of Slovenian and
Croatian origin [Jernej Kopitar
(Repanj, August 21, 1780 – Vienna,
August 11, 1844), Franc Miklošič
(Ljutomer, November 29, 1813 –
Vienna, March 7, 1891), Vatroslav
Jagić (Varaždin, July 6, 1838 –
Vienna, August 5, 1923) and Milan
Rešetar (Dubrovnik, February 1, 1860
– Florence, January 14, 1942)]
exerted great influence on the
processes of standardization in the
South Slavic languages and
especially on the linguistic
convergence of Croats and Serbs. In
that regard the greatest success was
achieved through Jernej Kopitar’s
influence on the ingenious
autodidact Vuk Stefanović Karadžic
(Tršić, November 6, 1787 – Vienna,
February 7, 1864) who lived in
Vienna from 1813 until his death in
1864. Karadžić’s linguistic reform
of the Serbian language, based on
the neo-Shtokavian Ijekavian dialect
(the eastern Herzegovina dialect of
Serbian which Karadžic spoke –
trans.), radically separated the
Serbian language and its Cyrillic
alphabet from its Slavic-Serbian
tradition, that is, from its organic
connection with the Russian
language. The much more complex
development of the Croatian language
in its threefold literary traditions
(Chakavian, Kajkavian and
Shtokavian), which were more or less
interconnected in the early modern
period, following the period from
1780 to 1815, was increasingly
directed towards standardization
based on its own Shtokavian
tradition. This opened up the
process which, in the period from
1835 to 1850, laid the foundations
for the Vienna Literary Agreement
between the principal Croatian and
Serbian linguists – this being the
key initiative in the process of
linguistic convergence between
Croats and Serbs, Bosniaks and
Montenegrins.
V
In the above
examples, the implicit ‘(South)
Slavic common horizon’ is the
precondition for the modern approach
to one’s own national issues and
aspirations, that is, Yugoslavism is
the in statu nascendi (nascent
state) for the period of early
nationalism. Still, Yugoslavism
cannot be understood only from the
perspective of modernization. In the
history of South Slavic nations,
both in the early modern period and
in the “long 19th century”,
tradition and innovation keep up in
equal pace – something that is
typical of European fringe
countries. ‘Common Slavic horizons’
coexisted in the Middle Ages in the
experience of various Slavic peoples
– mainly due to Old Slavic
linguistic and cultural traditions,
largely immune even to confessional
boundaries – only to gain in
importance through European
influences - which remained strong
all the way up to and including the
20th century - in the epochs of
humanistic and then baroque Slavic
studies.
The Protestant
fringe in the history of South Slavs
exerted both in the linguistic and
also in the cultural sense a crucial
influence on the national formation
of the Slovenes, the South Slavic
nation that in a long historical
period maintained itself at the
crossroads of European Slavic,
Romance and German cultures. Primož
Trubar (Rascica, June 9, 1508 –
Derendingen, June 28, 1586) – coming
of age and maturing in the Slavic,
Romance and German worlds at the
time of the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation, in the time of
the “Ottoman scare” and, more
broadly, the time of the shifting
European world view – was not only a
Protestant thinker and preacher, but
also a humanist who left such an
indelible mark on Slovenian culture
that it could not be called into
question even by the comprehensive
re-Catholicization of the Slovenes.
However, his work was projected
along South Slavic lines and was
ultimately the most influential
among the Croats.
The Slovenes, as
subjects of the Habsburg Hereditary
Lands, and the Croats in the
‘Reliquiae reliquiarum’ (the
‘leftovers of the leftovers’) of the
Croatian Kingdom of Dalmatia,
Croatia and Slavonia after the
Ottoman conquest of Slavonia in the
late 16th century – trans.), were
never as close as they were in the
period from 1526-27 to 1606, between
the enthronement of Ferdinand I as
the Croatian King and the Treaty of
Zsitvatorok (of 1606), and before
and after the Bruce Treaty of 1578
(both treaties were between the
Habsburgs and the Ottomans –
trans.). Intellectual exchange
between individuals on both sides of
the Croatian-Slovenian border were
far-reaching and stimulating, while
the South Slavic Protestant
imagination barely had limits at a
time when everyone all the way down
to Constantinople was fair game for
conversion, regardless of their
faith. Many a strong individual,
from both the Croatian and the
Slovenian sides, took part in these
exchanges. Although they probably
would not have existed if there had
been no Reformation, one should also
not overlook the numerous cultural
transfers from both Italy and
Germany that had made their way into
Croatia by way of Slovenian
mediation before and after the
Reformation. Even though the meaning
of such mediation changed after the
Battle of Vienna (1683-1699), when
the borders of the Kingdom of
Croatia-Slavonia shifted eastward to
Zemun, they were important at least
until the Berlin Congress in 1815.
Mavro Orbini
(Dubrovnik, mid-16th century –
Dubrovnik, 1611)– even though he was
not the first in the early modern
era to write about the Slavs – is
the founder of the modern
understanding of Slavism. In his
work “Kingdom of the Slavs” (Il
Regno degli Slavi, Pesaro, 1601),
the spirit of Catholic renewal and
erudite culture are amalgamated in a
way that far surpasses the
boundaries of his initial
inspiration by Dubrovnik culture. He
set forth a work that in different
ways became a point of reference in
the culture of all Slavic,
especially South Slavic nations.
Orbini’s Slavs originate in Old
Testament times: “…the father of
Japhet, namely, knowing that
necessarily there must be three
stages of human life and granting
each of his sons a profession that
would fit the given character of
each, made his decision known thus:
‘You, Shem, as a priest will conduct
the service of God. You, Ham, will
work the land and devote yourself to
crafts. You,Japhet,, will rule and
defend the country as king and be
skilled in arms as a soldier’ (…)
Thus the Slavs, having descended
from Japhet, had always been
courageous in arms and had conquered
many peoples” (Orbini 1999: 76).
Orbini also names all the peoples of
his time of Slavic origin: “These
peoples of Slavic ethnicity and
language are not only those
inhabiting Dalmatia, Illyria, Istria
and Carpathia, but also other famous
and powerful nations like the
Bulgarians, the Ras or Rasani (old,
medieval Serbs – trans.), Serbs,
Bosnians, Croats, the inhabitants of
the five surrounding mountains
(Petogorci, “the Five-Mountain
people”), the Russians, Ukrainians
(Podolans), Muscovites (a variation
of Russians – trans.), the
Circassians (close to the
Macedonians – trans.), the
Pomeranians (living in southwestern,
central Europe near the Baltic Sea –
trans.) and those living in the Bay
of Veneti (in the Baltic Sea –
possibly precursors of the Slovenes
- trans.) and all the way to the
river Laba (present-day Russia –
trans.). Those that have descended
from these nations are called by the
Germans, to this day, call the Slavs
or the Vendi or the Vindi
(Slovenes): ultimately these consist
of Lusatian Serbs, the Kasubi
(Polish Serbs), Moravians, the
Poles, the Lithuanians, the
Silesians (inhabiting what is mostly
present-day Poland – trans.) and the
Czechs. In brief, Slavic languages
extend from the Caspian Sea to
Saxony and from the Adriatic to the
North (German) Sea where all
throughout Slavic peoples are to be
found” (Orbini 1999: 77). Orbini’s
baroque Slavic imagology, published
at the time of the exhausting
Habsburg-Ottoman Long Turkish War
(1593-1606), had its South Slavic
epicenters as they could be
perceived from Orbini’s broad
Dubrovnik-based view, which compiled
many literary sources from Antiquity
and the Middle Ages. It suggests an
essentially different understanding
of a nation from that suggested by
(Johann Gottfried) Herder and as
such has remained a lasting fountain
of South Slavic inspiration.
The Jesuit Juraj
Križanić (Obrh near Ozalj in
Croatia, 1617 or 1618 – Vienna,
September 12, 1683) undoubtedly
contributed the most to the early
modern understanding of Slavism as
something beyond confessional
boundaries (‘trans-confessional’).
From an early age in his homeland
Croatia, he gained first-hand
experience of the scope and
consequences of Catholic-Orthodox
in-fighting. Educated in Ljubljana,
Graz, Bologna and Rome, Križanić
dedicated his life to the
ecclesiastical and cultural unity of
the Slavic West and East, and to the
support of Russia which he saw, once
Europeanized, as the leader of the
Slavic nations’ renewal. His huge
intellectual output, which did not
falter even in the time of his
Siberian exile, was overwhelmingly
dedicated to his chosen calling. The
tragic episodes of his life – the
utter misunderstanding which
followed him from Rome to Moscow,
his Siberian exile, and, finally,
his death in Vienna on the very day
on which the Ottoman siege ended –
are all a testimony to the fact that
he was at odds with his time.
Irrespective of just how differently
he was perceived by different
individuals at different times, he
was either the misguided dreamer or
the herald of possible different
futures. There never would have been
Yugoslavism in the “long 19th
century” without its dreamers or
visionaries.
In contrast to
Križanić, his contemporary, the
Pauline monk Ivan Belostenec
(Joannis Bellosztenecz; Varaždin,
circa 1594 – Lepoglava, 1675), spent
most of his life laboring on his
voluminous “Treasury – A
Latin-Illyrian (i.e. Slavic)
Dictionary” (Gazophylacium,
seuLatino-Illyricorum onomatum
aerarium; vol. I-II, Zagreb 1740),
the first Croatian dictionary to
include words in the Kajkavian,
Chakavian and Shtokavian dialects –
with an emphasis on the Kajkavian
dialect. In spite of his seminal
role in Croatian culture,
Belostenec’s South Slavic vision was
constrained by the erudite
constructs that came out of the Pax
Ottomanica Ottoman Peace) in central
south-eastern Europe of the 17th
century.
In Belostenec’s
dictionary there is even no clear
distinction between “Slav” and
“Slovene”!
Sclavus (Slav)isSzlovenecz (Slovene -
I, 1092), but also Sclavonia
(Slavonia) is Szlovenʃzki
orʃzag (Slovenian country, state),
while Sclavonicus (Slavic) is
szlovenʃzki (Slovenian as
inszlovenʃki jezik, Slovenian
language - I, 1092). A Szlovènecz
(Slovene) is, on the other hand,
Illyrius, Illyricus, Sclavus (an
Illyrian, a Slav). A Szlovènka (a
female Slovene) is Illyrica
mulier (female Illyrian), Szlovenſki
Orſag (Slovenian country) is
Illyrica, Illyris, Illyrium,
Illyricum, Sclavonia (Illyria,
Slavonia). Finally, Szlovenſzki
(Slovenian) is Illyricus,
Illyricanus, Sclavonicus (Illyrian,
Slavic - II, 507).
Additionally,
Croata (Croat) is Horvath, Hervat,
„(a)ntiquitùs nominabantur Curetes“
( “the ancient legendary tribal
name” - I, 379). Croatia, olim
Crobatia (Croatia, formerly Crobatia)
is Horvatʃzki orʃzak, horvatʃzka
zemlya (Croatian state, Croatian
country), y Kralyevʃztvo (the
Kingdom - I, 379). Horvatſkiorpo
horvatſki (Croatian) is Croaticè,
Illyricè (Croatian, Illyrian - II,
129). In Belostenec’s dictionary,
the meanings for Illyrian, Slav and
Croat overlap, but it is highly
questionable when he is talking
about Slovenes as Slovenes, and when
Slovenes become Slavonians and even
simply Slavs.
Furthermore,
Dalmata (Dalmatian male) and
Dalmatius (Dalmatian female) is
Dalmatin, Dalmatinka (Slavic
versions of the same), while
Dalmatia (Dalmatia) is Dalmaczia,
Dalmatinʃzki orʃzag (Dalmatian
country - I, 400). As distinct from
the mutually overlapping Croats and
Slovenes, in Belostenec’s dictionary
Dalmatians are uniform
(‘one-dimensional’) from Antiquity
onwards. Even though his Dalmatia is
not a kingdom but a country, he
fails to describe its
relationshipwith Croatia proper!
A similar
constructivist approach, with its
serious, ‘epochal’ limitations, was
also applied in the case of the
Bosniaks, Serbs and Bulgarians:
Bosnya Orſzag
(Bosnian country, state) is Bosna
zemlya (Bosnian country), Bosnia,
Misia, Regnum Bosniae (kingdom of
Bosnia). Bosnyak (a Bosniak)…is koi
je iz Bosnye… (“he who comes from
Bosnia - II, 26).
Raʃtia (Rastia or
Rascia – the country of the Ras,
‘Old Serbs’) is Thracia (Thrace -
the ancient name given to the
south-eastern Balkan region, the
land inhabited by the Thracians -I,
1020), while Thraca, Thracia
(Thrace) is Rasci (Rasia) or
Valachia magna (Great Valachia or
Walachia -a historical region of
south-east Romania between the
Transylvanian Alps and the Danube
River – trans.) or Vlaski orʃzag
(Walachian country - 1210).
Szërblyanin is Rascianus (Serbia is
Rascia), while Szërbſka zemlya
(Serbian country, land) is Rascia,
Servia (Rascia, Serbia - II, 498)
Ulàh (Vlach) is Valachus, Rascianus,
Trax, Tracus, Thracis (Walachian,
Rascian, Thracian - II, 569).
Bùlgarin
(Bulgarian) is Bugarin, Bùgar,
Bulgarus, Maesus (Moesia), while
Bulgárſki zemlya (Bulgarian country,
land) is Bulgaria, Maesia Superior
(Greater Moesia – Moesia was an
ancient region and later Roman
province situated in the Balkans
along the south bank of the Danube
river. It included most of the
territory of modern-day Serbia
(without Vojvodina) and the northern
parts of the modern Macedonia
(Moesia Superior), as well as
Northern Bulgaria and Romanian
Dobrudja (Moesia Inferior) –
trans.), Triball (Triballi) - an
ancient tribe whose dominion was
around the plains of modern southern
Serbia and western Bulgaria, roughly
centered where Serbia and Bulgaria
are joined – trans. - (II, 34)].
The common
denominator of Belostenec’s
“etymologizing” is the implicit
belief that the (South) Slavs are an
autochthonic people in south-eastern
Europe. Whether it is viable to
connect the ethno-genesis of the
South Slavic peoples to their
predecessors from Antiquity is still
an open question and it certainly
did not interest Belostenec as a
question in cultural anthropology
but rather as an issue of legitimacy
in the historical sense. In this he
was consistent, and one could say
that Belostenec belonged to those
scholars who anticipated one of the
great issues of Croatian and other
South Slavic national integrations
in the 19th century – that is, to
what degree as a nation they are
historically rooted in (the
territory of) their own countries.
Namely, following the logic of
Romantic “primordialism,” those who
in the past were firmly rooted (in
their territory) could also with
greater confidence believe that they
would sustain themselves there in
the future too.
The interweaving
of different types of identity in
Belostenec’s work is fascinating
because it enables multiple
constructs, but also because it
opens up the possibility for
alternative solutions which could
become the binding tissue for all of
them. With his pan-Croatianism,
formulated in his work Croatia
rediviva (Croatia revisited),
published in Vienna in 1701, Pavao
Ritter Vitezović (Senj, February 7,
1652 – Vienna, January 20, 1713)
dissolved the dilemmas of scholars
like Belostenec and extended the
name Croatian to all South Slavs
and, in that respect, completed the
work on the first modern history of
Serbia, Serbiae illustrate libri
octo (Eight illustrated books of
Serbia).
From 1701, to 1835
– when Ljudevit Gaj (Krapina, July
8, 1809 – Zagreb, April 20, 1872)in
Zagreb launched the Novine horvatzke
(Croatian News) and the Daniczu
horvatzku, slavonzku y dalmatinzku
(Croatian, Slavonic and Dalmatian
Morning Star), which, the following
year, he had already renamed as
Ilirske narodne novine (Illyrian
National News) and the Danicu
ilirsku ( Illyrian Morning Star) –
the process of Croatian national
integration explicitly shifted to a
program of South Slavic, “Illyrian”
linguistic and cultural linking and
integration, whilst at the same time
not abandoning the class political
program of the state and legal
unification of Croatian lands: “ The
ideology of the Illyrian Movement
contained and expressed two levels
of integrationist impulses, the
Croatian and the South Slavic. The
latter was most strongly felt on
Croatian territory, which was at the
core of the dynamic, northern part
of South Slavic territory, partly
adjoining Slovenian territory and
partly overlapping with Serbian
territory. The South Slavic idea
neutralized strong specific
provincialisms… and played an
important role in forming the
Croatian nation. At the same time,
it facilitated the cooperation of
Croats and Serbs in Croatia in
achieving common interests – the
building of institutions needed by a
society in its transition from a
feudal to a bourgeois society and
maintaining the special political
position of the “Triune Kingdom” as
a bulwark against Hungarian
political and national expansionism”
(Stančić 1990: 133). In this sense,
the Illyrian Movement played both a
Croatian international and a South
Slavic international role.
Irrespective of the fact that its
results were contradictory, both
amongst the Croats, and amongst the
other South Slavs, especially the
Serbs and Slovenes, there is no
doubt that the Illyrian Movement
opened up, in a concrete historical
way, the issue of what should and
could be the processes leading to
the establishment of modern South
Slavic nations and the development
of modern societies in general. In
different ways, this issue was of
vital importance to all South Slavic
nations. The practical, political
effects of this movement were
visible in the spring of 1848. Even
though the idea of “Austro-Slavism”-
a South Slavic synonym for
Yugoslavism – as a liberally based
project of the (con) federal,
constitutional reform of the
Habsburg Monarchy, remained only at
the level of political aspirations
of the South Slavic national elites,
(Yugo) Slavism, which conceptually
soon marginalized the concept of
Illyrism, achieved legitimacy in
circles in favor of South Slavic
integration, especially in Croatia.
Not even the many controversies
associated with this concept would
question this all the way up to
1918.
The name Illyrian
was contentious both amongst Serbs
and amongst Slovenes, and Teodor
Pavlović (Karlovo – today Novo
Miloševo – February 14, 1804 –
Karlovo, August 12, 1854), the
editor of Serbskoga narodnog lista
(Serbian National Paper) – as much
as he supported “pan-Slavic literary
interconnectedness” – also
emphasized: “Let the Krajnci
(Slovenians) be the Krajnci; the
Horvats (Croats) the Horvats, and
the Srblji (Serbs) individually; but
when we talk about all of them
together, let us call ourselves as
we by nature do and must call
ourselves: of one tribe born, dear
brother Yugoslavians and Yugoslavs!”
(Novak 1930: 78-79).
The experience of
the simultaneous Serbian
coming-of-age in respect to national
integration both as Habsburg and
Ottoman subjects – which, on the one
hand, implied dynastic/monarchic
loyalty, and on the other, an
agrarian revolution reduced to a
bureaucratic nation-state – is
reflected in the critical
questioning of the socialist
Svetozar Marković. He was a decisive
advocate of the federalist
resolution of the Serbian national
issue and the national issue of
every other nation that overlaps and
intermingles with the Serbs: “The
Serbian people are so positioned as
to intermingle with the Bulgarians,
Croats and Romanians, while two of
these nations, the Bulgarians and
the Croats, are their closest
relatives by blood and language.
Where are the frontiers of ‘the
united Serbs’, of the new Serbian
state? This is difficult to achieve,
if we do not wish to get into
conflict with all these peoples. (…)
The Serbian people have no
geographic or ethnographic
boundaries which would set it apart
as a unique whole. In order to
create a state of five to five and a
half million Serbs, the Serbian
people would have to make enemies
out of the Bulgarians, Croats and
Romanians. They would have to take
on the role of conqueror, as the
Hungarians are doing today.”
When the Croatian
national elite accepted the Yugoslav
name, it accepted it more
consistently than any other South
Slavic national elite, but it should
also be emphasized that it did so
with the support of many influential
Serbs, mainly from Croatia, but also
– and not too rarely – with the
support of the Slovenes, and in
other parts as well. From the
Society for Yugoslav History
(Družtva za povjestnicu
jugoslavensku, 1850), and the
Archive of Yugoslav History (Arkiva
za povjestnicu jugoslavensku, 1851),
via the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences
and Arts (Jugoslavenska akademija
znanosti i umjetnosti, 1866) –
established in great part by the
donation of Djakovo bishop Josip
Juraj Strossmayer (Osijek, February
4, 1815 – Djakovo, March 8, 1905) –
all the way up to the Yugoslav
Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor,
1915-1919), which was made up of
influential Croats, Serbs and
Slovenes, war refugees from the
Habsburg Monarchy including Frano
Supilo (Cavtat, November 30, 1870 –
London, September 25, 1917) and Ante
Trumbić (Split, May 15, 1864 –
Zagreb, November 17, 1938),
Yugoslavism as a concept, a cultural
and/or political program, a practice
and above all a vision realized
itself in many contradictory forms
amongst primarily Croats but also
other South Slavs in the Habsburg
Monarchy, as well as outside its
borders, above all in Serbia and
Montenegro. However, the short-lived
State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs
(October 29 – December 1, 1918) did
not choose the Yugoslav name as its
own, nor did it become the name of
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (December 1, 1918), up
until the royal ‘octroyed’ (or
‘granted’) acts of October 3, 1929,
when the dictatorship of King
Alexander I invalidated the project
of the common Yugoslav state. The
true motive for evading the Yugoslav
name in 1918 was to formally
disguise what was in reality a
unitaristic project, while in 1929,
by conceding the Yugoslav name, the
intention was to formalize a
deception which no longer had any
real bearing on the national
interests of the Yugoslav peoples.
VI
As far as the
geographic aspects of South Slavic
national integration in the “long
19th century” are concerned,
Yugoslav studies and ideologies were
particularly focused on – what we
would call today – economic
geography and ecology. Here it is
important to bear in mind that at
the time autochthonic ideas about
the South Slavic world were already
taking shape on the margins of the
Dinaric-Pannonian basins, also in
large part on the boundaries between
the Habsburg Monarchy and the
Ottoman Empire and were strictly
monitored by the “sanitary cordons”
(Sanitatscordon) of the
Military-Krajina buffer regions,
practically until the
Austro-Hungarian occupation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878.
Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade are
cities along the Sava River and
whatever separates them, they had in
common that they mutually recognized
each other by way of urbanity and by
way of ethnicity – at least from
1840 onwards –as the epicenters of
events in the South Slavic north and
south, along the Danubian and the
Adriatic routes. Ljudevit Gaj was
the first who programmatically,
linguistically and culturally
integrated the area from the Julian
Alps to the Black Sea, from the west
to the east, endowing the Croatian
national renewal (i.e. Illyrian
Movement) with a Yugoslav meaning.
(1835-1848). However, it was only in
the latter part of the 19th century
that the conservative national
élites, confronted with the great
challenges of European-wide
modernization, would begin to
realize that less than a third of
the mostly northern South Slavic
territories were agriculturally
fertile flatlands, while two thirds
consisted of mountainous terrain,
significantly less agriculturally
productive, with limited lines of
communication and very few natural
throughways from the plains to the
Adriatic Sea, and without waterways
that led into this sea. In these
areas, there was not enough drinking
water to sustain concentrated
populations and larger livestock
funds. These were problems
confronting all South Slavic peoples
except for the Macedonians
integrated into the Vardar-Aegean
plains, who, in any case, were not
capable, during the better part of
the 19th century, of developing
larger urban areas or huge livestock
funds – especially since, as Ottoman
subjects up until 1912-13, they were
also confronted by various
challenges from the Bulgarian and
Serbian, but also Greek and Albanian
sides. If there was a geographic
basis to the South Slavic/Yugoslav
issue, it could only be concerned
with the pro-modernizing and
pro-national-integration transversal
and longitudinal networking of
territories to the north and south
of the Middle-European-Adriatic
basins, between the sub-Danubian and
Adriatic regions, predominantly in
the mountainous areas of the Balkan
Peninsula.
The ideologues of
South Slavic/Yugoslav cooperation
sought the economic basis of
Yugoslavism primarily in agrarian
economics, and even if they had
anticipated industrial economics,
they were more focused on the
development of the state rather than
on the development of
entrepreneurship, driven more by the
fear of mass pauperization than by
the transitional processes leading
to capitalist economics. Agrarian
economics and rural culture were
dominant in South Slavic societies
up until the socialist modernization
and industrialization in the second
half of the 20th century, but the
social and economic types were very
different, from the Habsburg
Hereditary Lands in the north-west
to the tribal communities in the
south-east, and from classic Ottoman
serf-like relations to the agrarian
economics and rural culture of the
free farmers in traditional
communities in
autonomous/independent Serbia. It
was very difficult to project any
kind of common, stable South Slavic
state on that basis. Therefore, the
ideologues of South Slavic/ Yugoslav
cooperation advocated a different
approach. The German Drang nach
Sudosten (lit. “thrust towards the
south-east” i.e. the former German
policy of eastward expansion –
trans.), Italian irredentism, as
well as all the other grand national
programs of the South Slavic
neighbors, provided more than
sufficient reason for the South
Slavs to defend their vital, common
interest, crucial for their future,
together, in a common Yugoslav
state, within or outside of the
borders of the Habsburg Monarchy.
After the Balkan Wars of 1912 and
1913, that began in part as a
reaction to Italy’s war against the
Ottoman Empire, this issue came to a
head and its resolution depended on
the great powers which were ready
for such an outcome because of their
numerous other interests.
On the eve of
1914, Jovan Skerlić (Belgrade,
August 20, 1877 – Belgrade, May 15,
1914) was one of the Serbian
ideologues of integral Yugoslavism
as the South Slavic response to the
challenges of the “age of empires”,
but also as the guarantee of
successful Westernization,
advocating – among other things – a
compromise in linguistic unification
(neo-Shtokavian Ekavian plus Roman
script). As a huge authority in
Serbian culture, he was also a
leading influence on the political
beliefs of many, especially the
young generation.
In contrast to
Skerlić, his contemporary Dimitrije
Tucović (Gostilje at Zlatibor, May
13, 1881 – Vrače Brdo near
Lazarevac, September 20, 1914), a
Marxist and social-democrat, was
consistently against all
trans-national projects that
legitimize the hegemony of one
nation over another. In his work
“Serbia and Albania: A Contribution
to the Critique of the Serbian
Bourgeoisie’s Policy of Conquest”
(Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog
kritici zavojevačke politike srpske
buržoazije, Beograd 1914), he wrote
things which today seem like
prophecy: “We dealt here in detail
with the Albanian issue driven more
by practical needs than theoretical
interests. The Albanian policy of
our government ended in defeat which
cost us many lives. In that respect,
even greater sacrifices await us in
the future. The policy of conquest
pursued by the Serbian government
towards the Albanian people has
created such relations on the
western border of Serbia that peace
and a normal state of affairs can
hardly be expected anytime in the
near future. At the same time, this
policy has pushed Albania into the
hands of two major powers that have
the greatest interest in the Western
Balkans - and every consolidation of
any outside capitalist state in the
Balkan Peninsula represents a
serious danger to Serbia and the
normal development of all the Balkan
nations.” He was also deeply
convinced that relations between the
South Slavic and Balkan nations must
develop along (con) federal lines
and, in the long term, be secured
through the socialist transformation
of all of them. However, the outcome
of World War I was such that the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes became a problem the moment
it was established, both within its
borders, but also outside them.
None of the states
established by Versailles after 1918
was a (con) federation. Even though
the key players in this order were
liberal democracies (the United
States, Great Britain and France),
practically none of the newly-
established states – with the
possible exception of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic – was a
liberal democracy. Although all of
them emerged from the experience of
life in multi-national empires, none
of them consistently respected the
imperatives of multi-nationality.
Moreover, Weimar Germany was, with
respect to its constitution,
incomparably more centralized than
the Deutsches Reich (one army,
centralized fiscal authority etc.):
“The German Republic from 1919 was
thus potentially much stronger than
the Reich from 1871 ever was” (Simms
2016: 287). Thus all who
participated in the establishment of
the Yugoslav state as a state based
on Woodrow Wilson’s principles were
obviously mistaken, since the only
formula that in the civic sense
could have been sustainable was a
federal one, one that the victorious
side did not recommend even to
vanquished Germany. Bearing in mind
that World War II was in many
respects a continuation of World War
I, the Yugoslav state was an
anomaly. Its reconstruction was
possible based only on radically
different assumptions.
In 1996, John
Lampe published a book of synthetic
analysis called Yugoslavia as
History. Twice There Was a Country
(1996), reminding readers that the
Yugoslav state had disappeared in
1941, only to be re-established,
after the hell of war from 1941 to
1945, and then, in 1991/1992, only
to disappear again in the whirlpool
of war and violence from 1991 to
1995. Therefore the question that
for all researchers is all the more
intriguing is how it was possible,
after everything that had burdened
relations between the peoples and
nations of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes / Kingdom of
Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941, and
the terrible human degradation and
deprivation of the occupied Yugoslav
territories from 1941 to 1945, to
renew Yugoslavia as a federal state
with a political monopoly by the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia/
League of Communists of Yugoslavia?
The paradox was
all the greater since the Yugoslav
communists were the only ones, after
the capitulation of the Yugoslav
Royal Army in April 1941, in the
process of the establishment of
occupational and collaborationist
régimes, to declare a willingness to
universally lead the resistance
against occupation and collaboration
and for the renewal of Yugoslavia as
a community of nations. Namely, they
were banned and literally outlawed
in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes in 1920/1921, subject to
state terror and proscribed in
dominantly anti-communist public
opinion, including the opposition.
In 1941, in terms of strength, they
were a barely discernible force. No
one who knew anything about them
could doubt that their determination
to lead armed resistance was not
motivated by restorational but by
revolutionary inspiration. “Never a
return to the old!” was the message
to all who were invited to join
them. This was ultimately a message
to all those who in the previous
Yugoslavia felt deceived and
betrayed and who did not rule out
the possibility of a better, more
just world. The second message,
“brotherhood and unity”, was
directed at all who, for whatever
reason, felt marginalized and denied
in their human, civic and national
rights and who did not exclude the
same rights for others. This
alternative was so radical that the
national-liberation resistance to
occupation and collaboration could
not avoid being burdened on its
margins by civil war. However
inclusive this communist- inspired,
national-front mobilization, it had
to be selective in order not to lose
its credibility. The brakes failed
seriously for the first time at the
moment of “victory”. Revanchism
against the vanquished, however
limited, had far-reaching
consequences, as did every other
repressive campaign, with loss of
human life or without it, which
ensued all the way up to the
dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia in
war. Even though in terms of
modernization and level of
civilization, socialist Yugoslavia
did achieve results and values that
were without precedent in the
history of South Slavic nations, it
did not manage to create a political
culture and a political system
capable of withstanding the
pressures of internal and external
crisis.
To Lampe’s
insights we could add a post
scriptum, namely, the year 1999, as
well as numerous other phenomena in
the “Western Balkans” and in the
“region” that still confront us with
disturbing uncertainties. Tragedies
and traumas are everyday occurrences
for millions of people, former
citizens of the SFR of Yugoslavia
and the many and varied transitions
from the proscribed (socialist)
“uniform thinking” seem endless.
While Slovenia and Croatia have
managed to become members of the
European Union, it is still a huge
open question whether any other
state that emerged from the violent
dissolution of Yugoslavia will
manage to enter into its full
membership, even though the majority
of the population in all of them
wants this. Simultaneously, the
recognizable contours of a repeated
transformation of the “Western
Balkans” into a global field of
imperial confrontation are
increasingly visible. There is
nothing new under the sun in the
Balkans.
*
Given that in the literature devoted
to the Yugoslav heritage of the
different nations that made up
Yugoslavia at the time of its
dissolution there is considerable
discussion about the history of
Yugoslavism before the creation of
Yugoslavia, the author of this paper
– written after the above- mentioned
works – decided upon a
textbook-like, individually-profiled
review of the “big topics”.
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