Introduction
Between the two
world wars, the historiography
usually interpreted the constitution
of the Yugoslav state as the
achievement of centennial aspiration
of the people of same or similar
ethnic origin. After the WWII the
historiography saw the 1918-41
Yugoslavia as a state of failed
hopes eventually fulfilled in its
renewal in 1945 – in a new form
(republic) and in a new type
(federation). However, the true
history of the Yugoslav state in
both of its cycles (1918-41 and
1945-91) was equally contradictory
and dramatic.
The end of the WWI
radically changed Europe’s political
map. Four empires disappeared:
Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German
and Russian. A number of independent
nation-states emerged: Poland,
Finland, Baltic States – Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania –
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and
the Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians
and Slovenians. The later was the
most complex of all these newly
founded states. Nations that found
themselves in it in 1918 – having
lived in different empires and
civilizations – were strangers to
each other (internal migration has
been insignificant, while the
migration beyond the region almost
non-existent) and it was only in the
common state that they were to
confront their interests and
harmonize their goals. Formulated by
their political representatives
prior to the establishment of the
common state, these goals – at least
in the case of Serbians, Croatians
and Slovenians – had reflected
particularistic interests lasting
throughout the history of the
Yugoslav state.1
Two principles clashed in the
emergence and history of the
Yugoslav state: that of power and
that of rights. The conflict
undermined the sense of people’s
belonging together. Besides, in the
final struggle for Yugoslav
unification some decisions that
strengthened Serbia’s position sowed
the seeds of lasting rifts.2 In its
short life – hardly over two decades
– the Yugoslav state went through
several phases. Analyzing the
characteristics of those phases this
chapter aims at reconstructing the
process that determined the fate of
the Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians
and Slovenians. That process,
perceived from the angle of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration at the
end of the 20th century, makes a
historian question not only the
interests resulting in a common
state but also the assumptions of
its sustainability that remained
contrasted till the very end.
The Idea of a
Common State in the WWI: Concepts
and Their Promoters
The idea of
unification Serbia proclaimed its
war goal in 1914 was deep-rooted not
only among Serbian political and
intellectual elites but masses as
well. And it was so long before the
outbreak of WWI. Leader of the
People’s Radical Party
Nikola Pašić
took (1894) that “cut off from other
Serbian countries Serbia has no
reason whatsoever to exist.”3 The
army became more influential after
the establishment of the
revolutionary organization
Unification or Death, known as Black
Hand, and ensuing assassination of
the last ruler from the Obrenović
dynasty, King Alexander (May 29,
1903). Under the auspices of Russia,
Serbia became the center of the
South Slav movement. Annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908) strongly
boosted Serbian nationalism.
Historians have been referring to a
genuine “war psychosis.” Everything
was in the sign of preparations for
a liberation war and unification:
the Church, education, the press and
literature. And Serbian scientist
Jovan Cvijić argued categorically,
“The Serbian problem must be solved
by force.”4
After the Balkan
Wars (1912-13) Serbia considerably
enlarged its territory and
population. This, coupled with more
sympathies for it from South Slavic
nations, boosted its
self-confidence.
The WWI broke out
at bad times for Serbia, exhausted
by Balkan Wars. But Serbia could not
miss the chance it has been waiting
for, for so long. The government of
the Kingdom of Serbia, and then the
People’s Assembly in Nis (December
7/November 24, 1914), adopted a
declaration on Serbia’s war goals,
quoting, “Confident in the
resoluteness of the entire Serbian
nation to persist in the holy
struggle for the defense of its
hearth and freedom, the Government
of the Kingdom of Serbia takes that,
in this hour of decision, its main
and only duty is to ensure a
successful outcome of the warfare
that became, from the very
beginning, also a struggle for
liberation and unification of all
our oppressed brothers, Serbians,
Croatians and Slovenians. The
triumphs that must crown this
warfare will fully compensate for
bloody sacrifices Serbia’s
generations of today sustains.”5
(Italics, L.P.).
Adopted at the
beginning of the WWI, the Nis
Declaration equalized Serbia’s
struggle for independence and the
struggle for liberation and
unification of all Serbians,
Croatians and Slovenians. At the
initiative of the government of the
Kingdom of Serbia, and with its
financial support, the Yugoslav
Committee, as the second pillar of
the idea of the common state, was
established in London, and formally
in Paris (October 1, 1915).6 Though
dedicated to the same idea, the two
bodies were at odds, from the very
start, about the state’s
arrangement; in other words, about
how to actually make it a common
one. The differences, mostly between
political and intellectual elites of
the two biggest nations, Serbians
and Croatians, were growing deeper
and deeper, and eventually turned
insurmountable.
As said above, the
two promoters of a common state –
the government of the Kingdom of
Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee –
held different views. The government
of the Kingdom had an eye on
Serbia’s supremacy counting on the
following prerogatives: the existing
nation-state, the sympathies of the
Entente, material losses and the
heavy toll in human lives the
country paid in the WWI.7 Historians
observed long ago that a new state
had been seen as an “award” for
Serbia’s own liberation war or, to
put it colloquially, as “spoils of
war.”8 A centralized and unitary
state guaranteed Serbia’s
domination.
The Yugoslav
Committee was inconsequential in
Austria-Hungary. It had no armed
forces. And it was itself was split
between supporters of and opponents
to a centralized and unitary state.
Croatians were advocating a
federation. As for Frano Supilo, he
stood for the establishment of a
Croatian state first and only then
its unification with Serbia.
Opposing a centralized and unitary
state, representatives of Croatian
intellectual and political elites
argued for Croatia’s right to
statehood and national identity.
Unlike other non-Serbian peoples
Croats will be more and more playing
the role of “an admiral ship,” as
historian Ivo Banac put it.
The federal
concept has been advocated for in
various forms. Before the Entente
decided to wipe off Austria-Hungary
of the map, 33 MPs of the Yugoslav
caucus in the Vienna Parliament had
called for unification of South
Slavs within the dual monarchy. And
on October 6, 1918 in Zagreb the
People’s Committee of Slovenians,
Croats and Serbs was formed with a
view to take over the reins at the
moment of Austria-Hungary’s
disintegration. The Committee stood
for unification of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians provided that a
constitutional assembly decides on
the type of government (republic or
monarchy) by a two-third majority
vote, and two governments are formed
in the interregnum: the governments
of the Kingdom of Serbia and of the
People’s Committee of Slovenians,
Croats and Serbs.
Two causes of the
collapse of the 1918-41 Yugoslav
state have been pinpointed in the
historiography: the failed economic
unity and the undemocratic rule.
Here the historiography has
overlooked the fact that in the
aftermath of the WWI the Yugoslav
state as a whole was among most
underdeveloped European countries,
with regions largely differing from
each other in terms of economic
development. It has also lost sight
of another fact: undemocratic
regimes have been a response to
nations’ calls for freedom and
equality, to nations’ refusals to
have a subordination replaced by
another one. Hence, the key problem
of the 1918-41 Yugoslavia was above
all political: the type of
governance and the system that would
have met the needs of each and every
nation rather than of just the one
with biggest population or of a
supra-national bureaucracy.
Neither at the
beginning nor during the WWI the
idea of a common state would have
been sustainable was it not for a
compromise between the advocates of
different concepts (the Corfu
Declaration). When the war ended and
Austria-Hungary was a threat to all
no more, the compromise was broken
and all decisions were made on the
grounds of the balance of power
established during the war. The
People’s Council of Slovenians,
Croats and Serbs had represented
eight million South Slavs in
Austria-Hungary. It had never
questioned the unification with
Serbia and Montenegro. But what it
had thought vital were conditions
for the unification: the type and
the character of a common state.
Two factors made
it easier to abandon the compromise:
the threat of Italy’s territorial
aspirations and the presence of the
Serbian army in the territory of the
State of Slovenians, Croats and
Serbs, the People’s Council took
upon itself to represent. The policy
of compromise put away and decisions
on vital issues made on the grounds
of the balance of power emerging
from the war (predetermining the
type of the state and declaring its
first constitution with a simple
majority vote in the Constitutional
Assembly) resulted in lasting
distrust, especially in the
relationship between Serbs and
Croats; and turned the 1914-41
Yugoslavia – definitely not an
“artificial creation” of big powers
– into a state without legitimacy.
The Act of
Unification: Predetermination of the
Type of State
Decisive Role of the Serbians
outside Serbia:
Svetozar Pribićević’s Late
Self-Reproach
A circle from the
Serbian-Croatian Coalition led by
Svetozar Pribićević advocated a
centralistic state, a monarchy and
unconditional unification. On the
other hand, representatives of the
Croatian People’s Peasant Party –
HPSS (established in 1905) and their
leader
Stjepan Radić was arguing for
step-by-step negotiations with
Serbia, unification with it provided
the safeguard of Croatia’s
historical and legal continuity as a
state, for a republic and a
federation.
Having bypassed
the People’s Council and the
Croatian Assembly alike, Svetozar
Pribićević’s circle decided to send
a delegation of the Council to
Belgrade. Invoking people’s right to
self-determination Stjepan Radić was
strongly against the action. Even
the People’s Assembly of the Kingdom
of Serbia was ignored in the crucial
decision-making on unification.
The delegation of
the People’s Council arrived in
Belgrade with the Directive on
conditions of unification: a general
people’s assembly of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians should decide on the
type of the state by a qualified,
two-third majority vote, as agreed
under the Corfu Declaration; the
assembly would be convened within
the period of six months following
on the armistice; in the meantime
the King would hold the executive
power, whereas the legislative power
would be invested with a state
council – made of members of the
People’s Council and the Yugoslav
Committee, and with proportional
representation of Serbs and
Montenegrins; and, the state council
would call and conduct the elections
for the constitutional assembly.
Once in Belgrade, the delegation of
the People’s Council departed from
the letter of the Directive. But the
predetermined decision was nothing
unexpected. Italy’s occupation of
the coastal areas, the fear of
social turmoil and, above all, the
action taken by Svetozar
Pribićević’s coalition on the one
hand, and the Regent eager to
enlarge Serbia’s territory through
unification as soon as possible, and
figure as a unifier independently
from Nikola Pašić on the other, sped
up the unification act of December
1.
The Regent proclaimed “unification
of Serbia and the countries of the
independent state of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians in the unified
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians.”9 The manner in which the
establishment of the Yugoslav state
was decided on not only
predetermined relations between
Yugoslav nations – it also
predetermined the nature of its
regime. Thus created state was more
than an enlarged Serbia – it was an
authoritarian monarchy with all
powers vested in the monarch.
Absolutism was mirrored in
centralism at the level of the
state, and in unitary, integrative
yugoslavianism at the national
level.
On the eve of the People’s Council’s
delegation departure for Belgrade,
Stjepan Radić warned, “Do not rush
headlong like geese into the fog.”
For him, that was “an act of
conspiracy against people, against
Croatia and Croats above all.”10 Much
later, in exile at the time of King
Alexander’s dictatorship, Svetozar
Pribićević, the inspirer of the
People’s Council delegation’s visit
to Belgrade and a major actor of the
predetermined unification, wrote,
“The delegation of the People’s
Council erred politically and
constitutionally having decided on
unification in Belgrade through an
agreement with Serbian governmental
and party officials rather than
discussing it beforehand at a
plenary session of the People’s
Council in Zagreb, which was solely
authorized to sanction it. I
honestly confess the part I played
in this fatal error.”11
Provisional Solution to and
Heterogeneity of the State:
Arguments for Centralism and
Absolutism
At the Paris Peace Conference
(January 1919) the delegation led by
Nikola Pašić found itself in a
difficult situation. Everything was
provisional: the substance of the
state – the “old” though enlarged
Kingdom of Serbia or a new state;
the name for the state (Serbians
would not have their name melted in
some other); the conflict between
centralists and federalists; the
borders – especially with Italy and
Hungary. The state of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians was internationally
recognized under the Versailles
Treaty (June 18, 1919). Ensured was
the continuity of the Kingdom of
Serbia’s foreign policy in wartime.
Together with Great Britain and
Italy, France, as Europe’s most
powerful country, was the main
warrant of the Versailles order
meant to prevent restoration of the
Habsburg monarchy and Germany’s
another encroachment on Middle
Europe and the Balkans. In addition
to curbing “the red danger” of
Russia, the alliance of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians,
Czechoslovakia and Rumania (1920-21)
– the so-called sanitary cordon –
shared this goal.
What marked the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenians – apart from
the above-mentioned provisional
solution – was extreme
heterogeneity. The state with
population of 11,984,919 – according
to the 1921 census – was deeply
divided, and not only along ethnic
and religious lines. Its subjects
have experienced different forms of
government with different
institutions throughout history.
They differed from one another
dramatically in economic and
cultural development, in literacy in
particular. Further on, they had
been adjusted to different agrarian,
legal and educational systems. And
above all, there were scars of the
war in which they had been on
opposite sides, suffering unequal
losses – especially in human lives.
This generated frustration of many
actors and fear of anarchy. Against
such a backdrop – actually or with
purpose – centralism and absolutism
emerged as the only alternative.
Hence the Decree and the January 6
Dictatorship met no resistance.
Things were the same in other
European countries experiencing
dictatorships in the aftermath of
the WWI. And yet, there was a
distinctive feature to the January 6
Dictatorship: in the midst of the
crisis it was a response to was the
conflict between the two biggest
nations – Serbs and Croats. A state
concept some intellectual and
political elites of South Slavic
countries had aspired to – the
concept for a composite state – was
turned down without any prior
consideration in favor of a
centralized and unitary state
concept of the government of the
Kingdom of Serbia. And the former
was overmastered by the highest
governmental act and by the
principle of the end justifying the
means. “Acting in tandem in the
Constitutional Assembly, the
Democrats and the Radicals managed
to ensure the support of a part of
the Farmers’ Alliance and of a
non-Serbian party, the Yugoslav
Muslim Party, thus enlarging the
bloc ready to approve the
government’s draft constitution.
Representatives of this non-Serbian
party were remunerated and given
benefits in educational and
religious autonomy, judiciary and
governmental offices. To win them
over for the Constitution nothing
was refrained from – from pressure
through bribery to purchase of
votes,” historians have already
observed.12
The First Constitution of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians:
Strong Polarization over Two
Concepts for the State
Several constitutional drafts have
mirrored the rift between supporters
of the centralistic and unitary
state, and advocates for a
fundamentally composite one
(autonomies, federation or
confederation). However, only the
government’s draft, backed by the
alliance between the Radicals, the
Democrats and the King, stood a
chance. No effort was spared to
ensure it an upper hand. The vote on
it (simple rather than qualified
majority) was so planned as to avoid
any risk. It was adopted in a tight
vote: evidently, the alliance had
been on guard for good reason. And
the centralistic and unitary bloc
had known too well that the
opportunity arising once in the
history should not be missed. As the
19th century man to whom pan-Serbian
liberation and unification was a
historical fixation, Nikola Pašić,
the leader of the People’s Radical
Party, demonstrated this awareness
to an inch. He opposed the
constitutional draft put forth by
the Radicals’ founding-father,
Stojan M. Protić. Himself also
advocating a unified state, but a
more rational and modern
constitution, Protić’s differently
saw the unity. “The nature is also
unique but diverse at the same time.
And the state can be one and only
too, but not only needs not but
should not clothe all citizens in
one and only waistcoat. The nature
recognizes just unity in diversity.
Whatever applies to the world of
living things applies to a human
being and human society,” he said.13
Or, as he put it in other words,
“The policy of breaking Croats with
a tutorial, bureaucratic and
gendarme governance the St. Vitus’s
Day Constitution is after investing
with legality, instead of policies
based on mutual agreement, is
turning into the policy of breaking
our very Kingdom. This is the policy
that makes the Kingdom’s ribs and
the ribs of the entire state crack.
It takes the Kingdom towards
bankruptcy and political collapse.”14
Protić saw the bigger picture. For
him, agreement and compromise
denied, threatened the unity of the
state. Pašić took that the wartime
winnings, especially the heavy toll
Serbia paid in human lives, should
be ultimately manifested in the form
of government and the system. This
implied superiors and inferiors, and
by no means equality. Referring to
Stojan M. Protić and the unity of
the Radical Party the latter was
much concerned with, Pašić was
crystal-clear when saying, “While we
were working on the Constitution,
some of our people demanded a kind
of independence for Croats. Serbia,
having sacrificed so much for
liberation and unification, could
not accept it. We didn’t want them
to be servants but we had to let
them know that is had been us,
Serbians, who had won the battle for
liberation and made unification
possible.”15
But since Croats, speedily
integrating in the 1920s, would not
have some new Austria-Hungary, let
alone something less, force against
their aspirations had to be resorted
to. Some were even suggesting
“amputation” of Croatia. And all
this dispelled any delusion about
the St. Vitus’s Day Constitution as
a democratic one.
The St. Vitus’s Day Constitution
defined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians as “a constitutional,
parliamentary and hereditary
monarchy.” However, under all
provisions the King had the position
of power and control over the
people’s representation. He was the
one to convene the People’s Assembly
and empowered to dissolve it. He
sanctioned all the laws. He was the
Commander in Chief of Armed Forces.
He represented the state abroad.
Verdicts were pronounced in his
name. He appointed ministers who
were accountable to him and to the
People’s Assembly. And yet,
notwithstanding all these powers
vested in him, the Army was his
ultima ratio: the Army within which
the White Hand, a secret
organization close to him, operated.
Parliamentarianism was nothing but a
stage set. The King himself had a
penchant for dictatorship, but the
dictatorship was also immanent in
the country’s state of affairs.
Considering the manner in which the
St. Vitus’s Day Constitution was
declared and its contents the
situation was not pacified. On the
contrary, more and more
manifestations following on the
declaration of the Constitution –
scarcely analyzed in the
historiography – testify that
solutions were searched for along
some other avenues. Among those
manifestations were: the Conference
of Public Figures in Ilidza (June
28-29, 1922) perceived at the time
as “a starting point for an entire
public opinion movement for
Serbian-Croatian rapprochement;” the
Congress of Public Figures in Zagreb
(December 10, 1922) attended by one
thousand outstanding figures from
all over the country, also seen as
the event “inspiring relations
between Serbs and Croats with the
spirit of reconciliation and good
will;” the debate on the pages of
the Serbian Literary Gazette
motivated by the wish to “have our
state community arranged by free
agreement between and by equal will
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.”
In his contribution to the
above-mentioned debate Democrat
Milan Grol wrote, “The adjustment on
the old Croatia has been made with
so much impatience and haste that
Croats saw it as a tendency contrary
to the one that made them join the
community. Trust was lost. And that
is why Croats are demanding more
guarantees for their
self-government.” And slavist Toma
Maretić argued, “Whoever knows
Jesuits knows too well that they
would spare no effort to make our
young state repugnant to Croats, to
destroy it with the helping hand
from our enemies, as Jesuits would
team up with the Devil just to spite
Serbs as much as possible…I think
that an agreement would most
efficiently knock them out of action
and incapacitate them in full.”16
For Serbia’s Republicans, Jaša
Prodanović and Ljuba Stojanović, a
federation was a solution to the
problem.17
A debate on the national issue
within the Independent Workers’
Party – under the auspices of which
the banned Communist Party of
Yugoslavia was operating - was a
major event in the
post-constitutional crisis.18 However,
the ironclad proof of the growing
opposition to centralism was the
outcome of the 1923 elections
winning the Croatian Republican
Farmers’ Party 70 parliamentary
seats in comparison to 50 it gained
in the elections for the
Constitutional Assembly. The St.
Vitus’s Day Constitution did not
solve the crisis. On the contrary,
it deepened it. Since the
Constitution was on the verge of
legitimacy because of the manner in
which it had been declared – by
simple rather than qualified
majority vote (223 out of 419 MPs or
53 percent of the total number of
parliamentarians) – the rulers of
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians had to count on concealed
force as modus operandi. In mid-1928
the clash with the growing
opposition reached a critical point
that marked the end of the era of
parliamentarianism.
Pseudo – Parliamentarianism:
Masked Dictatorship Preludes Overt
Absolutism
By the letter of the St. Vitus’s Day
Constitution the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenians was a
parliamentary monarchy. Modeling on
a liberal democracy, it provided
that the People’s Assembly, as a
supreme and sovereign representative
body, shall reflect voters’ free
will and that a parliamentary
majority shall form a government.
However, the practice in the Kingdom
was diametrically opposite to its
constitutional role model. First,
the King was above all other
constitutional factors and, second,
there were hardly any prerequisites
for parliamentarianism, as a legacy
of Europe’s liberalism.
The Constitution provided not that
the King should appoint ministers
from the ranks of the parliamentary
majority: so, governments were
formed in the court rather than in
the People’s Assembly. The King was
empowered to convene and dismiss the
parliament, and call elections.
Courts of law were proclaiming
verdicts in his name. As the
Commander in Chief of Armed Forces
and in hookup with the clandestine
organization, the White Hand, under
the command of General Petar
Živković – to be appointed the Prime
Minister later on – the King
actually had limitless authority,
accurately described in the
historiography. “The King’s specific
position in the constitutional order
and his superiority over other
constitutional factors – along with
political clashes in the backward
society shaken by social turmoil and
ethnic divides – fueled the
concentration of power in his hands
since other decision-makers – under
or regardless of constitutional
provisions - were deprived of their
rights.”19
Under such circumstances the
People’s Assembly could not have
been capacitated for coping with
economic and social problems of the
country that was among the most
underdeveloped in Europe, the
country of disparities and in ruins
in the aftermath of the war. Not
guided by ideas, social or national,
as Slobodan Jovanović noted, it was
nothing but a rostrum of virulent
political skirmishes over denied
rights but for a “portion” of power
as well. Frequent debates on
scandals shaking the country –
failing to reveal perpetrators and
bring them to justice – only added
to the resignation of the feeble
public opinion: the press was
actually a mouthpiece of the
political culture reflected in
parliamentary debates. With the
exception of the post-1903 Serbia,
the state had no tradition in
parliamentarianism: no one was
psychologically prepared for
dialogue, compromise or agreement.
Political parties were many, the
same as nationalistic and mostly
para-military organizations that
were major actors of political
violence. Parliamentarianism was
compromised. This state of mind
culminated on June 20, 1928 when the
People’s Assembly became the scene
of bloodshed. In the midst of the
parliament the Radical Party MP
Puniša Račić shot at Croatian
political representatives. He killed
Pavle Radić and Đuro Basariček, and
badly wounded Ivan Pernar, Ivan
Granđa and Stjepan Radić, the latter
the indisputable Croatian leader who
succumbed several days later. A week
before he died Stjepan Radić signed
the Resolution of the
Farmers-Democratic Coalition - voted
in after a debate in Zagreb –
stressing nations’ political and
statehood singularities and calling
for the annulment of the existing
political system and the
establishment of the one ensuring
equality of all these singularities.
The King unhesitatingly moved from
screened dictatorship to overt
absolutism. Shocked with the
assassination in the parliament, the
public in Croatia was protesting.20
Anyway had Serbs and Croats been at
odds: while the Serbian side was
giving thought to Croatia’s
“amputation,” the Croatian side was
boycotting the People’s Assembly and
seeking to internationalize “the
Croatian question.” With the
assassination of Croatian political
leaders Serbia-Croatia tensions
reached a climax. Violence had been
given a final say rather than
dialogue, compromise or agreement.
Apart from the shock it caused the
effects of the murder were
far-reaching: they deepened mutual
distrust and doubts about
sustainability of the
Serbian-Croatian state, as a modern
and democratic one. As an answer to
the opposition to centralized and
unitary state, dictatorship has
always been latent: masked at first
(1921), it turned into an open one
(1929) and eventually resumed its
mask (1931).
The assassination of Croatian
representatives in the parliament
scarred political relations in the
Kingdom till the outbreak of the
WWII. Shot down Đuro Basariček
(1884–1928) was in the membership of
the Croatian Farmers’ Party from its
very beginning and a MP from 1922
till 1928. He knew full well the
history of Serbia’s statehood and
policies, he wrote about the
progenitor of socialism in Serbia,
Svetozar Marković, and was on
friendly terms with leftist farmers.
At the parliamentary session of
February 26, 1927 he warned about
“dark forces” plotting dictatorship,
and on June 20, 1928 he tried to
stop red-handed Puniša Račić.
Pavle Radić (1886–1928) stepped onto
the political arena together with
his uncle, Stjepan Radić, who had
entrusted him with major tasks in
the party. He was the one to
announce the Croatian Farmers’
Party’s consent to the monarchy
(1925) and its readiness to
participate in the government. He
moved to Belgrade with his wife and
eight children. He was a strong
supporter of a Yugoslav state. If
people like him were to be
assassinated in the highest common
representative body, what could have
been the fate of the state?21
January 6, 1929:
King Alexander’s Overt Absolutism
Dictatorships were not uncommon in
Europe in the aftermath of the WWI
(Poland, Southeast European
countries, etc.). What set apart the
January 6 dictatorship in the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians was the conflict between
two nations – Serbs and Croats – in
the People’s Assembly. Deepened
beyond remedy, let alone marked by
bloodshed, that conflict made the
groundwork of King Alexander’s
Proclamation of the January 6
dictatorship.
For the King, parliamentarianism was
the main reason why intermediaries
between him and the people should be
banned: even the form of
parliamentarianism that was far from
its true meaning, and was just a
screen for his supremacy over other
constitutional factors.
“Instead of strengthening the spirit
of people’s trust and unity of the
state, parliamentarianism, as it is,
begins leading towards
disintegration of the state and
dissociation of its people,” states
the King in the Proclamation. This
“evil” (the evil of
parliamentarianism) cannot be
defeated by “old methods” (elections
and forming governments) on which
“we have already wasted several
years.” “We must search for new
methods and open up new avenues”
instead. In saying this, the King
actually referred to his “sacred
duty” to safeguard “people’s unity
and the state as a whole”
“resolutely” and “by fair means or
foul.”22
Dictatorship imposed new
restrictions on the country’s anyway
underdeveloped political life. All
parties and associations with tribal
insignia were banned. These
attributes were taken off the
country’s very name: on October 3,
1929 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians was renamed the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The press was
placed under strong control.
Liberally-minded politicians were
being arrested. Communists were
subjected to biggest terror: they
were standing political trials, sent
to jail and murdered. However, the
policy of the January 6 regime
brought about neither peace nor
stability. Instead, as historians in
the first Yugoslavia put it, it
opened “new fronts.”
The Kingdom faced the consequences
of the big global depression with
delay. Socially and economically,
the poor country, exhausted in wars,
was in dire straits: more than
400,000 people were on the
breadline. Having to cope with
domestic difficulties and pressures
from abroad, the regime simply had
to search for a way out of the
crisis.
The King tried to safeguard his
overt absolutism by other means. In
a proclamation of March 3, 1931
glorifying the results of the
January 9 regime he stated, “I have
decided to replace the incumbent
policy with the large one of direct
cooperation with people.”23 The
Decretive or September Constitution
(March 3, 1931) that should have
testified of the King’s promise
nothing but screened his absolutism.
The state remained centralized and
unitary, while the King himself
untouchable. The Article 116 of the
Decretive Constitution – also known
as “the small constitution” –
provided that the King “in
emergencies shall have the right to
act beyond constitutional and legal
provisions, and subsequently ask the
People’s Representation to give its
consent to the steps taken.”24 Further
on, the King had the right to,
formally and actually, mobilize
armed troops, the administration and
police forces. And his right to
appoint prime ministers and
ministers decisively shaped the
political scene.
In his inaugural address after the
declaration of the Decretive
Constitution (January 18, 1932),
brimming with despotic
self-confidence, the King claimed,
“At long last, the ethnic truth of
the Yugoslav thought broke through
all the obstacles, artificially
raised for centuries, and in the
final stage of our martyr-like and
bloody national revolution and the
World War culminated in a single and
indivisible Yugoslav kingdom, a
nation-state.” And then he concluded
categorically, “People’s unity and
the wholeness of the state can never
be bargained with, they must always
be more important than everyday life
and all particularistic interests.”25
The opposition promptly decoded this
metaphysics: under-the-table
absolutism.
In November 1932 in Zagreb the
Committee of the Farmers’ Democratic
Coalition adopted a document known
as the Zagreb Points. The document
claimed that the people – actually
farmers – made the foundation of
sovereignty; it condemned Serbia’s
hegemony as destructive; and calling
for reversion of the state of
affairs in 1918, it denied the
predominance of one nation over
others. Not only the Zagreb Points
but the echo they found in
Vojvodina, Slovenia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina testified of the
collapse of the ideology of
“integral yugoslavianism” the
Decretive Constitution could not
have whitewashed.
The regime had to seek new
supporters of the policy of
centralism and integrality. And it
found a supporter in a state-run
party, the Yugoslav Radical Farmers’
Democracy /JRSD/ renamed the
Yugoslav National Party in 1933, the
forerunner of the Yugoslav Radical
Community. Aspiring at overcoming
all regional divisions and extending
his influence on the entire state,
King Alexander backed up this
state-run party, without actual
voters, till the end of his life.
In reaction to the regime’s rigid
centralism and the “integral
yugoslavianism” ideology, separatism
grew stronger in Croatia, Macedonia
and Montenegro, and in Kosovo –
irredentism. The first Ustashi camp
was established in 1931 in Italy; in
1932 the Croatian Revolutionary
Organization declared the
constitution of its own, and in 1933
publicized the Tenets of the Ustashi
Movement: an independent Croatian
state, liberation by revolutionary
means, reversal to the situation in
1918, and the Drina River as the
border between the East and the
West. The paragraph of the Tenets
exemplifying the sum and substance
of the Movement’s ideology ran as
follows, “No one without hereditary
or blood ties with the Croatian
people shall have a say in Croatia’s
public affairs, nor shall any
foreign nation or state decide on
the future of the Croatian nation
and the State of Croatia.”26
The Allied Combatant Labor
Organization (known as Zbor) emerged
in Serbia in 1934-35. Its leader was
the King’s friend, lawyer Dimitrije
Ljotić. Himself an anti-communist
and anti-Semite, Ljotić was
propagating “integral
yugoslavianism” and a corporative
state, while finding his role model
in Germany’s National Socialism.
Hitler’s electoral triumph in
Germany in 1933 was a major factor
King Alexander began counting on.
Neutral on the surface, he was
turning from traditional friendship
with France (the Salonika Front,
Serbian youth educated in France
during the WWI, France as a warrant
of the Versailles Treaty, etc.)
towards Germany on account of
economic compatibility of the two
countries and anti-communist
alliance with Hitler. That trend did
not change even after King
Alexander’s assassination by
Macedonian and Croatian separatists
on October 1934 in Marseille.
Regency: Continuity of Foreign
Policy and of Necessity
Compromise
on Domestic Policy
In his will King Alexander’s
enthroned his cousin, Prince Paul
Karađorđević, the regent in place of
the minor crown prince. Prince Paul
formed the cabinet of Milan
Stojadinović (1935–1939) who
appeared as a modernist unlike King
Alexander who had been seen as a
conservative: backed by the
state-run party, the Yugoslav
Radical Community, the King had been
a forerunner of the policy of rigid
centralism and “integral
yugoslavianism.” At the time of
regency, that policy was also in
clash with the realities: the
already formed nations or those in
process of identity-building were
against the seeming supranational
integration. They were more and more
disappointed in “yugoslavianism” in
no matter what form. Stojadinović’s
attempt to bring about an agreement
between Vatican and the Serbian
Orthodox Church failed. In the
elections in 1938 the governmental
list won a razor-thin majority of
vote.
Prince Paul was concerned that with
Nazi Germany’s assistance the
independence of Slovakia’s could
influence Croatia where aspiration
for autonomy had given birth to a
strong national movement – ignoring
of which threatened with nailing up
to the utmost an entire nation.
Therefore, Prince Paul overthrew the
Milan Stojadinović cabinet and
entrusted the premiership to the
little-known politician, Dragiša
Cvetković, whose main task was to
draw an agreement with Croats.
The agreement between Dragiša
Cvetković and the Croatian political
leader, Vlatko Maček, was reached in
almost no time, but the time for its
implementation was also running out.
It was signed on August 26, 1939,
just a couple of days before the
outbreak of the WWII. The first
autonomous administration within
Yugoslavia, seated in Zagreb, had
been established under the
agreement. The course it would have
taken were it not for the WWII could
only be presumed. But the course it
took in the war and at its end is in
the domain of empirical evidence.
Be it as it may, the Cvetković –
Maček agreement opened the
floodgates to a chain reaction:
Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnian Muslims
were demanding the same autonomy for
themselves. The Serbia-begotten
Cultural Club assembled Serbia’s
intellectual and political elite. It
was helmed by the legal theoretician
and historian, Slobodan Jovanović,
one of the most authoritative
Serbian intellectuals and, later on,
the Prime Minister of the government
in exile. The Club was standing for
a banovina (a region ruled by a ban,
governorship) of “Serbian
territories” (Bosnia, Montenegro and
Macedonia), close to the historical
notion about the “Greater Serbia.”
Historians have concluded
overconfidently that 1939 pulled the
plug on centralism and even that the
majority of Serbs had been in favor
of federalism at the time. However,
as it may turn up later on, the
ideas replaced by other ideas under
the pressure of some circumstances,
had been abandoned just for the sake
of appearance.
The End of the Alleged Neutrality:
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Joins the Triple Alliance and the
Ensuing Coupe d’état
Forced to make concessions in
domestic policy, including the
agreement with Croats made for the
sake of territorial integrity,
Prince Paul, guided by the same
idea, made a foreign policy choice
that put an end to the alleged
neutrality of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. In this he actually
continued the policy of his
predecessor. Though an Anglophile
himself, Prince Paul believed that
the Kingdom’s choice of Berlin could
shield the Yugoslav state from the
war. Hitler, preoccupied with
preparations for the attack against
the USSR, combined tolerance and
pressure in his attitude towards the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. And
eventually, on March 25, 1941 in
Vienna Dragiša Cvetković and
Aleksandar Cincar Marković put their
signatures under the Tripartite
Pact.
On the very same day, the riots
broke out in Belgrade spreading
speedily all over Serbia. Behind the
riots were communists and
anti-Fascist activists, while the
masses in protest, recalling the
WWI, revived their anti-German
feelings. The masses’ ‘no’ to the
alliance with the Reich was evident
in the slogans protesters were
shouting - “Down with the
Government, long live an alliance
with the Soviet Union!” “Better the
grave than a slave!” and “Better the
war and the pact!”
In the night of March 26-27, 1941
Generals of the Air Force Borivoje
Mirković and Dušan Simović carried
out a coup d’état. The King
proclaimed himself of age. General
Dušan Simović was appointed the
Prime Minister, and Vlatko Maček the
Vice-Premier. Both sides reacted at
the coup d’état. The Allies
responded with enthusiasm: for
Winston Churchill the coup d’état
testified that the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia “found its soul.” The
Reich saw it as a brazen challenge
in the midst of its preparations for
the war against the USSR. In his
proclamation to the German nation of
April 6, 1941, Hitler said among
other things, “The Government
(Cvetković – Maček – L.P.) that had
stood for peace with Germany was
ousted on the explicit pretext that
it was necessary because of its
attitude towards Germany…As of this
morning the German people are at war
with the usurpers in Belgrade and at
war against all those forces the
Great Britain found in the Balkans
to turn against peace in Europe.”27
Military Catastrophe
By bombing Belgrade on April 6, 1941
Germans attacked the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia without a declaration of
war. Powerful enemy troops were
storming in from Germany (Austria),
Italy, Hungary, Rumania and
Bulgaria. Having vacillated in its
foreign policy, the Kingdom was left
without allies. Its military was
inferior. It had 600,000 troops
under arms and no modern weapons
(airplanes, mechanized infantry,
heavy artillery, military industry,
etc.). A multitude of
fifth-columnists were spreading
defeatism and disseminating anti-war
propaganda. But the High Command
failed to control the situation from
the very start. Even Hitler was
surprised at the feeble resistance
met with. And the April War was
nothing but a scene of chaos and
breakdown.
Germans marched into Zagreb on April
10, 1941. After Vlatko Maček refused
the premiership under German
protectorate, the Independent State
of Croatia was declared and the
Ustashi brought to power. “People’s
sovereignty” was brutally misused.
The state was ruled by militia,
army, secret police and the system
of concentration camps – there were
twenty of them. The Ustashi
principles for an ethnically pure
state, proclaimed back in 1933,
governed the country. German sources
in mid-1941 warned that the
indifference of the poor strata
would grow into resistance. And in
1942 these sources argued that the
bestiality of the Ustashi regime was
inciting hatred not only among
Eastern Orthodox population (Serbs)
but Croats as well.
Germans marched into Belgrade on
April 13, 1941. In August General
Milan Nedić was appointed the Prime
Minister of the so-called government
of national salvation. His quisling
administration differed from
Petain’s in France. In Serbia,
Germans kept all major levers of
power in their hands. The system of
concentration camps was established
in Serbia too. They were there to do
away with Jews: out of 75,000 Jews
according to the census in 1940,
6,500 survived the war.
Concentration camps were also death
houses for Roma, communists and
anti-fascists.
The “Government of National
Salvation’s” large-scale
communication with Germany rested on
the belief that the victory of the
Reich would make it possible for it
to establish a farmers’ state in
Serbia. And to that end, this
government relied on followers of
Dimitrije Ljotić’s “Zbor” and Kosta
Pećanac’s Chetniks.
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to
exist on April 17, 1941 when its
army, having fought for eleven days,
capitulated. The question of who was
to blame has been being raised ever
since: after the April War Slobodan
Jovanović blamed Croats and so did
General Velimir Terzić after the
WWII. Historians argued that the
defeat of April 1941 was a “military
defeat” rather than that of the
state. In other words, the reasons
behind the collapse of the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia, according to
historians, were not “intrinsic
contradictions” but a “foreign
aggression.” No doubt that in
military terms the powers were
absolutely unequal, but it had been
domestic conflicts that made the
Kingdom into a worn out state: the
state without cohesion that was
badly needed for an organized,
although unequal, resistance.
Revolutionary Workers’ Party:
from
Persecution through Inner Conflicts
to Resistance
to Occupation and
Disintegration of the State
The defeat of the Central Powers,
the October Revolution, the collapse
of the Second International’s
strategy, Bolsheviks’ strategy for a
global revolution and the creation
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians – these were all
historically unprecedented
challenges to social democracy in
Yugoslav countries. Social
democratic parties of Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina initiated
unification of all social democratic
parties in the Kingdom. Leftist
factions of social democratic
parties of Croatia and Slavonia, and
social democratic groups and
organizations in Dalmatia,
Vojvodina, Macedonia and Montenegro
joined the union. The Unification
Congress was held in Belgrade on
April 22-23, 1919: 432 delegates
voted for the establishment of the
Socialist Workers’ Party of
Yugoslavia (Communist) – SRPJ(k).
Everything was in the sign of
commotion and compromise over the
social-democratic strategy for
gradual reforms and parliamentary
struggle, and against “historical
skipping” of developmental stages on
the one hand, and the communist or
bolshevist strategy resting on an
organized and unified party. Known
in Russia’s revolutionary tradition,
the latter model of party, which,
under favorable circumstances such
as a world war, takes power by
storm, was contrary, by definition,
to social democracy. Hence, it was
not that easy for Yugoslavia’s
social democratic parties to make a
U-turn. The main document of the
Unification Congress (Foundations
for Unification) was brimming with
elements of social democracy. At the
same time, however, SRPJ(k) joined
the Third Communist International –
the Comintern – convened in March
1919 in Moscow. The organization,
unique in the history of mankind,
assembled sixty communist parties
from all over the world, and stood
for the headquarters of global
revolution and a major instrument of
the new Soviet state’s policy.
Circumstances were playing into the
hands of the revolutionary trend
within SRPJ(k). The dichotomy of the
party’s program soon proved to be
unsustainable. Anyway, the Comintern
– actually the Soviet Union – was
after destroying social democracy as
an arch enemy of a global revolution
on Russian model.
In the state such as the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was in
the aftermath of the WWI, the
“spirit of the time” spoke for the
revolutionary trend within SRPJ(k).
Frustrated by the heavy loss in
human lives and war destruction, and
disappointed by the post-war chaos,
SRPJ(k) was staging protests that
found an echo among apathetic
masses. Such were the protests
against international intervention
in the Soviet Union and Hungary
(July 21-22, 1919) and the
railroaders’ strike (April 1919)
with participation of 50,000
strikers to which the regime
responded by militarizing the
railroads.
Besides, communists triumphed in the
1920 municipal elections in Croatia,
Slavonia and Dalmatia, and then in
Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia. And
when the communist list won in
Belgrade, the municipal
administration was suspended so as
to prevent communist councilmen from
taking office.
On the eve of its Second Congress
(on June 20-25, 1920 in Vukovar)
SRPJ(k) had 65,000 members. At the
Congress the party was renamed the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia – KPJ.
Although the Congress made a clear
break with social democracy,
differences between the two currents
persisted for a time: till the
Manifest of the Opposition in
October 1920.
Under its new name, the party won
almost 200,000 votes in the
elections for the Constitutional
Assembly thus becoming the third
biggest party in the country, after
the Yugoslav and the People’s
Radical Party.
The regime and King Alexander in
particular saw the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia as a branch office of
bolshevism that had destroyed the
Russian Empire, the pivot of Eastern
Orthodox Slavs and the historical
ally of the Serbian nation. The rise
of Communists following on their
electoral victory that enlarged the
anti-monarchial bloc of federalists
and republicans had to be curbed.
The Decree /Obznana/ banning
communist propaganda, communist
organizations and publications was
issued in December 1920. In response
to “white terror” younger communists
went in for “red terror:”
assassinations of governmental
officials. The Law on the Protection
of Public Security and Order came as
a new link in the chain of violence.
Under the Law, the People’s Assembly
suspended communist MPs: the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia was
outlawed and remained such till late
1941. New circumstances in which it
found itself led to splits over the
party strategy and, hence, two
leaderships: one embodied in the
Deputy Executive Committee seated in
the country, and the other in the
Cross-Border Committee in Vienna.
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia
was facing hard times of fierce
factionalism the many causes of
which have never been thoroughly
explored. Factions threatened the
very survival of the small and weak
party. The Comintern always
intervened in these conflicts: and
always in line with its strategy
that unconditionally obliged every
section, including the CPY, to
discipline regardless of the
realities. The Fifth Congress of the
Comintern (June 1924) adopted the
Resolution on the National Question
in Yugoslavia. In line with the
strategy for a global revolution –
the “class against class” struggle –
the Congress voted for the ouster of
the regime in the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenians and for
peoples’ right to
self-determination, including
secession.
In its Open Letter (May 1928) the
Comintern demanded Yugoslav
communists to put an end to
factions: the CPY is not a “debate
club,” it said, but a revolutionary
party with a mission of going
“deeper in the masses.” The Fourth
Congress of the CPY (Dresden,
September 5, 1928) adopted the Open
Letter with one accord, including
its stance that independent
nation-states should be established
in the territory of the Kingdom
faced with a bourgeois-democratic
revolution.
Even after the January 6
dictatorship was proclaimed, the CPY
– sticking to the Comintern’s stance
about the crisis of capitalism
generating “a new revolutionary
situation” – continued calling for
“an armed struggle and ouster of
absolutism.” The fact that the CPY
all but vanished testifies of how
much its appeal had nothing to do
with the realities: out of 3,000
members in 1928, its membership
spiraled to 300-500 people. Tens of
its members killed, including CPY
Secretary Đuro Đaković, was the
price of the “armed resistance”
policy.
Hitler’s rise to power (1933)
influenced the Comintern’s strategy.
The Seventh Congress of the
Comintern (February-March 1935 with
participation of 500 delegates from
65 countries) shifted its focus on
social-democracy, as an arch enemy
of a global revolution, to fascism.
Ideological “cleansing” –
bolshevization of communist parties
– began in parallel with the policy
of the People’s Front. It was
triggered off by the murder of
Kirov, seen as Stalin’s potential
heir, on January 1, 1934. The brief
ebb after the Seventh Congress was
replaced by a high tide of political
processes from 1936 till 1939.
Moscow processes and the murder of
Trotsky in Mexico (1940) put to
death all of Lenin’s associates. And
then Hitler and Stalin signed a
non-aggression pact. And what was
the effect of these developments on
CPY?
The purges swept away five
secretaries of CPY. The process of
the party’s bolshevization was
completed at the same time.
Historians have ascribed the fact
that the above-mentioned havoc in
the communist movement had left the
latter speechless, to its fanaticism
and preoccupation with the
revolutionary goal and establishment
of a revolutionary organization as
means to attain it. In this context,
“instinctive” revolutionaries
emerging from socioeconomic and
political realities of the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia, for whom the power of
the working class rested on its
revolutionary organization, were new
to CPY, predominantly helmed by
intellectuals – which, according to
usual interpretations, was the
reason behind its factionalism. At
the same time the party was seeking
a new support from abroad. When in
1937 in Vienna he took over “party
duties” unaware – according to the
research of his latest biographers,
Ivo and Slavko Goldštajn – that the
previous secretary of CPY, Milan
Gorkić, had been shot in Moscow,
Josip Broz Tito was already an
experienced pragmatist who had never
sided either with the leftist or
rightist faction, a party and trade
union executive, an inmate of
Lepoglava, Maribor and Ogulin
prisons for five years, and a worker
for the Comintern, where, according
to available sources, he had been
more of an observer than a
decision-maker. And he himself had
been “under observation” while
waiting for long to have his mandate
confirmed. He was not the only one
never to comment on the Moscow
processes: supposedly, he discussed
them only with writer Miroslav
Krleža. But with all of their
“incredible accusations and ever
more incredible confessions” the
Moscow processes are still the
phenomena that not even a historian
can explain. There is no doubt,
however, that Tito finalized the
process of the party’s
bolshevization. Both his writings
and his deeds testify to this. As
for the former, this is probably
best illustrated in the article “For
Bolshevization and Purity of the
Party” he penned for the
“Proletarian” magazine in 1940. And
as for the latter, this was manifest
in the party itself as it was in
wake of the April War in on the eve
of the uprising.
The key dilemma Tito earmarked in
the above-mentioned articles was
about “who fights against whom;”
anyone without clear understanding
of it actually sides with the “other
party.” And the usual phrase about
CPY not being “a debate club but a
revolutionary party.” And, in
summation, “The Party is ready to
smash all the stumbling blocks in
way of its development.”
Sticking to the Comintern strategy,
CPY took all the steps possible: it
transferred the leadership in exile
back to the country, ensured its
financial independence, installed
younger cadres, and began preparing
the defense of the country and its
restoration as a federation. All in
all, the struggle against the
aggressor side by side with USSR
under the slogan “There is No Going
Back!”
Historians have seen CPY as a modern
party.28 But the way they described it
is quite opposite to a modern party
that implies “debate,” which CPY had
to deny for the sake of its
survival. “The Party developed a
strict code of values and conduct
implying ideological commitment,
military readiness for sacrifice and
inter-party solidarity, as well as
Spartan discipline and self-imposed
fanaticism. At the end of the decade
(1930s – L.P.), CPY was
well-regulated, authoritarian party
oriented towards Yugoslav unity.”
The party’s orderliness was a
product of the Russian revolutionary
tradition and an answer to the
question “What is to be done?” –
posed by Russian revolutionaries
from Chernyshevsky, through Tkachov
and Nechayev, to Lenin, as well as
the Comintern as the instrument of
the policy resulting from the
Russian Revolution. It was a
combination of a religious order and
a military organization. A genuine
debate, before and after the
Revolution, was seen as leading
towards uncertainty. As the time
went by, separation of parts from
the whole was gaining significance
from a military-political point of
view rather than ideological: the
ideological sum and substance of
communist parties has never been
questioned. Therefore, the history
had to complete the circle till the
ideological origin, the Soviet
Union, collapsed under the weight of
ideological archaism.
In Conclusion
The history of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenians from 1918 till
1929 and of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia from 1929 till 1941 was a
short one: only twenty-three years.
The idea about unification of South
Slav nations was born in the 19th
century expressing the aspiration of
some for liberation from the Ottoman
Empire and of others’ from the
Habsburg Monarchy. At the beginning
of the WWI the government of the
Kingdom of Serbia proclaimed the
unification its war goal. Soon was
formed the Yugoslav Committee in
London and then the People’s Council
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians
living in the Habsburg Monarchy.
Dissonant views about the type and
form of the state (monarchy or
republic; unitary, centralized state
or federation) emerged during the
war and in its aftermath.
According to the compromise (the
Corfu Declaration) reached in the
wartime, both the type and form of
the state were to be decided by the
two-third majority vote of a
constitutional assembly. However,
King Alexander prejudged the
decision on the type of the state:
on December 1, 1918 he proclaimed a
monarchy ruled by a Serbian king.
And on June 28, 1921 the
Constitutional Assembly voted in the
first constitution, the St. Vitus’s
Day Constitution, by a simple rather
than a two-third majority of vote.
The action sowed the seeds of
discord. Ever since, the two biggest
nations, Serbs and Croats, had been
confronted. Parliamentarianism, as a
way towards reaching mutual
understanding, had no tradition.
Besides, the King turned it into
tokenism: it became “a false
parliamentarianism.”
Serbia’s political and intellectual
elites – inseparable in this context
– believed they were entitled to
hegemony considering Serbia’s heavy
loss in human lives in the WWI. The
Croatian bloc, named “the admiral
ship” of other non-Serbian nations,
demanded autonomy to safeguard
national identity and equal
participation in governance. Having
gone through dramatic stages, the
conflict culminated in the bloodshed
in the parliament on June 20, 1928
when Serbian MPs gunned down their
Croatian counterparts. The shooting
accounted for a state of emergency
and then, on January 6, 1929, for
dictatorship. The Decretive
Constitution of September 1932 just
seemingly abated the dictatorship:
the King was still entitled to make
all the crucial decisions the
people’s representation was
approving subsequently. Actually,
the Decretive or September
Constitution testified that a
country, the peoples of which have
just begun identifying their
interests, cannot be maintained by
force alone, kept on a tight rein by
representatives of the majority
nation. In reaction to dictatorship
separatist movements grew stronger:
VMRO in Macedonia and the Ustashi in
Croatia. They masterminded the
assassination of King Alexander on
October 9, 1934 in Marseille.
Since his eldest
son, Crow Prince Peter, was
underage, King Alexander bequeathed
the throne to his cousin, Prince
Paul Karađorđević.
Even at the time
of King Alexander the Kingdom’s
neutral foreign policy was just
seemingly such. After Hitler’s
election victory in 1933 the Kingdom
was more and more distancing itself
from France, its traditional ally,
and turning towards Germany. To
avoid the scenario of Slovakia’s
independence under the Reich, Prince
Paul opted for the Agreement between
the cabinet of Dragiša Cvetković and
the Croatian political leader, Dr.
Vlatko Maček. Signed only two days
before the outbreak of the WWII the,
Agreement could not have been
implemented. But it caused a chain
reaction: Serbia, Slovenia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina were demanding
the status of regions ruled by bans
(banovine). The Serbian Cultural
Club, established in Serbia,
assembled representatives of
Serbia’s political and cultural
elite. At its helm was theoretician
of law and historian Slobodan
Jovanović, later the Prime Minister
of the Royal Government in exile.
Apart from Serbia, the Club was
after Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Montenegro: the territories
falling under the notion of the
Greater Serbia.
Prime Minister
Milan Stojadinović’s slogan was
“Neither war nor pact.” But the war
was unavoidable without a pact. On
March 25, 1941 the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite
Pact. In response to this “act of
high treason” generals overthrew the
government in the night of March
26-27. Streets in Belgrade and other
towns were swarming with thousands
of people demonstrating their
support to the coup d’état. Furious
because he had to postpone the
attack at the Soviet Union, Hitler
ordered bombardment of Belgrade on
April 6, 1941 without declaration of
war. The April War lasted eleven
days only; Hitler himself was
surprised with the poor resistance
his troops met with. On April 10,
Germans marched into Zagreb. The
Independent State of Croatia was
proclaimed. The Ustashi reign of
terror generated disappointment in
sovereignty looked forward to for so
long. In August 1941 in Serbia,
Milan Nedić, an extreme nationalist,
was appointed the Prime Minister.
The virus of the
October Revolution spread over the
Kingdom too. Communists rose in the
early 1920s. The Communist Party of
Yugoslavia was among the first
communist parties to become a branch
of the Third International. It
followed its “class against class”
and armed resistance to absolutism
strategy till 1935. It was banned
from 1921 till 1941. It this closed
circle it was bolshevized through
elimination of factions and their
promoters. By denying any debate
whatsoever, it grew into a strong
revolutionary organization prepared,
with its membership of 12,000, for
an armed struggle against the
aggressor together with the USSR but
also for establishment of the Soviet
model at home: “there shall be no
way back.” It worked its way up on
this paradigm; but this paradigm
first had to become worn out in its
very origin, the Soviet Union,
before it historically exhausted the
party. But this is the subject
matter other chapters will be
dealing with.
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